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The purpose of this thesis is to present and substantiate a t~eory of counter-
organization targeting. This thesis achieves this objective by creating and testing a 
framework for analysis which blends the principals of organization theory with classic 
counterinsurgency theory. The goal of this framework is to provide an analytical tool for 
operational-level targeting of adversary organizations during war, conflict, and stability 
and support operations. 
This study analyzes the historical precedents of counter-organization targeting to 
demonstrate its viability as a necessary condition for success in counterinsurgency 
campaigns. Additionally, by applying the framework against an unresolved case, this 
study validates its applicability against a broader spectrum of the operational continuum. 
As a result, this thesis offers an innovative framework allowing for a logical and common 
sense approach to observing, assessing, targeting, and interdicting adversary 
organizations. 
Finally, this thesis holds both predictive qualities with respect to understanding an 
organization's future behavior, as well as prescriptive qualities, in the sense of 
systematically attacking and neutralizing the same organization. This thesis also expands 
the concepts offered in U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20, Stability and Support 
Operations, and bridges the gap between the strategic, and the tactical levels of campaign 
planning and execution. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Post Cold War events have shown an emerging and increasing tendency toward 
sub-state conflicts and political violence. As we move to the close of the 20th century, 
there is no indication of these trends diminishing. In all likelihood, future conflict 
scenarios will bear greater similarity to the chaos of Mogadishu, than to the battle space 
characterized by Operation Desert Storm. Potential adversaries in these future scenarios 
will be highly-diverse in terms of their cultural, societal, ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
makeups. One of the few characteristics that will remain constant is the adaptation of 
some form of organizational structure by groups compelled to challenge existing regimes 
or rival factions. 
The purpose of this thesis is to present and substantiate a theory of counter-
organization targeting. Simply stated, our theory argues that the structure of the 
organization will influence its functional methodology, shape its strategic options, and 
delineate its inherent strengths and weaknesses. Forearmed with this knowledge, the 
campaign planner can focus on these structural vulnerabilities to effectively exploit, 
interdict, or neutralize, a hostile organization. We substantiate this theory by creating and 
testing a framework for analysis against both historical and current cases. 
The goal of this framework is to provide an analytical tool for operational-level 
targeting of adversary organizations during war, conflict, and stability and support 
operations. It incorporates independent variables principally derived from concepts of 
ix 
organization theory. These variables, (organizational ideology, organizational 
personality, mission goals, core technology and environment) are further refined by sub-
variables derived from classic counterinsurgency theory. This refinement melds two 
academic disciplines in a manner particularly germane to this study. 
This thesis then analyzes the historical precedents established in previous 
counterinsurgency campaigns (the Huk Rebellion, the Malayan Emergency, and the 
Vietnam War) to validate infrastructure targeting as a necessary condition for success. 
Additionally, the factors of systematic targeting, targeting of appropriate nodes, and 
integration with an overarching campaign, are addressed with respect to their necessity 
and sufficiency in achieving success. Each case is also analyzed utilizing the framework 
to validate its applicability as a counter-organization targeting tool. 
This thesis also applies the analytic framework against an unresolved case (the 
Abu Nidal terrorist organization) to demonstrate its applicability against a broader 
spectrum of the operational continuum. As a result, this thesis offers an innovative 
framework allowing for a logical and common sense approach to observing, assessing, 
targeting, and interdicting adversary organizations. 
Our conclusions address the efficacy of each of the variables presented in our 
analysis, and present relevant hypotheses derived from each. Finally, we show that this 
thesis holds predictive value with respect to understanding an organization's future 
behavior; as well as prescriptive value, in the sense of providing a framework for 
systematically attacking and neutralizing the same organization. This thesis also expands 
X 
the concepts offered in U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20, Stability and Support 
Operations, and bridges the gap between the strategic, and the tactical levels of campaign 






In contrast to former President Bush's vision of a Wilsonian style "new world 
order," in which enlightened democracies cooperate to eliminate conflict, today's world 
adds new meaning to the realists' definition of an anarchical system. We find ourselves 
in the midst of Robert Kaplan's "Coming Anarchy" I and Samuel P. Huntington's "Clash 
of Civilizations."2 This is a world where a ravaged environment forces overpopulated 
nations to migrate toward, or fight for precious natural resources such as water and land 
(witness the manifestations in Rwanda, Liberia, Somalia, Ivory Coast, Brazil, and 
Pakistan); where fragile third world state regimes are forced to retain control over divided 
societies through repression and violence (as in Angola, Haiti, Niger, and Cuba). The 
line between war and crime becomes blurred (the Shining Path in Peru, drug cartels in 
Colombia, warlords in Somalia), while the line between the "haves" and "have nots" is 
more distinct. Among the most disturbing and potentially disastrous scenarios is the 
fracturing of state boundaries along ethnic and religious lines (as we are seeing in the 
Balkans, Iraq, Turkey, and Chechnya). Clearly, we find ourselves on the cusp of a "new 
world disorder" rather than a period of democratic enlightenment. 
lRobert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly, (February 1994), 
pp. 44-76. 
2Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs, (Summer 1993), 
pp. 22-49. 
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With these developments well under way at the end of the 20th century, and no 
indication of the trends diminishing, future conflicts will certainly be characterized by 
more of the same. In all likelihood, conflict environments will bear greater similarity to 
the chaos of Mogadishu then the set piece conventional battles of Operation Desert 
Storm. While emerging scenarios are bound to have characteristics that are superficially 
recognizable and common, the widening array of environments and situations will create 
the paradoxical characteristic of difference. Stripped of Cold War frames of reference, 
the reality of sub-state conflicts will emerge from an array of cultural, religious, 
linguistic, and historical factors, influencing the social anomy and disenfranchisement 
manifested by the onset of political violence and militant anarchy. 
The state, under these circumstances, will find it difficult if not impossible to 
attack these trends. International boundaries will dissolve under the weight of tribal and 
ethnic imperatives and the weakness of traditional governments. In an age where we 
view our concepts of war through a prism of computers and precision-guided weapons, 
the Shaman and the AK-47 will assume significant roles and the warlord, an 
anachronistic specter last seen in prerevolutionary China, will take his place among the 
powerful. 
Despite our overwhelming and natural tendencies to revert to Jeffersonian 
isolationism when exposed to these imbroglios, the overarching impact of vital and 
important U.S. national interests will compel our involvement in many of these emerging 
scenarios. The issue of what constitutes national interest, and hence justifies U.S. 
involvement, remains a topic of vigorous debate. Commentator Michael Mandelbaum 
2 
has argued that the United States should not base its foreign policy on trying to fix these 
seemingly insurmountable problems, but should instead focus on traditional definitions of 
national interest that are more clearly understood and supported by the American public.3 
In contrast, Tony Smith's article "In Defense oflntervention," argues that the United 
States must be a leader in enforcing international norms of behavior with regard to 
democratic principles and human rights.4 
Steven Metz has offered a forward thinking approach to American strategy 
concerning involvement in counterinsurgency that both addresses the evolving nature of 
sub-state conflicts and cautions against reckless involvement. Paramount to his argument 
is the idea that the United States should adopt a rigid selectivity in determining if a 
threatened state is worth the effort our involvement will require. Metz also argues 
"insurgency should be considered simply protracted, organized violence which threatens 
security and requires a government response, whether revolutionary, political or 
nonpolitical, open or clandestine."5 
Regardless of the outcome of the current debate on national interests or the 
relevance of compelling reasons, U.S. involvement and intervention is a certainty, 
whether prompted by humanitarian ideology' protection of vital resources, or by national 
3Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," Foreign Affairs, 
(Jan/Feb1996), pp.28-32. 
4Tony Smith, "In Defense of Intervention," Foreign Affairs, (Jan/Feb 96), pp. 34-46. 
5Steven Metz, Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability, 
(Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA), 1995. 
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security. Falling within the mission parameters described in FM 100-20, Stability and 
Support Operations,6 U.S. forces will often find themselves entering situations 
constrained by both political and military factors. Budget constraints and concerns for 
maintaining existing alliances with third party states will often restrict both the size and 
scope of many U.S. interventions. From an operational perspective, mission parameters 
calling for peace enforcement will require restrictive rules of engagement (ROE's) and 
nonbelligerence in environments rife with multiple warring factions and halfhearted 
compliance with negotiated settlements. 
These types of constraints have already been observed in the U.S. interventions in 
both Bosnia-Hercegovina and Somalia. Politically, both French, and in particular 
Russian concerns weighed heavily on the development of preconditions for U.S. 
intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina. In Somalia, the humanitarian intentions that 
initially prompted U.S. involvement, influenced the decision not to disarm the local 
populace as a force protection measure.? 
Of the few characteristics that will remain constant, among the seemingly infinite 
number of variables and factors present in intrastate conflict scenarios, is the adaptation 
of some form of organizational structure by groups compelled to challenge existing 
regimes or rival factions. It is the countering of these organizations by targeting specific 
6US Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, includes in its definition of MOOTW, a 
myriad of missions which now fall under the parameters as delineated by FM 100-20, 
Stability and Support Operations. 
7While the ROE's in Somalia did permit possession of small arms by the local populace, 
they also allowed use of deadly force against any individual with a crew-served or anti-
armor type weapon. 
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aspects of their structure that is the focal point of this study. This approach is important 
and central to any overarching counterinsurgency campaign plan because it allows for 
both a more judicious use of force and appropriate allocation of assets. Additionally, this 
work advances and expands many of the ideas offered in the new Army Field Manual 
100-20, Stability and Support Operations. This capstone doctrinal manual goes to great 
lengths refining many of the concepts previously covered under the broad concept of 
military operations other than war. 8 
B. THEORY PRESENTATION 
In developing our theory of counter-organization targeting we will focus on 
insurgent warfare and counterinsurgency as a vehicle to demonstrate the veracity and 
validity of the concept. We have selected insurgency because of the generalizability of 
many of its characteristics. Counterinsurgency theory recognizes these characteristics as 
ideology, life-cycle phases, operations, and a variety of signature missions ranging from 
terrorism and clandestine sabotage in the earliest stages of development, to conventional 
warfare and popular revolt in the culminating stages. Insurgency also provides many of 
the worst-case characteristics that can evolve from more benign scenarios; observers of 
the animosity and belligerence that emerged between political factions following the U.S. 
intervention in Haiti can attest to this phenomenon. For the purpose of this study, we 
define insurgency as a struggle by an organized movement or movements against a 
8Missions included under this blanket term which are germane to this study include: 
support for counterinsurgency, security assistance, foreign internal defense, support for 
insurgency, combating terrorism, and others. 
5 
l 
standing government in which the former employs political resources, subversion, and 
armed conflict, to achieve its goals or objectives.9 
The focus of this study addresses only one aspect of a counterinsurgency 
campaign, that of counter-organization targeting, and its relevance as a necessary 
condition for overall success. This study does not however, address the requirements for 
political reform, civic action, psychological operations, security operations, or 
conventional military operations. While these aspects represent probabilistic variables in 
the success of an overarching counterinsurgency campaign, as well as many other 
operations falling under the broad definition of stability and support operations, their 
incorporation into this study would result in a primer on counterinsurgency that would not 
pay adequate attention to any of them. 
Why then develop a theory focusing on countering organizations by targeting their 
structures? Simply stated, our theory argues that the structure of the organization will 
influence its functional methodology, shape its strategic options, and delineate its inherent 
strengths and weaknesses. Forearmed with this knowledge, the campaign planner can 
focus on these structural vulnerabilities to effectively exploit, interdict, or neutralize, a 
hostile covert organization. 
To further refine this theory we offer that embedded within any organization that 
has evolved beyond the point of conspiracy, is a substructure commonly referred to as the 
infrastructure. This infrastructure, comprising leaders, specialists, functionaries, 
9This definition is a composite derived from both Steven Metz's Counterinsurgency: 
Strategy and_the Phoenix of American Capability, and from Army Field Manual 31-20, 
Doctrinejor Special Forces Operations, (1990). 
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technicians, and a vast array of supporting systems, acts much like a central nervous 
system in allowing the organization to function. By reducing the effectiveness of this 
system, we argue the efficiency, hence the overall effectiveness ofthe organization will 
be reduced. We further argue that certain related conditions will influence the ultimate 
outcome of the counter-organization campaign. These conditions, which will be 
addressed in terms of necessity and sufficiency are: The intuitive or systematic nature of 
. the infrastructure targeting plan; targeting of appropriate nodes within the infrastructure; 
and finally, the inclusion of infrastructure targeting in an overarching counter-
organization campaign plan. 
While the significance of the infrastructure has not escaped the notice of experts 
in the field of counterinsurgency, the preponderance of existing literature has examined 
this aspect primarily from a strategic perspective. While not denigrating the significance 
or importance of a strategic perspective on counterinsurgency, this study will focus more 
on the operational or campaign level of analysis. We intend this approach to allow a 
more practical application of theory than is currently employed by U.S. forces conducting 
other than war operations; thus placing into the hands of the practitioners, the necessary 
tools to accomplish the mission. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology we will employ to explain and substantiate this theory is 
multifaceted and presented sequentially. In Chapter II, we will present an analytic 
framework that will allow us to develop a structural representation of an insurgent 
organization. Drawing from organization theory, this framework will apply the principal 
7 
analytic variables of the insurgent organization's ideology, organizational personality, 
mission goals, core technology, and environment (environment being unique as an 
extrinsic intervening variable). Additionally, we will assign subvariables derived from 
counterinsurgency theory to each of the principal variables to refine the characteristics in 
a manner germane to this study. 
Standing alone, this framework will serve as a doctrinal template that will allow 
for characterization of an insurgent organization's structure into one of four pure-case 
developmental models. These models, representing simple, machine, divisional, and 
adhoc/cellular configurations can be applied against the full spectrum of insurgency and 
many other than war scenarios. When placed into practice this doctrinal template, 
prompted by diagnostic questions requiring inductive, deductive, and empirically-based 
responses, will evolve into a situational template. This template will depict the actual 
organizational structure along the continuum represented in our hybrid configuration 
model with respect to the realistic influences of intervening environmental variables 
present in a given case. 
Again applying concepts of organization theory, we will identify the generic 
strengths and weaknesses present in any given structure. We will then focus on the 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities that emerge in the linkages between structural 
components. These linkages are what we term the infrastructure lines of communication 
(ILOC's), and are where vulnerabilities present themselves within the structure. These 
ILOC's serve as avenues and systems for passing supplies, intelligence, armaments, 
personnel, and controlling and coordinating operations. By identifying those ILOC's 
8 
most critical to an organization's ability to function, we maximize targeting effect with 
regard to time constraints, resources, and our own overarching campaign goals. 
In Chapters III through V, we will employ case study methodology using 
historical abstracts (or mini-cases) to show where infrastructure targeting has been an 
effective mechanism for countering insurgent organizations. These historical cases, the 
Hukbalahaps in the Phillippines, the MRLA in the Malayan Emergency, and the Viet 
Cong versus the Phoenix Program in Vietnam, provide a representative group of various 
insurgent scenarios. They also represent a diverse set of ultimate outcomes, insurgency 
goals, environments, political influences, and methodologies.IO 
In each case, we will provide a brief background followed by an analysis 
conducted utilizing our framework. Additionally, we will address ILOC functioning and 
structural characteristics in each organization and compare the theory-derived 
infrastructure vulnerabilities with those actually targeted in each case. Finally, we will 
assess the influence of the related conditions, (intuitive vice systematic, ILOC' s 
appropriately targeted, and integration with campaign strategy) with respect to their roles 
as necessary or sufficient in explaining the case outcome. 
lOWhile recognizing that this case selection may be viewed as somewhat narrow (all post-
1945 Asian insurgencies with varying levels of communist influence), we argue that 
characteristics of these cases are diverse enough to allow for broad generalizations. 
9 
In Chapter VI, we will apply our framework in an analysis of the Abu Nidal 
terrorist organization (ANO) to demonstrate its applicability outside the medium of 
insurgent warfare.11 While the ANO case will not allow for complete evaluation based 
on historical resolution, it does provide a demonstration of our theory and framework in 
practical application on a case in progress. 
In Chapter VII, we will conclude our case study analysis by conducting a 
comparative examination of the overall findings to further validate our theory, process, 
and the necessity and sufficiency of our initial hypotheses. We will also identify the 
critical shortfalls in unsuccessful counterinsurgency campaigns and show where failures 
in both recognizing organization structure and targeting appropriate ILOC's were major 
contributing factors in the ultimate outcomes. 
Having demonstrated the validity of our theory of counter-organization targeting 
in our case studies (as well as its detailed application against a case currently in progress), 
we will attempt to draw some generalizable conclusions from our findings. Further, we 
will discuss shortfalls or weaknesses in the theory and offer possible alternative 
explanations for anomalies. Finally, we will discuss the theory's predictive and 
prescriptive qualities and applicability with regard to counterinsurgency and the broader 
context of Stability and Support Operations. 
11 This case is germane to this study largely because ANO currently functions as an 
independent terrorist organization. In many cases, terrorist cells function as a sub-
structure within an insurgent organization and may warrant detailed attention within the 
overarching analysis. 
10 
II. THEORY DEVELOPMENT, INTEGRATION, AND APPLICATION 
A. COUNTER-ORGANIZATION THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
1. Background 
Organization theory holds that when groups of people come together to 
accomplish a common goal, they form an organization. The organization will form 
distinct patterns of architecture based on a multitude of deterministic variables which will 
result in an organizational structure. How an organization structures itself to accomplish 
its goals is one of the earliest and most critical decisions facing its founders (be they 
corporate or revolutionary). 
The structural perspective of organization theory is rooted in the early twentieth 
century works of Frederick W. Taylor and later in the mid-1940's by Max Weber. Taylor 
is considered "The Father of Scientific Management" and is best-known for his time-in-
motion studies which began in 1911. These studies were designed to analyze every part 
of a factory worker's task in an attempt to identify wasted motions and to show the most 
efficient way of performing a particular task. Weber was a German sociologist and is 
best-known for his theories concerning the rational approach to organizational structure 
and the development and functioning of bureaucracies. 
The works of these early researchers led to the development of the structural 
perspective of organization theory and is based on the following set of assumptions: 12 
12 Adapted from Lee G. Boleman and Terrance E. Deal, Reframing Organizations, 
(Jossey-Bass Inc., San Francisco), 1991, p. 48. This text offers a concise description of 
the development of modem organization structural theory. 
11 
• Organizations exist to accomplish a primary goal. 
• For any organization, a structure can be designed to fit its particular set 
of circumstances. 
• Organizations operate most effectively when environmental turbulence 
(uncertainty) and personal preferences are constrained by norms of 
rationality . 
• Specialization permits higher levels of individual expertise and 
performance. 
• Coordination and control are essential to effectiveness. 
• Organizational problems arise due to inappropriate structure or 
inadequate systems and can be remedied through restructuring. 
Along these lines then, the primary mission goa[ of the organization should be the 
driving force that shapes an organization's ultimate structure. Classic organization theory 
assumes that the organizations in question are associated with business, government, or 
some institution which exists and functions in full view of society. Therefore, the goal is 
usually associated with producing goods or services for consumption or in service to 
society. In the classic model, the technology and means an organization utilizes to 
transform raw materials (inputs) into goods or services (outputs) is termed its core 
techno fogy. 
The primary constraint that works to prevent optimizing the core technology to 
the structure is the environment. The environment is considered the market in which goods 
or services compete in, as well as sources of inputs and any direct competitors or threats. 
The more stable the environment is, the more the core technology can be standardized for 
optimum efficiency. The more unstable or volatile the environment, the more the 
organization must be able to adapt itself to the changing influences. Other factors 
12 
influencing organizational structure in the classic model are size, information tecfmofogg, 
and the nature of tfie worl(jorce.l3 
2. Departure From the Classic Model 
While the classic model of organizational structure theory provides important 
insights and explanatory power about how businesses, bureaucracies, and private 
institutions function and grow, the model is not applicable to the covert organizations we 
are analyzing in this work without significant modification and redefining of operating 
terms. The covert organization (be it terrorist, guerrilla, revolutionary, etc.) operates and 
exists in a secretive underworld which lies beneath the mainstream of society. The 
organization must maintain secrecy (particularly in the early stages) because it is weak in 
comparason to its opponents. While secrecy (along with other operational security 
measures) help ensure survival, its price is decreased organizational efficiency and 
effectiveness. To overcome this liability, new variables must be introduced to function as 
control measures in light of these security requirements. 
The variables that impact on an organization that must rely on secrecy for its very 
survival dramatically alter the formula for effective organizational structure. What is 
considered a structural strength in the classic model suddenly becomes a liability in the 
covert organization. The causal linkage in the classic model holds that the structure of 
an organization is a direct result of the mission goal (purpose, vision, strategy), which in 
tum determines the core technology (tasks; transformation of inputs/raw materials into 
13 For a comprehensive explanation of these factors at work in the classic model, see 
Boleman and Deal, pp. 65-77. These factors, while important, are addressed later as sub-
subvariables of our framework for analysis and will not be elaborated upon here. 
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outputs/products). This process is impacted prior to final structure outcome by the 
intervening variable of the environment (competition, opportunities, threats, etc.) in 
which the organization exists. This causal logic chain is depicted in Figure 2.1. 
!ENVIRONMENT I 
MISSION CORE \ ORGANIZATION 
GOAL TECHNOLOGY STRUCTURE 
Figure 2.1. Classic Model Causal Logic Chain 
In the covert organization, the logic chain is altered with the introduction of two new 
independent variables which directly impact the organization's mission goal: that of 
icfeofogg, and what we term organization personality. While both of these variables also exist 
in a normal organization, rarely do they impact on an organization's mission goal and 
likewise, its ultimate structure, as they do in the covert organization. In normal 
organizations, these variables are often reflected in managerial styles, or sometimes as 
byproducts of the organizational functioning itself. But in covert organizations, we see 
these variables directing and altering mission goals and ultimate organizational structure 
in non-optimizing and even counter-intuitive ways. While these variables (along with the 
other independent variables) will be defined and elaborated upon later, for now their 
relevance lies in the manner in which they alter the causal logic chain for a covert 
organization, as reflected in Figure 2.2 below. 
bDEOLOGY I !ENVIRONMENT I 
MISSION CORE I ORGANIZATION 
GOAL TECHNOLOGY I STRUCTURE 
~ 
ORGANIZATION Figure 2.2. Covert Organization Causal Logic Chain 
PERSONALITY 
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3. Framework for Covert Organization Structural Analysis 
At this point in our theoretical development, we have drawn the independent 
variables of mission goal and core technology, along with the intervening variable of the 
environment from the classic organizational structural model; to these we have added 
two independent variables identified as playing unique roles in the covert organization, 
i.e., ideology and organizational personality. When added together, we not only have a 
causal linkage to explain structural formation, but we also have a list of specific design 
variables that becomes a framework with which we can analyze existing organizations 
and identify specific structural design and functional characteristics. This framework can 
be conceptualized as a grouping of lenses through which we view a particular 
organization; first internally through the design variables the organization itself can 
control (ideology, organization personality, mission goal, and core technology), then 
externally through the intervening design variable (environment) which the organization 
has no direct control (but can influence) over. This framework is depicted by the 
following visual model. 
ENVIRONMENT 
Figure 2.3. Framework for Covert Organization Structural Analysis. 
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Note that in this model, mission goal occupies the center triangle of the pyramid. 
This is not to show primacy of importance between the various design variables. In fact, 
the relative importance of each design variable will change from case to case. This 
merely represents the mission goal as a sort of "lynch-pin" variable around which all the 
other variables rotate. 
4. Structural Design Variables 
As each major structural design variable is identified for the framework, 
important subvariables within each variable appear. The subvariables help to define each 
major variable and put them into the context in which they are used within this study. 
This process focuses the analytical lenses onto a much finer-grained level of analysis and 
supplies a consistent measure for comparison between structural models and cases. 
Because an understanding of the context of each variable, subvariable, and when 
necessary, sub-subvariable is so important to proper structural analysis, each will be 
explained in detail. Similarly, it is also important to understand that many of the 
subvariables and sub-subvariables do, at times, cross-over and become intertwined with 
others to create an infinite number of possible combinations. Bowever, when analyzing 
these variants to determine structure, even the most subtle distinctions must be 
determined, as they can dramatically affect the final product of the analysis. 
a. Ideology 
The ideology of an organization consists of the core system of values and 
beliefs of the founding members on which they based their organization. These core 
beliefs require the member or "believer" to put the values of the ideology before their 
16 
own personal beliefs or needs. These core values and beliefs are transferred to the new 
member through intense training and indoctrination, and are reinforced through loyalty 
checks. 
The subvariables of ideology include societa( pofitica( re[igious, and etfinic-
6asei variations. Societal ideologies can be based either along familial ties or social/class 
lines. Political ideology sub-subvariables are either considered nationalist movements, 
populist movements, activist movements (such as environmental protection groups that 
also utilize terrorism to further their causes), or classic ideologies of the 
Marxist!Leninist/Maoist persuasion (or their offshoots). Religious ideologies are 
classified as either fundamentalist movements (such as Islamic and radical Jewish 
Orthodox movements in the Middle East), cultist/apocalyptic groups, or reformist 
movements. Ethnic-based ideologies are those based either on racial differences, clan 
membership, or tribal affiliation (all widely see from Africa to Eastern Europe). Ideology 
is one variable in which there is much cross-over between subvariables and sub-
subvariables, and many of the distinctions exist within a shade of gray. 
b. Personality 
The organizational personality incorporates those influences that give the 
organization consistent patterns to follow for problem-solving, methods of functioning, 
and planning. The personality provides information about the organization's motfus 
operantfi or operationa[ wtfe, both within itself, and in dealings with its opponents (whether 
they are the regime or other contending covert organizations). The subvariables of 
personality include featfersfiip, maturity, and cu[ture. 
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Leadership refers to the predominant style found among the organization's 
leaders. These can range from a charismatic style (cult of personality), autocratic style, 
authoritarian, or democratic style. In many instances, leadership style will be directly 
related to an ideology subvariable, such as the authoritarian leadership style of a 
patriarchal-based clan or tribe. 
Maturity consists of the sub-subvariables of age and physical size of the 
organization, along with the current phase of its particular life-cycle. For the purposes of 
this study, the life-cycle phases of a covert organization include preparatory (planning 
and-organizing), initial violence (latent/incipient and acts of terror), expansion (guerrilla 
warfare), victorious (open conventional warfare), and consolidation.l4 
The subvariable of culture refers to the level of sophistication of a 
particular people that make up a covert organization. The sub-subvariables include 
agrarian, industrial, and advanced-technological levels of cultural sophistication. This 
concept stretches from the actual physical development of technology present in the 
organization, to the mind-set or paradigm from which the members of an organization 
approach problem-solving. Because of the speed of technological change, many cases 
will be presented with paradoxes in which a high level of technological hardware exists 
within an agrarian culture-based organization. These paradoxes present problems both 
for the organization itself, as well as for those analyzing it for the purpose of dismantling 
it. 
14 For a full explanation of this stage model, see Thomas Perry, "Terror as a Weapon of 
Political Agitation," Internal War-Problems and Approaches, Harry Eckstein, editor, 
(The Free Press of Glencoe, London), pp. 90-95. 
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c. Mission Goal 
Mission goal refers to the organization's ultimate objective and desired 
endstate. It includes what could be termed as the organization's "vision" and the strategy 
adopted for achieving its vision. This goal is in direct relation to the opposing regime and 
requires a change in the present status quo. It should be realized that the organization's 
stated mission goal may be entirely different from its actual mission goal. Also, the 
actual mission goal may be different from what the organization is ultimately willing to 
settle for, given lower levels of success than originally anticipated. These goals may 
actually fluctuate with time and with varying levels of success through time. Correctly 
identifying the covert organization's mission goal is key to not only dismantling the 
organization itself, but also to designing an effective overall counterinsurgency campaign 
as well. 
The subvariables for mission goal exist along a continuum in terms of both 
threat to the regime's power and authority, and in relative control the organization will 
have with a successful outcome (these parameters show a strong positive correlation). In 
ascending order of threat and control we have reformist, ecorwmic!crimina( secessionist, and 
revo[utionary. 
A reformist mission goal calls for a change in the status quo within a 
representative government where one or more groups calls for a greater say in how the 
government is run. A classic example was the fight for more power between various 
factions within the Lebanese government during the Lebanese Civil War which started in 
197 5 and continues to smolder to this day. If the organization faces an authoritarian 
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regime as an opponent, then the reformist task takes on the proportions of a total 
revolution. 
An economic/criminal mission goal is forwarded by an organization that 
desires autonomy from the present government to achieve economic benefits either 
through control of a particular market, or through illegal enterprises. The organization 
does not wish to overthrow the current regime, merely to either co-opt it or threaten it 
enough so as to achieve freedom of maneuver and official constraints. Classic examples 
include the Mafia in the United States, the drug cartels in South America, and the up-and-
coming Russian Mafia in the former Soviet Union (FSU). 
A secessionist mission goal is the result of a group of people wishing to 
break away from the regime in power and forming its own autonomous state. In recent 
years, with the end of the Cold War a wave of secessionist movements raced across 
Eastern Europe and Asia. Examples of ongoing secessionist struggles include the 
Balkans, the war in Chechnya, the Kashmiri revolt in India, and the long-fought Tibetan 
war. 
d. Core Technology 
The core technology of a covert organization can be thought of in terms of 
an industrial metaphor: converting the available raw materials through a standardized 
production process into various outputs or products which will achieve the organizational 
goal. The concept of applying this industrial metaphor to an insurgency is not new, but 
incorporating it into the realm of organizational theory manifesting itself as the core 
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technology of a covert organization is.IS Likewise, the sub-subvariables of this particular 
application are unique and require redefinition. 
The first subvariable, inputs, consists of both ei(ogerwus and etufogerwus 
sources of support. Inputs for a covert organization include raw materials such as food, 
recruits, money, equipment, and weapons. Inputs also can be intangible in the form of 
popular or political support. During the Cold War years, exogenous support was viewed 
as the outside support of a local covert organization by either of the superpowers, or by 
one of their proxies. This exogenous support could range from moral support, through 
open political support in international forums, to tangible support in raw materials or 
military aid. However, with the end of the Cold War, the term exogenous must be 
redefined to include not only outside sponsorship or support, but support garnered from 
propaganda-driven media campaigns in other countries, contributions from the Diaspora 
living abroad, and revenues generated from illegal activities conducted both at home or 
abroad. Conversely, endogenous support for the purposes of this study will include any 
sources that are within the organization's area of influence or span of control. This would 
include raw materials provided by members of the organization, any supplies, personnel, 
or revenue generated or collected by villages or urban areas under control of the 
organization (through recruiting campaigns, quotas, and taxes), or through any inputs 
gained as a result of either covert or overt operations such as raids and ambushes against 
regime targets. 
15 For an in-depth explanation of the theory of insurgency as a production system, see 
Nathan Leites, and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on 
Insurgent Conflicts, (The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA), 1970. 
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The subvariable of proau.ction is defined in terms of descriptive sub-
subvariables representing opposite operating relationships including: concentrated or 
dispersed, simple or complex, rigid or flexible, and efficient or inefficient. The 
production phase is where recruits are transformed into intelligence operatives, terrorists, 
or guerrillas. Production also includes transforming information gathered from various 
sources and turning it into intelligence to be used or exploited against the regime, as well 
as where foodstuffs are converted into rations and distributed, troops are paid, and future 
operations are planned. Perhaps most importantly, the production phase includes 
transforming the decisions made by the leadership along with all types of operational 
information into messages, and is then communicated to all the other structures within the 
organization. 
Concentrated production means that only a single element exists within 
the organization that is responsible for a particular functional area and must distribute its 
support to all parts of the organization from a centralized location. Dispersed production 
means that each operational division within an organization possesses its own elements 
responsible for various functional areas and is not highly dependent on the central 
organization for direct support. 
Production is either simple or complex in relation to both processes and 
final outputs produced. Examples of simple production processes would be the minimal 
military training given to a basic "freedom fighter" or "vanilla guerrilla," which likewise 
are examples of simple outputs. Examples of complex production processes and outputs 
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would be specialized training given to covert intelligence operatives, bomb-making 
instruction given to demolition teams, and terrorist training given to assassination teams. 
Production processes are considered rigid if they cannot adapt quickly to 
change the types of outputs as dictated to different operating conditions or developments, 
either positive or negative. Conversely, production is flexible if it can rapidly change 
either its tempo or outputs to adapt to changing conditions. A flexible production process 
will allow a perceptive covert organization to capitalize on even the smallest gains and 
propel the organization into a new growth period or phase of operations. 
For the purposes of this study, the concept of production efficiency is 
directly proportional to output effectiveness, which is measured in terms of quantity of 
outputs, quality of outputs, or a combination of both, within a given period of time. Thus 
as production efficiency increases, output effectiveness will also increase in either 
quantity (number of guerrillas, number of operations, etc.), quality (higher level of 
training of guerrilla force, operations against more critical targets, etc.), or both (higher 
number of better-trained guerrillas) within a given time frame (per month, quarter, year). 
The final subvariable of core technology is outputs. Outputs are the final 
product of the production phase and include various functionaries such as guerrillas, 
intelligence operatives, terrorists, auxiliary members, or cadre. Outputs also include 
operations such as raids, ambushes, acts of terrorism, publicity or propaganda campaigns, 
or political initiatives. Outputs are considered to be either singular or diversified. 
Singular type outputs would be generic guerrillas who must conduct a wide range of 
operations. In contrast, diversified outputs consist of specialized operatives who conduct 
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a narrow range of operations requiring a higher level of expertise and training. The goal 
of all outputs is to generate new sources of endogenous support, thus making the covert 
organization less dependent on exogenous support. Examples of these positive outputs 
would be a raid in which food or equipment is captured, a propaganda campaign which 
garners new recruits into the organization, or the assassination of a repressive regime 
functionary which gains increased support from the population. Conversely, the 
organization must guard against producing negative outputs that fail to generate more 
inputs. Examples of negative outputs would include raids in which no resources were 
recovered, terrorist acts that punish the population as well as the regime, or the 
assassination of popular public figures that in tum increases the opposition to the 
organization and its movement. 
The concept of the organization's core technology functioning as a 








Figure 2.4. The Production Pump 





The environment is the external context and set of conditions within which 
the covert organization must survive and operate in. The set of environmental 
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subvariables join together to form an intervening variable which acts upon the "pre-
structure" (which was determined by the set of internal structural design variables) and 
twists the final structure away from that which would be ideal for maximum efficiency 
and effectiveness. The environment is ever-changing and highly sensitive to critical 
actions by both the organization and the regime. It is in no way deterministic; on the 
contrary, the environment is a stochastic medim;n in which no mater how closely-held the 
parameters are between similar confrontations or similar cases, the outcomes will still 
vary somewhat randomly. The key is to fully understand the impacts of various 
environmental factors on a covert organizational structure, which will in turn allow the 
counter-organization practitioner to limit the range of variance between actions and 
outcomes. 
Perhaps the best analogy to help comprehend this relationship between 
organization and environment would be that of rifle or pistol marksmanship. The 
marksman knows the distance to his target, the point of aim he must take, the bullet 
trajectory for a given load, and a theoretical point of impact if he holds all of these 
variables constant from shot to shot. Yet the slightest breeze, temperature change, or 
change in barometric pressure or even light conditions can change the point of impact. 
The objective of the marksman is not to put each successive bullet into the same hole as 
the first, but to make the smallest overall cluster around that first shot. Only through 
knowledge of the effects of the environment can the variance be held within predictable 
limits. In a similar fashion, the counter-organization practitioner must target the covert 
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organization with a tight cluster of actions which will cause a series of responses that are 
somewhat predictable. 
In an effort to simplify the variable of environment, the sub-variables 
reflect current military doctrinal terms while the sub-subvariables reflect terms from both 
military doctrine and organizational theory terminology. The environment is therefore 
divided into strategic, operationa( and tactica[ subvariables. The strategic environment of 
the covert organization refers to how the organization and the movement it represents 
interacts with the regime, the population, and ~my other opposition groups involved in 
terms of political relationships, social implications, and the nature of the problem facing 
the organization. The operational environment refers directly to forces which either 
facilitate or hamper freedom of maneuver and the conduct of military or political 
operations. The tactical environment refers to specific factors that will determine where, 
when, and how a covert organization will both function and conduct operations. 
The strategic environment is either stable or dynamic based on the 
perceived level of uncertainty at work outside the organization. A high degree of 
uncertainty (a direct product of a lack of information, intelligence, and feedback) leads to 
an extremely dynamic environment. As more information is acquired, stability increases. 
The strategic environment is either simple or complex, depending on the scope and the 
nature of the problem confronting the organization. This can be measured in terms of the 
number and quality of opponents, social issues at work, and political implications of the 
organization's actions both during and after hostilities. Finally, the strategic 
environment includes the level of popular support for both the covert organization and the 
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regime. For both, the population is either supportive, indifferent, or opposed. In these 
terms, the covert organization may realize a definite advantage. If a small but equal 
percentage of the population is both supportive or opposed to the covert organization, 
while the majority is indifferent, then the organization can retain freedom of maneuver 
within the sea of indifference. But on the other hand, if the regime faces the same 
situation posed by this distribution, then it is facing a majority of those who are not 
considered supportive of the regime. This is not a good situation for the regime, which 
typically is fighting to maintain and demonstrate its legitimacy through "hearts and 
minds" programs. Thus, government forces cannot be guaranteed the same freedom of 
maneuver as that supported by the indifference shown to the covert organization. 
The operational environment is a reflection of the hostility directed against . 
the covert organization and is measured in terms of freedom of maneuver the organization 
has to carry on functional and military operations on a daily basis. Thus the environment 
is permissive if the covert organization enjoys complete control and freedom of 
maneuver while maintaining minimal security measures within a given area. The 
environment is semi-permissive if the covert organization is in contention for control of a 
given area and has a moderate level of freedom of maneuver to carry out operations with 
a heightened level of security measures. The environment is non-permissive if the covert 
organization is attempting to operate in a given area which is under the complete control 
of the regime and operations are conducted only at great risk to the organization while 
enforcing maximum security measures. 
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The tactical environment consists of the sub-subvariables of cover, 
resources, and targets. Cover refers to the quality and conduciveness of the physical 
terrain to provide protection and concealment from which the covert organization can 
survive, function, and operate from. Good cover would provide rugged terrain that is 
inaccessible to regime forces without considerable effort and early warning. Examples 
would be dense forest, jungle, or mountainous terrain. However, with the urban sprawl 
associated with today's largest cities, certain sections of a city such as an old quarter or 
slum area may provide equally good cover to an urban-based covert organization. 
Resources refers to the availability of sources of natural and man-made resources within a 
covert organization's area of influence. Resources include water, food sources, and 
populations from which to garner support, recruits, and revenue. Targets refers to the 
availability, criticality, and accessibility of regime controlled or contested targets within a 
covert organization's area of operations. These three sub-subvariables are all 
interdependent and the covert organization must find the best mix that provides sufficient 
levels of all three. If any particular sub-subvariable is lacking, then the organization is 
put at increased risk as it must extend itself to compensate for the imbalance and is thus 
left vulnerable. An example would be a covert organization which enjoys good cover in a 
remote mountain region and has good resources from nearby streams and villages, but 
because of its remote location, action units must travel long distances over open terrain to 
reach concentrated urban areas to find a high density of regime targets. 
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Thus with all the major structural design variables, subvariables, and sub-
subvariables defined, we have developed the framework with which to analyze the 
structure of covert organizations. These variables are summarized in Table 2.1. 
IDEOLOGY 
Societal (familial, class) 
Political (nationalist, populist, activist, Marxist/Leninist/Maoist) 
Religious (fundamentalist, cultist, reformist) 
Ethnic (racial, clan, tribe) 
PERSONALITY 
Leadership (charismatic, democratic, autocratic, authoritarian) 
Maturity (age, size, phase in life-cycle) 





Revolutionary (restorational, reactionary) 
CORE TECHNOLOGY 
Inputs (endogenous/exogenous) 
Production (concentrated/dispersed; simple/complex; efficient/inefficient; rigid/flexible) 
Outputs (singular/diversified) 
ENVIRONMENT 
Strategic (stable/dynamic; simple/complex; population: supportive/ indifferent/opposed) 
Operational (hostility: permissive/semi-permissive/non-permissive) 
Tactical (cover, resources, targets) 
Table 2.1. Structural Design Variables 
In the next section, we will integrate this framework for analysis with an organizational 
doctrinal template to develop pure-case organizational models which can then be 
situationalized to depict a specific covert organization. 
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B. THEORY INTEGRATION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
DOCTRINAL, PURE -CASE, AND HYBRID MODELS 
1. Development of the Doctrinal Template Model 
a. Mintzberg's Conventional Doctrinal Model 
Once an organization is conceived and shaped by the principal structural design 
variables, it begins to take on a form composed of its functional parts. A pioneering 
researcher in the academic discipline of organizational theory, Dr. Henry Mintzberg, has 
developed graphically-depicted models to represent the functioning parts of an 
organization and the various forms an organization can assume based on conventional 
design parameters.l6 In Mintzberg's conventional doctrinal model, an organization has 
five basic functional parts: the strategic apex, middle line, operating core, 
technostructure, and support staff His visual model of how these basic parts fit together 
is depicted in Figure 2.5. 
Strategic Apex 
Technostructure r Support Staff 
Middle Line 
Operating Core 
Figure 2.5. Mintzberg's Basic Model of the Organization 
(Henry Mintzberg, Structure in :Fives, 1993, p. 11) 
16 The theoretical structural models, operant terms, and functional concepts for 
conventional organizations adapted to our models, terms, and functional concepts for 
covert organizations are based on those developed by Dr. Mintzberg in his book, 
Structure in Fives, (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ), 1993. 
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In Mintzberg's organization, the strategic apex houses the executives who 
are chiefly responsible for ensuring that the organization fulfills its mission goals by 
supervising those managers under them, and by planning, developing, and implementing 
future strategy to ensure continued success. The middle line joins the strategic apex to 
the operating core, and houses those middle managers charged with managing operations 
and supervising production. The middle-line managers extend the formal authority of the 
strategic apex to ensure that the mission gets accomplished. The operating core consists 
of those personnel who actually perform the basic work of the organization or provide the 
services offered by the organization. The technostructure houses those analysts and 
specialists charged with standardizing the production process. These analysts plan and 
modify the work flow, as well as train those personnel who are in the work flow. 
Personnel analysts, such as recruiters and trainers, are also housed in the technostructure. 
The support staff consists of specialized functional units that support the rest of the 
organization in fulfilling the mission goal. Examples in a contemporary organization 
range from legal and payroll departments, to security, cafeteria, and janitorial services. 
The personnel in the support staff are not considered part of the operating core or any 
other substructure. 
b. Covert Organization Doctrinal Model 
While Mintz berg's doctrinal model is applicable to conventional 
organizations, it is not applicable to covert organizations without some modification. The 
first modification is to add several essential substructures. The first addition is the overt 
pofitica[ wing. 
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The overt political wing may not manifest itself during the early stages of 
a covert organization's life cycle, but as the organization becomes successful in its fight 
against the regime, it has an increasing need to gain legitimacy. From the viewpoint of 
the population as well as the world state system, the true mark of legitimacy stems from 
open political representation. As the organization becomes more of a contender for 
power against the regime, the more conventional in operation it must become. Thus the 
formation of an overt political wing becomes a necessary condition for ultimate success. 
The second additional substructure in the covert organization doctrinal 
model is the infrastructure. The infrastructure is not a stand-alone substructure per se; the 
infrastructure is in fact embedded within the structure of the organization. The 
infrastructure encompasses some substructures entirely, while merely running through a 
small portion of other substructures. The scope and depth of infrastructure embeddedness 
will also vary from case to case, as well as through time within the same organization. 
The infrastructure consists of those people, mechanisms, and sub-substructures within the 
organization that performs command, control, communications, intelligence, or logistical 
support functions. The conduits between substructures through which these functions 
flow, we term as infrastructure fines of communication {fLOC's). 
The final process necessary to transform the conventional doctrinal model 
into a covert organization doctrinal template model is to delineate (in insurgent terms) 
who will be found within each substructure. The strategic apex incorporates the 
leadership and core cadre of the covert organization. The middle line houses the mid-
level leadership and functional managers of various action arms. The operating core 
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houses all the operators; the guerrillas, terrorists, underground security and intelligence 
operators, and any other functionary that interacts with the regime or the population. The 
technostructure houses all the specialists, functionaries, recruiters, propagandists, and 
training cadre responsible for the standardization of the operating core, their outputs, and 
for monitoring progress and planning future operations. The support structure consists of 
both full time personnel concerned with the support of all organizational functions, as 
well as part-time support personnel known as the au~[iargwho provide logistical support, 
transportation, and security for the covert organization, usually in support of on-going 
tactical operations. The political wing, once formed, may include ,members of the 
strategic apex and is often an offshoot of the shadow government that served as a de facto 
regime in "liberated" or guerrilla-controlled areas. The political wing often claims no ties 
to military or terrorist functions within the organization, but this is primarily a public 
ploy to gain legitimacy and a method of gaining plausible deniability in dealings with the 
regime. However, in the majority of cases, there is a substantial ILOC connecting the 
political wing with the rest of the organization. Finally, as stated earlier, the 
infrastructure can incorporate entire substructures, or just certain key individuals within a 
specific substructure. In most cases, the infrastructure includes the strategic apex, 
technostructure, overt political wing, and the middle line in toto. The infrastructure will 
have ties to the operating core (such as guerrilla formation commanders, terrorist cell 
leaders, etc.) as well as the support structure (auxiliary liaisons, procurement 
functionaries, support coordinators, etc.). Thus a graphic representation of our adapted 
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Figure 2.6. Covert Organization Doctrinal Template Model 
2. Development of the Pure-Case Doctrinal Models 
a. Conventional Pure-Case Doctrinal Models 
Again referring to Dr. Mintzberg's research, Mintzberg developed five 
pure-case organizational structure models by "plugging in" various design parameters, 
situational factors, and mission goals. These models were based on " ... a theoretically 
consistent combination of the situational and design parameters." 17 These models serve 
as boundaries for structural development and represent not only different types of 
organizations, but also different stages of development within an organization's life-
cycle. Mintz berg's five models are the simpfe structure, the madiine 6ureaucracy, the 
aivisionalizetf fonn, the professiona{ 6ureaucracy, and the atffwcracy. The characteristics, 
functioning, and behavior of these five types of organizations is the subject of Dr. 
Mintz berg's lengthy book, and a restatement of that information would prove to be both 
17 Mintzberg, p. 156. 
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lengthy and redundant. In summarty, from these five pure-case models, we have adapted 
aspects from four of them that appear to apply to covert organizations as well. We will 
now take Mintzberg' s basic building blocks and from them construct four covert 
organization pure-case doctrinal models. 
b. Covert Organization Pure-Case Doctrinal Models 
By applying the five covert organization design variables to Mintzberg' s 
pure-case doctrinal models, we were able to adapt their aspects into four pure-case 
doctrinal models. The four structural models we have identified are the simpfe covert 
organization, the machine-fiR!- covert organization, the aivisiona{ covert organization, and the 
adfwc/ce{{ufar covert organization. We will now describe each of these pure-case models in 
general terms of design variables and substructure composition and function. 
The simpfe covert organization is usually founded on a socio-political 
ideology, but may be found at the birth of any ideology or organization. The organization 
personality demonstrates charismatic or authoritarian-style leadership. The organization 
is usually very young and very small. Usually this group of true believers forms the core 
cadre of a larger organization if it survives long enough to grow. This organization can 
be found in any culture, and is the easiest form to assume during the initial phase. It can 
also assume any mission goal. Its core technology is highly dependent on exogenous 
support; its production is concentrated, inefficient, simple and initially rigid. Outputs are 
usually singular (of the 'vanilla guerrilla' persuasion). The strategic environment is very 
dynamic but at this point simple; the problem facing the organization appears 
straightforward. The population is largely indifferent because the organization is so 
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small. Because it is so small, it is highly vulnerable, thus the operational environment is 
considered either semi- or non-permissible. The tactical environment requires good cover 
for protection, but at this early stage resources may be minimal. Due to the remoteness of 
its location, targets may be accessible but are largely non-critical to the regime (such as 
security outposts). Substructures consist of a strategic apex and an operating core. The 
leadership and core cadre are in the apex, while the operators (guerrilla fighters or 
terrorists) are located in the core. Because of the early stage of development, cadre from 
the apex may double as leaders in the operating core. Because of the multi-tasked role of 
the strategic apex, it is considered the key part of the organization. The structure of this 
organization is graphically portrayed in Figure 2. 7. 
OPERATING 
CORE 
Figure 2.7. Simple Covert Organization Pure-Case Doctrinal Model 
The Machine-Like Covert Organization is also most-observed with a 
socio-political mixed ideology. It is the next evolutionary developmental stage in the 
simple organization's growth if it is successful. The organizational personality is 
authoritarian or moving towards autocratic leadership and is less dependent on a 
charismatic leader. The organization is in an expansion phase and has extended its span 
of control over a particular area or region. It is normally seen in agrarian or industrial-
based cultures. This structure lends itself to secessionist or revolutionary mission goals. 
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The core technology is less dependent on exogenous sources of support, as local sources 
are developed or acquired. Production is still concentrated, simple, and rigid, but 
efficiency is increasing as the processes and outputs become more standardized. Outputs 
are expanding and beginning to get more specialized and diversified. The strategic 
environment is stabilizing; the problem is still relatively simple, while the population 
remains indifferent but is moving towards supportive. As the organization expands its 
areas of influence and control, the operational environment moves towards semi-
permissive. The tactical environment retains good cover for the organization's larger 
size, while adequate resources are available and accessibility to more critical targets 
increases. 
The addition of a technostructure acts to standardize production processes 
which in turn increases efficiency and overall organizational effectiveness. The 
expansion of a middle line of leaders and managers decreases the double-tasking burden 
on the strategic apex, while the development of a support staff increases the level of 
essential, but non-critical support to the entire organization. Because of the importance 
of the increased standardization and production efficiency to the organization's continued 
success, the techno-structure and production middle-line functionaries are considered key 
parts of this organizational structure. The structure of this organization is graphically 












Figure 2.8. Machine-Like Covert Organization Pure-Case Doctrinal Model 
The aivisiona[ covert organization is the next developmental growth phase of 
the machine-like covert organization if success is continued and the span of the 
organization's control is entering new regions previously controlled only by the regime. 
The ideology is basically unchanged. Leadership has developed along autocratic lines 
because the organization has been forced to decentralize authority due to time and 
distance constraints forced by expansion. The organization is well-established, is an open 
known competitor of the regime, and is primarily found in industrial-based cultures. The 
mission goal may be revolutionary or purely economic/criminal in nature. The core 
technology has evolved to the point where each regional division is responsible for 
providing its own endogenous sources of support. Each division may receive some 
exogenous support from th.e headquarters element in the form of funding. Production 
assets are reproduced and dispersed among the various divisions. Production efficiency 
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will reach its maximum in this type of structure, even though the production process is 
becoming more complex. 
Because of its assembly-line style of production, it still remains rigid to rapid 
fluctuation or change in the nature of the problem or the environment. Outputs have 
become very specialized and diversified. The strategic environment is considered 
relatively stable and still simple within each division. Popular support is steadily 
increasing, and the operational environment ranges from semi-permissive in some 
regions, to permissive in areas where the organization has now become the de facto 
regime. At this point, cover has become an indifferent factor of the tactical environment. 
Resources are considered extensive, and there are many critical targets dispersed over a 
large area. Barring third-party intervention or a change in the regime's approach, this 
organization at this point of time should prove triumphant. The structure of this 






Figure 2.9. Divisional Covert Organization Model 
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SUPPORT cf ..._sT_A_F_F_~ 
The acffwc/ce[[u[ar covert or;ganization is actually a combination hybrid 
structure that we are treating as a pure-case model, as it has become a more common 
structure among covert organizations during this post-modern era (even though its 
conceptual beginnings and first usage can be traced back to pre-industrial period partisan 
warfare). The innovations and increasing capabilities of modern technology afforded 
covert organizations the opportunity to develop sophisticated structures and operating 
techniques. Concurrently, modern regimes developed equally sophisticated technologies 
to counter these developments. Ironically, covert organizations have learned that one 
way to counter modern regimes' technological advantages is to adapt a structure that is 
decidedly "low-tech," yet still considered sophisticated, such as the adhoc/cellular 
structure. 
The adhoc/cellular structure is most commonly seen in covert 
organizations with ethnic or religious ideologies, however it is also conducive to social or 
political ideologies as well. The adhoc nature of the organization encourages either 
autocratic or democratic leadership styles. This structure is most often seen in young, 
small, and mid-sized organizations in their preparatory, initial violence, or on the cusp of 
their expansion phase. It can be found within any culture, and serves reformist or 
revolutionary mission goals best. This organization's core technology relies on each cell 
providing its own endogenous support, yet it is dependent on the overall organization for 
exogenous operational support. Its production is dispersed, yet inefficient; extremely 
complex, yet highly flexible to changes. Its outputs are very diversified with personnel 
outputs displaying a high level of specialization in many cases. The strategic 
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environment in which the adhoc/cellular covert organization functions in is extremely 
dynamic and complex. The population could display any level of support. The 
operational environment is generally non-permissive. The tactical environment typically 
consists of poor cover, limited resources, but a dense concentration of critical but well-
defended regime targets. While this environment may sound somewhat contradictory or 
unrealistic, this description fits almost any urban area around the world. 
The substructural components of the adhoc/cellular covert organization 
combine the elements of the strategic apex, middle line, technostructure, and support staff 
under a sort of adhoc umbrella structure. This adhoc structure may be temporary and 
only come together to plan and coordinate periodically (such as the General Council that 
provided guidance for the Palestinian intifada from 1987 to 1992), or it may be a 
permanent structure that acts as a centrallzed umbrella organization over its various cells 
(such as the PLO in the 1970's and 80's). The cells are self-contained units that may be 
general purpose or specialized by function. They can range in size from very small to 
large (intel cell v. guerrilla cell). 
While this structure sounds like an atomized collection of non-integrated, 
autonomous action cells just following their own course, when overlaid with a lateral-
coordinating mechanism (such as a matrix), a regional, functional, or operational division 
becomes visible. This matrix may be activated only during the conduct of tactical 
operations, after which time the organization reverts back into atomized cells. This 
makes the adhoc/cellular organization perhaps the hardest structure to locate, exploit, or 













Figure 2.10. Adhoc/Cellular Covert Organization Pure-Case Doctrinal Model 
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With the four covert organization pure-case doctrinal models complete, we 
can now summarize their design variable characteristics below in Table 2.2. 




IDEOLOGY socio-political socio-political socio-political ethnic/religious 
PERSONALITY charismatic authoritarian autocratic; well- autocratic or 
authoritarian autocratic; established; large; democratic; young; 
young; small; established w/in open small to 
early phase; one area; competitor; mid-sized; early to 
any culture expansion phase; industrial; expansion phase; 
agrarian/ind. any culture; 
MISSION GOAL found in all secessionist; revolutionary revolutionary 
revolutionary economic/criminal or reformist 
CORE 
TECHNOLOGY 
Inputs highly less dependent on each division endogenous within 
dependent on exogenous; provides cell; dependent on 
exogenous developing own endogenous; org. for exogenous 
support. sources of endog. receives some operational spt. 
exogenous from HQ 
Production concentrated concentrated; dispersed; efficient; dispersed; 
inefficient; incr .efficiency; complex/rigid inefficient; 
simple; rigid simple; rigid complex; flexible 
Outputs singular expanding diversified diversified 
ENVIRONMENT 
Strategic dynamic; simple; stabilizing; simple; stable; rei. simple; dynamic; complex; 
pop: indifferent pop: indifferent pop:incr.spt. pop: any level 
Operational non-/semi- semi-permissive semi-/permissive generally non-
permissive permissive 
Tactical good cover; good cover; indifferent poor cover; limited 
minimal adequate cover; extensive resources; targets 
resources; resources; incr. resources; many dense but hard 
accessible but accessibility to targets over a large (urban) 
non- critical tgts. critical targets area 
KEY PART OF strategic apex technostructure mid-line strategic apex & 
ORG. and production functionaries support staff 
& division apexes 
Table 2.2. Summary of Covert Organization Pure-Case Doctrinal Model Design Variables 
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3. Development of Hybrid Covert Organization Structural Models 
As Mintzberg noted in his study of conventional organization structure, in actual 
practice, some organizations come very close to the pure-case models, while in other 
cases they do not. Pure-case models are not meant to be interpreted as being mutually 
exclusive, but should instead be considered as an integrated theory " ... to guide us in 
trying to understand and design complex real-world organizations."18 So too, our theory 
and set of pure-case covert organization models should be utilized as the basis for 
understanding and describing (for the purpose of dismantling, rather than designing) 
structural hybrids that present a more accurate "snapshot" of covert organization 
structural reality. For the purpose of this study, the term liy6ria refers to an organizational 
structure that exhibits characteristics of more than one of the pure-case models. This may 
manifest in a combined overall structure, or in some cases where certain forces may favor 
different structures in different places, as a structure with hybrid substructures. 
The causes of structural hybridization are varied. A covert organization may form 
a aysfunctiona{hybrid due to the dominant influence of one of the intrinsic design 
parameters, such as personality or ideology. For example, while it may be more efficient 
for expanding covert organizations to move from a simple to a machine-like structure, 
because of societal, cultural, and ethnic influences, many of the tribal or clan-based 
organizations we currently observe operating in Sub-Saharan Africa (such as Somalia, 
Liberia, and Rwanda) retain a simple structure (or aspects thereof). Because of this, the 
18 Mintzberg, p. 291. 
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organizations are limited in growth and operant inefficiently, thus preventing one from 
achieving dominance without the complete destruction of its rivals. 
Covert organizations may form functiomzl hybrids as a response to multiple or 
contradictory extrinsic design parameters, such as our environmental sub-subvariables of 
permissiveness, complexity, and stability. For example, while a very dynamic strategic 
environment would tend to centralize structure and push it towards a simple design, the 
extreme complexity and low level of permissiveness presented by an urban tactical 
environment would push structure towards an adhoc/cellular design to deal with the 
extreme need for operational security. This set of factors would push the organization to 
form a simple-adhoc/cellular structural hybrid. In a similar fashion, an overall machine-
like organizational structure may have hybrids within its various substructures, such as an 
adhoc strategic apex made up of an elected central committee combined with more 
permanent "party" leadership. This arrangement was commonly encountered in 
communist ideology-based covert organizations, and has more recently been seen at work 
within certain Islamic fundamentalist organizations. 
An organization may also form a structural hybrid as a natural development 
within its own life cycle. This metamorphosis represents a transition phase in the 
organization and is based on recent setbacks or successes. As a machine-like 
organization that is dominant within a specific region of a country achieves success 
against the regime, it will seek to expand its span of control into other regions. This 
initial exploration may consist of a foray by a core cadre (in the form of a simple 
organizational structure) into a new region. 
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As their proselytizing efforts achieve success and the organizational influence expands its 
control over the region, the overall organization takes on structural and functional 
characteristics of a divisional structure. This process is repeated until the organization is 
ready to confront the regime in open conventional warfare. At this point, the 
organization is operating as a large divisional organization (complete with overt political 
wing) and is acting as the de facto regime within the regions it controls. The dynamic 
nature of this "pulling and hauling" between the influences of the structural design 
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Figure 2.11. Hybrid Configuration Model 
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C. ILOC FUNCTIONING AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Now that we have identified the four covert organization pure-case doctrinal 
models, we will delineate ILOC pathways and identify key structural strengths and 
weaknesses within each pure-case model. Further, based upon these findings, we will 
suggest generic action plans for interdicting these pathways and exploiting their 
weaknesses on a macro-level. 
1. ILOC Pathways and Infrastructure Functioning 
To facilitate our effort to delineate ILOC pathways within a covert organization, we 
will again turn to Mintzberg's outline of five views held throughout the discipline of 
organizational theory that utilize different flows to describe the functioning of conventional 
organizations.l9 Various theorists have provided five different views to describe the functioning 
of conventional organizations. Taken separately, each view describes how certain types of 
information or work is transmitted or performed within a given organization. While none of the 
views gives a complete picture by itself, when combined together, certain patterns are clearly 
evident. These five views are the ffow of forma{ autfwrity, ffow of aecision maf(jng, wort( consteffations, 
the ffows of reguf.atea activity, and the ffow of informa{ communication. 
While each of these views was developed with the conventional business or 
manufacturing organization in mind, their basic concepts can still be adapted and utilized to 
describe the functioning of the covert organization's infrastructure. Each one of these flows or 
relationships is reflected or incorporated within the concept of the ILOC. The one common 
19 Mintzberg, pp. 19-23. 
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denominator between each of these views is that a message of some sort must be transmitted 
from a sender to a receiver, and communication takes place. 
Within the covert organization, the conduit for all of these forms of communication is 
the ILOC. By tracing these ILOC's to points that overlap or intersect within a certain structure 
or substructure, we can then identify critical nodes of communication. Once these nodes are 
analyzed for vulnerability, then they can be targeted for elimination, thus creating a break in a 
vital communications link and reducing organizational efficiency and effectiveness. Each of 
.these five functions will be detailed separately, but let us first start with a "fleshed-out" covert 
organization doctrinal template to use as an example in describing each function. As we add a 
function, the delineation of specific ILOC' s and critical nodes will become clear. Our 
hypothetical covert organization displays a machine-like structure with a budding overt political 
wing. It is in the expansion phase, but is only strong in one region. It has concentrated 
production, but produces diversified outputs. The structure is visible in Figure 2.12. 
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Figure 2.12. Functional Components of Example Covert Organization 
a. Flow of Formal Authority 
The flow of formal authority refers to the flow of official decision-making 
power within the organization. In military-like organizations, these command channels 
are very formalized and well-defined. This flow will help to identify the power and 
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information brokers within the covert organization. The diagram in Figure 2.13 indicates 
that the flow of formal authority in our hypothetical case is fairly rigid along military 
lines. 
Figure 2.13. The Covert Organization Flow of Formal Authority 
b. Flow of Decision Making 
The next Function we will look at is the flow of decision making. In the 
covert organization, secrecy and security are of the utmost of priority. It is not surprising 
that in a militaristic-style organization, the flow of decision making tends to be extremely 
vertical and in one direction (down). 
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Figure 2.14. The Flow of Decision Making 
In Figure 2.14, we see a decision to carry out a series of terrorist acts being 
disseminated to a number of different functionaries. The political wing will need to 
prepare a public statement and prepare to handle the regime's public reaction. The 
support staff must coordinate auxiliary support for transportation, information, and 
security. The technical division staff must provide intelligence on possible targets. The 
military operations staff must begin planning. The decision must finally filter down 
through command channels to the terrorist cell that will actually perform the mission. 
From this example, we see that even though security and compartmentation of 
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information is always necessary, many more people know about the decision besides the 
senior leaders who decided to authorize the missions, and the operators who will actually 
perform the missions. 
c. System of Regulated Work Flows 
The next view looks at the system of regulated work flows occurring 
within the organization on a daily basis. This system includes such flows as information 
from the support structures on efficiency and productivity necessary for strategic 
planning, feedback from the middle line on current operations or any problems arising, 
the flow of work through the operating core focusing on the production phase from 
beginning to end, and the flow of commands and decisions from the apex that direct the 
efforts of the operating core. Figure 2.15 is a view of the system of regulated work flows 
within our example organization. Here we see information being fed from the support 
structures into the middle line and up into the strategic apex. There the information is 
utilized in the decision making process and is then passed down through the middle line 
to be executed by the operating core. There, a certain amount of work flow is passed 
laterally from each section of the operating core (in the form of coordinated operations) 
but the majority of outputs from each section flows down and out of the organization. 
Remembering that the aim of outputs is to generate new sources of inputs, fresh inputs 
are fed back into the organization, while bleed-offs are essentially wasted outputs. 
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Figure 2.15. The System of Regulated Work Flows 
d. Flow of Informal Communication 
While highly discouraged within covert organizations, informal 
communication between personnel both inside and between substructures does take place. 
Even the most rigid training and indoctrination is challenged by the human tendency to 
both covet and talk about information they are privy to. In Figure 2.16, we see the flow 
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Figure 2.16. The Flow of Informal Communication 
of informal communication within our hypothetical case. In an effort to improve 
coordination and circumvent design flaws of the structure, various subsections will 
communicate with each other on an informal basis. While this activity can prove quite 
productive to a conventional organization, it could prove fatal to members of a covert 
organization if this ILOC is properly targeted. 
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e. Work Constellations 
The final view of how the covert organization functions is provided by a 
visual portrayal of work relationships known as work constellations. Work constellations 
are used to visually group people who routinely work together in a particular area, 
perform a function, or coordinate with each other on a regular basis. Figure 2.17 
illustrates the work constellations in our example organization. 
Figure 2.17. Organizational Work Constellations 
What emerges from these groupings is a pattern of intra-organization 
relationships. Once work constellations are identified, it is safe to assume (in most cases) 
that the members of a particular group know each other and have access to the same body 
of information. If a particular work constellation can be properly targeted and penetrated, 
then that entire constellation is subject to exploitation or destruction. When overlaid 
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upon the other flows previously described, the ILOC' s between various constellations 
within the organization rise to the surface and their vulnerabilities become exposed. A 
summary of ILOC pathways and infrastructure functioning is summarized in Table 2.3. 
2. Structural Strengths and Weaknesses 
Based upon the various functional flows that are constantly at work within the 
covert organization, a pattern of generalizable structural strengths and weaknesses 
associated with each of the pure-case models emerges. Very rigid, formal structures 
become vulnerable to anything that might upset the regulated flow of information or 
work. Conversely, while a very loose, flexible structure would tend to allow the 
organization to adjust to changing environmental conditions, it becomes vulnerable to 
penetration at various levels as well as the isolation of various substructures. The 
tendency common between all the pure-case models is that what is considered a positive 
attribute of a particular structure has a reverse side to it that can be turned into an 
exploitable liability. The structural strengths and weaknesses for each of the pure-case 
models is summarized in Table 2.3. 
3. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities 
Once the structural strengths and weaknesses within a given covert organization 
are identified, the ILOC linkages between the various weaknesses must be micro-
analyzed to determine which ones appear most vulnerable to targeting. Again, based on 
the generic structural strengths and weaknesses inherent to each pure-case model, 
likewise there are generic infrastructure vulnerabilities associated with each. These 
vulnerabilities are also summarized in Table 2.3. To reiterate, these vulnerabilities are 
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generiC in nature, and only through further micro-analysis of the given case can the 
relative level of vulnerability be determined (our format for performing micro-analysis 
for infrastructure targeting is found in Appendix B). 
4. Macro-Level Generic Action Plans 
The final step in the targeting process is to determine an action plan to capitalize 
on the weaknesses and vulnerabilities discovered through the previous analytical steps. 
Based on the generalizable characteristics of our pure-case models described previously, 
we can develop generic action plans that address their inherent weaknesses. Again, these 
action pians are by no means guaranteed recipes for success. Each case is unique and 
requires the application of the entire analytical process. However, these generic plans can 
provide a general heading that a counter-organization campaign could follow and if 
executed properly, have a higher probability of success, rather than simply depending 
upon intuition or past experiences to provide the correct answers. These generic action 
plans are summarized in Table 2.3. 
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Flow of Formal significant from significant decentralized/ insignificant 
Authority top throughout significant 
Flow of Decision- top-down top-down differentiated mixed at all 
Making between HQ/div. levels 
Flow of Informal significant discouraged moderate significant at 
Communication between HQ and apex; eliminated 
divisions below 
Work none moderately insignificant significant 
Constellations significant between throughout 
divisions (matrixing for 
operations) 
STRUCTURAL unity of effort; efficient; heterogeneous- innovative; 
STRENGTHS quick commo consistent; self- spreads risk; flexible; secure; 
/response; sustaining (to a reach; diversified almost invisible 
dedicated; degree) assets; self- at times 
directed; secure sustaining 
STRUCTURAL restrictive; inflexible; supply- unity of effort inefficient; slow 
WEAKNESSES limited scope of side driven; (autonomy comma; 
operations; between conflictive; lack 
limited resources divisions); of direction; 
security isolated 
components 
INFRA- ILOC's from ILOC's from C31LOC's inputs and C3 
STRUCTURE strategic apex endogenous between HQ and ILOC's; C3 
VULNERABILI- and exogenous support; divisions; nodes 
TIES support production; 
techno-structure 
ACTION PLAN decapitation or interdict isolate divisions interdict inputs; 
interdiction of endogenous spt; from HQ and interdict and 
apex; isolate reduce from each other intercept C3 
from exogenous production (deny mutual (infowar); 
support sources efficiency; spt); interdict C3; prioritize 
interdict mid- concentrate HUMINT intel 
level effort against collection efforts 
functionaries and most vulnerable 
technicians division 
Table 2.3. Summary ofiLOC Pathways and Functional Characteristics 
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III. THE HUKBALAHAPS 1946-1954 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Hukbalahap (Huk) insurrection in the Philippine Islands was a manifestation 
of peasant unrest stemming from the long-term oppression of sharecroppers by the landed 
plantation aristocracy. The Huks had formed one of the largest and most active resistance 
movements during the Japanese occupation but were largely marginalized at the war's 
end because of their failure to comply with United States Armed Forces Far East 
(USAFFE) directives during the war.20 Additionally, General MacArthur as well as the 
American Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC), maintained a vehement distrust of anything 
even loosely resembling communism. While it is true that the Huks loosely ascribed to 
Marxism as an ideology, and the Philippine Communist Party (PKP) ultimately 
succeeded in coopting the rebellion's leadership, the majority of the Huk rank and file 
were more strongly motivated by nationalist and reformist ideals.21 
Initial government response to the Huks was simplistic and targeted destruction of 
the insurgent bands. The poorly trained and undisciplined Philippine Army committed 
atrocities which, expectedly, increased popular support for the Huks. Sweeping reforms 
initiated by the dynamic Secretary of Defense, Ramon Magsaysay, professionalized the 
military and focused efforts on ameliorating the causes of the insurrection. Notably, both 
20Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 
Los Angeles, 1977), p. 112. 
21Ibid. p.227. 
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Magsaysay and the Joint U.S. Advisory Group, cautioned against commitment of U.S. 
forces to bolster the Philippine Army.22 
In the end, a combination of low profile military operations, high profile land 
reforms, and civic action programs, curtailed popular support for the insurgents. 23 By 
1953 some 15,000 insurgents had surrendered and an additional4,000 had been captured. 
Louis Taruc, the Huk's most prominent military leader, surrendered in 1954 bringing to a 
close an organized insurrection that had cost more than 9,000 lives.24 
B. ANALYSIS 
1. Ideology 
Societally, class division played an important role in pitting a disenfranchised 
class of peasant farmers against a class of landlord elites. Predictably, this class 
distinction created a political environment particularly vulnerable to Marxist 
proselytization and influence. Religious fractiousness did not play a significant role 
despite the seeming incompatibility of Marxist and Catholic doctrines. Fractiousness 
along ethnic lines was evident with Spanish descent and Mestizo elites generally siding 
with the government, while the Huks derived the majority of their support from the 
indigenously pure population. 
22Larry Cable, Conflict of Myths:The Development of American Counterinsurgency 
Doctrine and the Vietnam War, (New York University Press, New York and London, 
1986), p.52. 
23Kerkvliet, pg. 238-240. 
24Cable, p. 62. 
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2. Organizational Personality 
The leadership style of the Huks can be characterized as a combination of 
charismatic and autocratic. This combined distinction is derived from the vitality and 
influence of their military leader, Luis Taruc, and the adherence to Marxist ideology 
which called for leadership through a central committee and politburo. In retrospect, this 
dysfunctional hybridization at the strategic apex of the organization, is seen as a 
contributing factor in the insurrection's demise. 
The Huk insurrection evolved through an extensive maturation process reaching 
its high water mark of 12,000 combatants and approximately 100,000 active supporters in 
1949. Despite fielding nine active Regional Committees (RC's), each with multiple 
battalion sized Field Commands (FC's), the Huk insurrection generally remained a Phase 
"' 
II insurgency retracting to Phase I as Magsaysay's campaign gained momentum. 
Culturally, the Huks reflected an agrarian-based movement with close ties to the land and 
the rural community. Power within the movement was formalized but also wielded 
indirectly. 
3. Mission Goal 
As the Phillippines gained independence the Huks were active participants in the 
early, and often fumbling democratic legacy emplaced by the departing Americans. 
However, their exclusion from active participation in the governmental process shattered 
any misperceptions about reformist goals and prompted the adoption of an espoused 
reactionary, revolutionary objective. This espoused goal, while at times seemingly within 
reach, may have been a best case outcome with an actual goal more along the lines of 
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secession or radical reformation. Unfortunately for the Huks, circumstances changed far 
too rapidly for them to realign their goals relative to realistic outcomes. As a result, they 
reverted to a struggle for survival before they could apply any of the leverage they had 
gained in earlier successes to achieve a negotiated settlement. 
4. Core Technology 
While loosely affiliated with other emerging Marxist/Nationalist movements in 
Asia, the Huk insurrection was almost entirely reliant on endogenous inputs for the 
duration of the insurrection. Although geography played a small role in their reliance on 
endogenous inputs ( an island is far easier to isolate from exogenous forms of support), a 
robust support base within Huk controlled areas was the most significant factor. 
Production to convert inputs into outputs is best described as in the middle of the 
concentrated/dispersed continuum. While production nodes were generally dispersed to 
the Regional Committees, the inability of five of the nine RC' s to self-sustain forced 
some degree of centralization so resources could be redistributed.25 Production was also 
relatively complex to meet the needs of the multiple systems that were competing for 
resources. The dispersion of production assets, while preferred from a security standpoint 
when functioning in a stable and permissive environment, became a hindrance following 
the onset of Magsaysay' s counterinsurgency campaign. The impact of Magsaysay' s 
campaign is also true regarding the efficiency of production; as long as the government 
forces were inept, the production efficiency allowed both a quantitative and qualitative 
level of outputs appropriate to maintain the initiative. Huk outputs were diversified in the 
25Kerkvliet, p. 213. 
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sense that they included mechanisms for propaganda, civil administration, and public 
education, as well as a broad scope of military operations. 
5. Environment 
The strategic environment for the Huks remained stable prior to Magsaysay's 
appointment as Secretary of Defense in 1950. Following the onset of his reforms, which 
included professionalizing the Officer Corps, increasing civil/military operations, 
psychological operations, and a more appropriate application of military force, the 
environment became less predictable and more dynamic for the Huks. In one respect the 
limited number of active belligerents (not discounting U.S. support for the Philippine 
government), tended to simplify the environment. However, more complex social issues 
compounded by the potentially chaotic political implications of Huk success, served to 
increase the complexity of the overall strategic environment. The support of the 
population, critical to the Huk' s success with regard to their overwhelming reliance on 
endogenous support, was generally supportive or indifferent prior to 1950. Magsaysay's 
intuitive knowledge of the criticality of popular support, was a key factor in his overall 
campaign plan. His civil military operations, political reforms, land redistribution, and 
psychological operations, all focused on marginalizing the Huks and diminishing their 
popular support. 
The operational environment for the Huks can also be considered in terms of pre 
and post Magsaysay. By 1949 large areas of three provinces were under Huk control and 
could be characterized as permissive to semi-permissive environments. In some areas the 
Huks were so well established that they functioned as a defacto government with an 
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active administration. Post Magsaysay, resurgent government forces challenged the Huk 
domain and forced a transition to a generally semi-permissive environment. As 
Magsaysay's campaign matured, much of what was once considered "Huklandia" became 
a non-permissive environment with the Huk stronghold of Mount Arayat remaining their 
only viable (albeit contested) sanctuary. 
The tactical environment was a paradox in regard to early Huk success, offering 
generally poor cover. Much of the three provinces that once comprised the area generally 
considered as Huklandia was easily accessible by road and agriculturally developed. 
These two factors, which should have allowed easy government incursions as well as 
interdiction of Huk formations, were largely neutralized by the early ineptitude of the 
government forces. These vulnerabilities became all too evident for the Huks after 
Magsaysay's reforms. Resources and targets were another environmental factor that 
remained relative to government ineptitude and Huk initiative. While the Huks 
controlled vast territories, their access to resources and targets remained high. 
Correspondingly, as government intervention increased, resources diminished with a 
predictable effect on the Huk's ability to maintain the military initiative. 
C. ILOC FUNCTIONING AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Critical to the positive outcome achieved by the Philippine government in dealing 
with the Huk insurrection of 1946-1954 was the intuitive knowledge and vision of its 
principal architect, Ramon Magsaysay. Magsaysay was able, through observation and an 
understanding borne of familiarity, to identify the support of the population as the Huk' s 
center of gravity. Accordingly, he changed the venue from a purely military effort, to one 
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competing for the trust and confidence of the people who comprised this decisive 
terrain.26 While his efforts superficially appeared defensive, assigning security forces to 
each village and limiting offensive operations, he actually laid the groundwork for a 
comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign. Within the auspices of this campaign, which 
included confidence building measures, civic and psychological operations, and 
ultimately comprehensive land reform programs, a number of Huk ILOC's became 
vulnerable to government military operations. 
1. ILOC Pathways and Infrastructure Functioning 
Within the Huk organizational structure the flow of formal authority was 
significant for the duration of the insurrection. Decision making within the organization 
followed a top down flow but also delegated authority to subordinate leaders. This is 
indicative of a hybrid comprising characteristics of both machine and divisional 
structures. However, as government pressure increased, latent factionalism surfaced 
between the Nationalists and Marxists within the organization's strategic apex and 
impacted the efficiency of decision execution. This factionalism further reveals the 
dysfunctional nature of the hybrid structure at the strategic apex. Luis Taruc, whose 
charismatic leadership probably served as a great stabilizing force at the organization's 
apex, further complicates the characterization of formal authority and decision making in 
the organization by incorporating features more commonly associated with a simple 
structure. 
26Cable, pp. 54-55. 
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The flow of regulated systems such as logistics, communications, and propaganda, 
were significant prior to Magsaysay's campaign but were hindered by a rigidity that 
became apparent as the environment destabilized. This further substantiates the 
characterization of the organization's structure as a machine/divisional hybrid. Informal 
communications between structural components, while discouraged, did exist between the 
strategic apex and various subordinate headquarters. It is also safe to assume that 
informal communications were routine between various elements of the Nationalist and 
Marxist factions within the overall organization. 
2. Structural Strengths 
The structural strengths found within the Huk organization are generally 
consistent with those indicated in Table 2.3. Encompassing characteristics of both 
machine and divisional pure case models, the Huk hybrid, prior to the impact of 
Magsaysay's reforms, was generally efficient, self-sustaining, and dispersed. These 
strengths were exemplified by the ability of the organization to redistribute resources such 
as money and weapons to bolster fledgling RC's trying to expand Huk influence.27 
These newer RC' s, while not self-sustaining, served to tie down government forces and 
reduce the pressure on more established RC's. 
Another strength derived from the machine structure aspect of the Huk hybrid can 
be seen in their consistency. High ranking PKP members headed national departments 
charged with oversight of finances, communications, education, and organization. These 
27Kerkvliet, pp. 214-215. 
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departments established and enforced national guidelines pertaining to their specific area 
of responsibility.28 
3. Structural Weaknesses 
Weaknesses within the Huk organizational structure, which became readily 
apparent during Magsaysay's campaign, are also consistent with those indicated in Table 
2.3. Inflexibility, demonstrated by their inability to react to government initiatives, was 
evident throughout the organization. As systems for procuring food and other types of 
support were neutralized, the organization proved incapable of responding with secondary 
or alternate means of support. As expected, FC' s relying on established nodes for support 
were forced to improvise and dedicate increasing amounts of time and energy to 
sustainment efforts vice operations. 
Unity of effort was another manifestation of the inherent weakness evident in the 
Huk structure. Despite the PKP's public claims of sovereign authority over the Huk 
movement, their own internal assessments depicted a much bleaker situation. 
Subordinate FC leaders frequently ignored party directives and chose not to attend party 
meetings where directives were issued.29 This apparent lack of discipline, compounded 
by the PKP' s inability to enforce directives, could only serve to diminish overall 
effectiveness. 
A critical structural weakness existed in the organizations security mechanism. 
This became clearly evident in October 1950 when an operation targeting twenty-two 
28fuid. pp. 222-223. 
29fuid. p. 223. 
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separate residences resulted in the loss of the organizations entire urban apparatus in 
Manila. 30 The psychological effect of this operation was significant; Magsaysay 
achieved his first major success against the Huks, and the level of paranoia and mistrust 
among the Huks multiplied. 
4. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities 
Presented as vulnerabilities within the Huk organizational structure are a number 
of ILOC's consistent with a machine/divisional hybrid. ILOC's from endogenous sources 
of support were particularly vulnerable for the Huks. A 1951 report from FC 45 to 
headquarters at RC-4 indicated that virtually all routes to and from their supply points 
were being controlled by government forces. 31 Another vulnerable ILOC was the 
training apparatus that indoctrinated new guerrillas and proselytized the PKP' s Marxist 
tenets. The increasing encroachment of government forces either forced cancellation of 
planned training sessions or prompted their early conclusion.32 
The C3 ILOC's, particularly the Huks archaic communication system, was 
particularly vulnerable to interdiction and compromise. Relying on a complex system of 
couriers, the communication system was never adequately staffed and painfully slow. 33 
Much of the early success against the Manila organization came about as a result of 
30Eduardo Lachica, The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt, (Praeger 
Publishers, New York, 1971), p. 131. 
31Kerkvliet, p. 241. 
32Jbid. p. 242. 
33Jbid. p. 216. 
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government surveillance of Huk couriers. Later attempts by the Huks to upgrade their 
communications system by incorporating a wireless radio system were unsuccessful and 
resulted in the loss of expensive equipment that they could ill afford to replace. 
5. Action Plan 
Consistent with the pure case generic action plans shown in Table 2.3, the Huk 
case would call for an action plan that both recognized the hybridized machine/divisional 
nature of the organization and adapted the appropriate portions of the pure-case plan. As 
history shows us in the action plan employed by Magsaysay, even an inadvertent or 
intuitively developed action plan that adequately addresses infrastructure vulnerabilities 
will contribute to success. 
Interdicting endogenous support and reducing production efficiency were 
important aspects of the action plan against the Huks. Magsaysay took significant steps 
to isolate the Huks from the population, and force them into a reactive role. 
Simultaneously, ambushes and small unit patrols succeeded in interdicting the Huk C3 
ILOC' s and denying mutual support between elements. 
One aspect not addressed by Magsaysay, but considered significant within our 
analysis, is the interdiction of midlevel functionaries and technicians. While Magsaysay's 
security forces had early success in Manila, no concerted follow-up to isolate and 
neutralize these nodes outside of Manila was forthcoming. As a result, a number of 
supporting systems like propaganda and finance remained viable and active until the 
. death knell of the insurgency and surely prolonged the end. 
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4. Conclusion 
What then can we conclude from the Huk case? First is the recognition of the 
Huk hybrid as a function of an organization trying to expand beyond its means and span 
of control. At a point where retrenchment and reinforcement of success may have sealed 
some form of victory, over-extension prompted a loss of control and an inevitable 
spiraling effect that sealed the fate of the Huk insurrection. 
Secondly, we can'tdenigrate the significance of the dysfunctional hybridization at 
the strategic apex of the Huk organization. The competing substructures within the apex, 
Taruc as patriarch, the PKP committees, and various nationalists, all contributed greatly 
to their problems with effective command and control. 
Finally, with respect to those factors considered necessary and sufficient in 
explaining success in a counter-organization campaign, we can make some informed 
observations and conclusions. Perhaps the most significant conclusion resultant from our 
analysis, is that this case demonstrates the efficacy of targeting appropriate infrastructure 
nodes as a necessary condition for success. This case also demonstrates that a systematic 
methodology for developing an infrastructure targeting plan was neither a necessary or 
sufficient condition to explain success in this instance. Magsaysay' s recognition of Huk 
vulnerabilities was clearly a result of his intuitive knowledge rather than the product of an 
analytic system. 
With respect to appropriate ILOC targeting, this case lends credibility to this 
factor as a necessary condition for success. While not sufficient to explain success in and 
of itself, the fact that Magsaysay targeted the appropriate vulnerabilities to achieve 
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maximum effect is significant. This case also underscores the necessity of integrating 
infrastructure targeting within an overarching counter-organization campaign. Magsaysay 
effectively balanced his efforts to achieve positive results from the governments strategic 
interaction with the Huks. 
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IV. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY 1948-1960 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Malayan insurrection was an attempt by the Malayan Races Liberation· Army 
(MRLA), the military wing of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), to force the British 
out of Malaya and establish a Communist Republic. Like the Huks, the MRLA had 
evolved from a sizable, although fairly quiescent, anti-Japanese guerrilla army. However, 
unlike the Huks, the MRLA held little appeal to the indigenous Malay population and was 
comprised almost entirely of immigrant Chinese. Additionally, the organization received 
virtually all of its support from the Malayan Chinese community; a politically 
disenfranchised element existing on the periphery of Malayan society. 
Commencing in 1948 the MRLA initiated the insurgency with a broad leap into 
what Mao would have called the "protracted warfare" stage. Operating from the fringe of 
the Malayan jungle, MRLA formations conducted raids and acts of terror against remote 
police posts and civilian plantations. Constrained by an obvious lack of jungle training, 
the MRLA functioned in large units, suffered disproportionate casualties, and never 
achieved their primary objective of establishing a sanctuary area. 
The initial British response., designed to buy time, was predominantly military 
and, while achieving very little in terms of civic action or political reform, was on the 
cusp of defeating the MRLA in the first nine months of the conflict.33 Not realizing how 
33Q'Ballance, Edgar, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-1960, (Archon 
Books, Hamden, CT, 1966), pp. 86-88. O'Ballance cites the death ofLau Yew, one of 
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close they were to destroying the MRLA, the British authorities let the opportunity pass 
and settled in for a protracted campaign. Instituting the Briggs Plan, so named for its 
author, General Sir Harold Briggs, the British incorporated virtually all assets available to 
the government in a comprehensive and ambitious strategy for defeating the insurgency. 
Crafted by an experienced jungle fighter in his own right and partially based on a 
study by Michael Calvert, the former Chindit 77th Brigade Commander, the Briggs Plan 
included policies to separate the MRLA from their primary means of support, the 
Chinese population. Of particular importance, in this respect, were the Chinese 
"squatters" living in illegal settlements near the edge of the jungle. 34 Relocating the 
squatters into government-controlled communities, the British sought to minimize the 
effects of their dislocation by giving them title to the new land they occupied.35 
Additionally, the presence of a government infrastructure in the new communities 
initiated the process of incorporating the Chinese into the greater Malayan society. 
Applying a patient but constant pressure on the MRLA, the British were able to 
declare vast areas of the country secure and reduce government presence and controls to 
near normal levels. Simultaneously, they went forward with the plan to grant autonomy 
and eventual independence to Malaya. Segregated from any means of support, the 
MRLA continuously ~ecreased in strength and effectiveness with final mopping up 
the few competent leaders in the MRLA, as well as poor morale, desertions, and tactical 
ineptitude, as reasons for this belief. 
34McMichael, Scott R. A Historical Perspective On Light Infantry, (U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1987), p. 97. 
35Cable, p. 79. 
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completed by the independent Malayan government in 1960. The British policy during 
the Malayan emergency (judicious use of force, segregation, coercion, and appeasement), 
as well as their employment of vast institutional experience in Chinese-Malayan affairs 
has become a primer in counterinsurgency studies. 
B. ANALYSIS 
1. Ideology 
Maoism dominated the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and influenced every 
aspect of life within the MRLA. Mao's own success against the Kuomintang and later 
the U.N. forces in Korea, provided validation for the doctrine. Ethnically, a clear 
distinction existed between ethnic Malays and the Chinese subculture. This distinction 
carried over into the MRLA which was almost an exclusively Chinese organization. 
Religious differences mirrored ethnic division with the indigenous Malay population 
being almost entirely Moslem, and the Chinese subscribing to either Confucianism, 
Buddhism, or in the case of the Communists, atheism. Religious diversity, while notable 
for the distinct dividing lines extant in this case, did not play a significant role in the 
insurgency. 
2. Organizational Personality 
Typical of most communist insurgencies, the leadership of the MRLA comprised 
both autocratic, and authoritarian aspects. Chen Ping, the Secretary General of the MCP 
held near-total control over both the Politburo and the MRLA. In terms of maturity, the 
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MRLA could trace its roots to early 1942 as the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army.36 
However, the apparent continuity implied by this seemingly robust level of institutional 
knowledge was significantly degraded by a general stand down from 1945 to 1948. 
Additionally, the MRLA's leadership was in a state of disequilibrium following the 
scandalous departure of their long time General Secretary, Lai Teck.37 Accordingly, the 
MRLA should be considered a relatively immature organization. 
The pervasive culture-type subsumed by the MRLA was predominantly agrarian 
with a strong commercial bent. Factors which influence this classification includes the 
temporary resident status assumed by the majority of the Chinese who originally came to 
Malaya to fill a labor void in the agriculture and mining industries. As this population 
expanded, a subculture of businesses and commercial enterprises tailored to the Chinese 
consumer market emerged in virtually every concentration of Chinese residents. 
3. Mission Goal 
The ultimate goal of the MCP was to establish a Communist Republic in 
Malaya.38 Their willingness to achieve this goal through armed insurrection is indicative 
of an insurgent organization with reactionary, revolutionary objectives. For the MCP this 
espoused goal was generally in line with their actual goals and remarkably, remained so 
for the duration of the insurgency. Even as the curtain was closing on the MCP and the 
36Q'Ballance, p.42. 
37Lai Teck absconded with the bulk of the MCP's treasury in 1947. He was later accused 
of being both a collaborator and double agent. 
38Jbid., p. 78. 
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MRLA in the final days of the emergency, their leadership attempted to negotiate cease-
fires as a ploy to rearm and regroup. Unfortunately for the Communists, the Malayan 
Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, saw through what was clearly an amateurish ploy 
and declined to negotiate. 
4. Core Technology 
Although the inputs for the MRLA came almost exclusively from the Malayan 
Chinese community, these inputs must be considered as coming principally from an 
exogenous source. This assessment is based on the tight controls imposed by the 
government which effectively removed this community from the MRLA span of control. 
Additionally, the MRLA never succeeded in establishing a sanctuary area free from 
government intrusion. Accordingly, what endogenous input sources that did exist, were 
constantly at risk. Production to convert inputs into outputs was highly dispersed and 
delegated out to separate regiments within the MRLA. These production nodes were 
fairly simplistic, producing "vanilla guerrillas" with limited military training, capable of 
performing simple tasks. The overarching headquarters at the MPC was slightly more 
complex given the need to control propaganda, intelligence, and the underground 
auxiliary or "Min Yuen." 
Production efficiency for the MRLA was adequate during the early stages of the 
emergency but was closely related to the availability of exogenous inputs. As population 
and resource control measures were instituted and guerrilla units were forced deeper into 
the jungle, production efficiency dropped below adequate levels. While demonstrating 
some flexibility in trying to establish alternate endogenous inputs, such as clandestine 
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jungle gardens, the MRLA production system was simply too rigid to respond to the 
changing environment. 
The outputs of the overall MPC organization can be characterized as closer to 
singular if measured against the singular to diversified continuum. The outputs for the 
MRLA were very straightforward if not totally singular in practice. In the early days they 
moved as large units (200 to 400 guerrillas), overwhelmed small police posts, farms, or 
mines, and escaped to the bush. Typically, they suffered disproportionate casualties and 
succeeded only because of sheer numbers. The Min Yuen, or underground, was slightly 
more diverse than the MRLA in that they provided support to guerrilla units, recruited 
new members, and performed acts of terror, sabotage, and extortion, as needed. 
5. Environment 
The strategic environment for the MRLA was at its most stable point early in the 
insurgency before government forces had adequate time to react to the emergency. As 
government reaction to the insurgency, particularly the Briggs plan, took effect, the 
strategic environment became increasingly dynamic. This environment was also fairly 
complex given the transition ofMRLA's opponent from British Colonial government to 
Independent Malayan Federation. The potentially divisive social issue of an ethnically 
defined insurgency as well as the possibly chaotic political ramifications resultant from 
insurgent success, further contributed to overall strategic complexity. 
The support of the population was generally divided along ethnic lines with native 
Malayans being clearly opposed to the insurgency. Among Chinese Malayans the 
majority of the community was indifferent, but easily intimidated by Min Yuen operatives 
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living in their midst. The presence of the Min Yuen, and the ease in which they extorted 
support from the population, created a perception of mass support which was largely 
inaccurate. As relocation into "new villages" became a reality, the villagers were all too 
happy to anonymously identify the Min Yuen living among them. 
The operational environment for the MPC, and its subordinate organizations, 
ranged from semi-permissive to non-permissive for the duration of the emergency. The 
MRLA never established a much sought after sanctuary area and as a result, had to 
maintain varying levels of heightened security as a standard operating procedure. For the 
Min Yuen, aggressive police work by the "Special Branch" kept them under a constant 
threat of compromise and arrest. As a result, they had to function in a non-permissive 
environment with extremely high levels of internal security. 
An analysis of the tactical environment reveals some interesting peculiarities that 
are unique to the Malayan case. On the surface, the foreboding jungle of the Malayan 
interior would appear to have provided excellent cover for MRLA units. However, the 
British and Commonwealth Units in Malaya were led by seasoned veterans who had 
defeated the Japanese in the jungles of Burma. In fact, it is arguable that never before in 
its history was a British Army so well prepared for jungle warfare as the one that 
responded to the Malayan Emergency. Accordingly, the cover of the jungle never 
afforded the protection the MRLA desired or needed. 
The availability of resources for the MRLA diminished in conjunction with the 
enactment of the Briggs Plan. As the MRLA formations were segregated from the 
population, and forced deeper into the jungle, resources became exceedingly scarce. The 
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availability of targets on the other hand, remained high but were of diminishing 
qualitative significance and typically related to replacing lost foodstuffs and equipment. 
C. ILOC FUNCTIONING AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Critical to understanding the defeat of the communist insurgency is an 
appreciation of the effect of the Briggs Plan. Instituted in 1950 and effectively carried out 
by both its principal architect and his successors, the Briggs plan neutralized the MRLA's 
initiative and forced them into a reactive mode of operations. Calling for a systematic 
clearing of the Malay peninsula, segregation of the MRLA from the populace, and forcing 
the insurgents to battle, the plan required close cooperation and coordination among all 
facets of the government.39 As a result of the consistent, if not persistent, application of 
the Briggs Plan, MRLA ILOC' s were identified, targeted, attacked, and neutralized. 
1. ILOC Pathways and Infrastructure Functioning 
Within the MRLA organizational structure the flow of formal authority was 
highly significant for the duration of the emergency. Decision making within the 
organization was a top down, highly militarized, and vertical system. Typical of 
communist influenced organizations, political officers held equal if not superior status 
over their military counterparts and influenced decisions accordingly.40 This dual 
structure of political and military leaders, which reached from the organization's apex 
down to the squad level, lent itself to dysfunction in the form of internal conflict and 
divisiveness. 
39Q'Ballance, p.l 07. 
40Jbid., p.103. 
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The flow of regulated systems in the MRLA was significant at the Regimental 
level and below. Well-established relationships between insurgent units and the local 
Min Yuen were considered the most reliable sources of support and intelligence. 
Following the displacement of most of the Chinese population into secure villages, these 
work flows were severely hindered. Informal communication within the MRLA was 
strongly discouraged. Despite the ineffectiveness of existing formal communication 
systems, such as couriers and "jungle mailboxes," the MRLA demonstrated distinct 
machine-like characteristics by maintaining a strict control of communications. As a 
result of adhering to this highly structured system, some MRLA units were effectively 
functioning without guidance toward the end of the emergency. 
2. Structural Strengths 
The structural strengths found within the MRLA are consistent with a hybrid 
organization predominantly characterized by simple and machine-like attributes. These 
strengths could be observed in the unity of effort and genuine dedication at least in part 
motivated by adherence to Maoist doctrine. MRLA Regiments were largely self-
sustaining prior to the Briggs plan and managed to eke out an existence for years after its 
inception. Consistency was another machine like attribute demonstrated by the MRLA. 
This could be seen at the unit level where highly regimented daily activities, uniforms, 
and strict field discipline, were the norms.41 
41fuid., pp. 104-105. 
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3. Structural Weaknesses 
Some of the weaknesses within the MRLA structure were evident at the onset of 
the insurrection while others became apparent as a result of government initiatives. 
These weaknesses are consistent with a simple/machine-like hybrid with some anomalies. 
Simple case model attributes include a limited scope of operations, as demonstrated by 
their early need to move and fight as large formations, and limited resources. Inflexibility 
and sensitivity to supply side operational constraints, were manifestations of the machine-
like attributes of the MRLA. Their reliance on a near sole source of support, and their 
inability to react positively when that source was neutralized, fully exemplify these 
attributes. 
· An anomalous attribute, normally associated with Adhoc/Cellular organizations, 
but present as a weakness in the MRLA, was a slow and inefficient communication 
system. This system was constrained by heightened security requirements and had 
limited adaptability because of both technology shortfalls and isolation. Accordingly, the 
MRLA committed to a system of runners and dead letter drops first instituted during the 
Japanese occupation and reliant on a percolating effect that sometimes took months to 
pass a message.42 Government forces quickly identified this weakness as a result of the 
high number of couriers intercepted by check points and ambushes. 
4. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerabilities within the MRLA are ILOC' s consistent with a simple/machine-
like hybrid. Most notably, the support ILOC's from both exogenous and endogenous 
42Jbid., p. 114. 
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sources are present. As history has demonstrated, these ILOC' s were highly vulnerable 
when subjected to the concerted interdiction efforts encompassed in the Briggs plan. 
Additional vulnerabilities present in this hybrid case include the ILOC' s from the 
strategic apex, and the techno-structure. Aggressive patrolling and population and 
resource control measures on the part of the government forces, isolated various MRLA 
Regiments from their headquarters and allowed for their subsequent defeat in detail. 
5. Action Plan 
As with the Huk case, the Malaya case would require an action plan formulated by 
blending the appropriate aspects of the pure case plans shown in Table 2.3. With the 
Briggs Plan, the British systematically designed and executed a counterinsurgency 
campaign, that addressed specific critical nodes within the MRLA organization. 
Consistent with the pure case plans we offer in Chapter II, interdiction of support 
from both endogenous and exogenous sources was a critical aspect of the Briggs plan. 
Perhaps the most significant element of this interdiction was the displacement and 
segregation of the Chinese community away from the MRLA areas of operation. As a 
result of this forced segregation an artificial change in the operational environment 
ensued with negative results for the MRLA, and corresponding positive results for the 
government. Decapitation or interdiction of the strategic apex was also attempted with 
mixed results. Interdiction was generally successful at isolating the apex from 
subordinate units, but less successful at decapitating the structure outright. The ongoing 
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hunt for the MPC Politburo did have the positive effect of driving them across the border 
into Thailand and degrading their overall effectiveness.43 
The final aspect of the generic action plan that was paralleled by the Briggs Plan 
was the interdiction of mid-level functionaries and technicians. Specifically targeted in 
the Malayan case were couriers, and any groups traveling on jungle trails. These were 
particularly high payoff targets given the MRLA rule that only allowed special couriers 
and politburo members unrestricted movement around the country.44 
D. CONCLUSION 
In the Malayan case we see a clear example of an insurgent organization whose 
level of influence was far less than the sum of its parts. For the MRLA, the decision to 
initiate a protracted struggle from the outset of the insurgency is indicative of an 
organization without a firm grasp of its own capabilities. Superficially, the MRLA 
mobilized as an impressive guerrilla army with years of experience against the Japanese 
and a sound ideology. In reality, the early MRLA was fairly inept in the jungle and 
burdened by an inferior strategic objective and wishful thinking. Five years into the 
insurgency, when MRLA units had evolved into formidable jungle fighters, the overall 
organization was too weak to do much more than survive. 
The MRLA also paid dearly for sacrificing preparation time in pursuit of early 
success against what they perceived as an unprepared British Colonial Government. This 
trade-off pitted an immature organization with minimal structural depth and little 
43Jbid., pp. 132-133. 
44Ibid., p.140. 
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sustainment capacity, against a small but professional garrison of British and Colonial 
troops and the potential strength of any reinforcements arriving on scene. Accordingly, 
when the anticipated and rapid collapse of the British regime failed to happen, the MRLA 
found themselves in a poorly timed conflict which they had both started, and which they 
were ill prepared to execute. 
With respect to our theory of counter-organization targeting, the Malayan 
Emergency provides one of the strongest examples of the effectiveness of targeting an 
insurgent organization's infrastructure. The fact that the Briggs Plan specifically and 
logically addressed critical ILOC' s consistent with our analysis, further substantiates 
infrastructure targeting as a necessary condition for success. 
This case also demonstrates the value of systematic targeting as opposed to 
reliance on the intuitive sense of the practitioner. To be certain, the Briggs Plan came 
from the intuitive and experiential backgrounds of its principal authors. However, the 
manner in which it was institutionalized allowed for its continued and effective execution 
' 
long after the departure of General Briggs. 
Regarding appropriate ILOC targeting, the Malayan case offers a strong argument 
supporting this condition as necessary for success. The British use of segregation and 
resource denial were highly effective against an ethnically distinct insurgency, in a rice 
poor region. Similarly, integration with an overarching campaign plan gains considerable 
credibility as a necessary condition for success. The British effectively mobilized every 
resource available to the government to conduct a consolidated offensive against the 
85 
MRLA. Infrastructure targeting was only one aspect (albeit a critical one) of this 
offensive. 
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V. VIETNAM, THE VC, AND THE PHOENIX PROGRAM 
A. BACKGROUND 
The VietCong (VC) represented the insurgency aspect of a long term struggle by 
Vietnamese Communists to discard the "yoke of foreign rule" and unify the country under 
one central government. Like the Huks and the MRLA, the VC achieved their earliest 
credibility fighting against the Japanese as the Viet Minh. Following World War II, the 
Viet Minh under the political leadership of Ho Chi Minh and his gifted military leader, 
Vo Nguyen Giap, succeeded in driving the French out of Vietnam. As a result of the 
political settlement achieved at the 1954 Geneva Conference, Vietnam was divided with 
the Viet Minh controlling the North and a government headed by Ngo Dinh Diem 
controlling the South. 
From the onset, both Ho in the North and Diem in the South consolidated their 
power and strengthened their relative political positions. In the North, Ho instituted 
brutal land reforms that prompted the executions of thousands of landowners.45 Diem 
initiated a massive campaign to destroy any remaining Viet Minh forces still in the South 
and ousted the last emperor in a well-orchestrated referendum.46 As a result of these 
powerful machinations, Diem had effectively driven the remaining Viet Minh into the 
swamps of the Mekong by 1958. It was at this "low water mark" for the Southern Viet 
45Stanley Karnow, Vietnam, A History, (The Viking Press, New York, N.Y. 1983), p. 
212. 
461bid., p. 223. 
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Minh that saw the Northern Communists institute a deliberate and methodological 
resurgence of guerrilla activity in the South. While the North's sponsorship initially 
included a trickle of logistics and personnel, political direction and guidance were its 
mainstays. Hanoi's announcement of the formation of the National Liberation Front was 
the final step in this return to an active insurgency. 
Relying on the cadres who had successfully evaded the government's security 
sweeps, along with returning Viet Minh who had gone north for education and training, 
the insurgency soon presented an open challenge to the government's authority. The Viet 
Minh, now called "Viet Cong" (VC) by the Diem Government, began to wrest control of 
the countryside from the government and even achieved some notable successes in direct 
confrontations against government troops (ARVN).47 The resurgent VC, as well as · 
increased infiltration of NV A formations into the south, prompted the commitment of 
U.S. ground forces to bolster the wavering South Vietnamese Government. 
Existing on the periphery of U.S. initiatives, which largely focused on finding and 
destroying guerrilla and NV A formations, the Phoenix Program targeted the Viet Cong 
Infrastructure (VCI). Phoenix, and its Vietnamese counterpart "Phung Hoang," evolved 
from existing counter-infrastructure programs like the early Counter Terror Teams (CTT) 
and its immediate forerunner, the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Program 
(ICEX). Phoenix was part of a rejuvenated pacification program falling under the 
Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Program (CORDS). The 
47 Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Anny and Vietnam, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore and London, 1986), pp. 78-79. 
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program itself was headed by Johnson appointee Robert Komer, and largely financed with 
CIA funds. 
The Phoenix Program acted as a central clearing house for all intelligence and 
activities directed against the VCI. The program made use of existing assets such as the 
Provisional Reconnaissance Units (PRU's), National Police, Regional and Popular Forces 
(RFPF), as well as recognized military units like U.S. Navy SEALS. The program, 
officially instituted in December 1967, was unquestionably successful at identifying, 
capturing, or killing, members of the VCI. By 1968, the VCI adapted their security 
measures in response to the anti-infrastructure activities of the various action arms falling 
under Phoenix.48 
The year 1968 was also significant for the Communist Tet Offensive which 
marked a turning point in the conflict. Although militarily a disaster for the Communists, 
Tet proved a political victory and prompted U.S. efforts to disengage from the conflict. 
As "Vietnamization" gained momentum, the U.S. role in Phoenix was also reduced, with 
the program becoming an entirely Vietnamese operation by late 1972. 
The effectiveness of Phoenix up to this point has been partially blamed for the 
NV A's attempted invasion of the South in April 1972. The VCI had suffered horrible 
losses and many of the survivors were forced to flee into Cambodia to evade the grasp of 
,Phoenix. The corresponding degradation in effectiveness of the ongoing guerrilla war 
prompted political leaders in Hanoi to launch a conventional invasion. The intervention 
48From The VietCong Infrastructure: Modus Operandi of Selected Political Cadres, 
Published as a handbook for Phoenix Advisors; hereafter referred to as the VCI 
Handbook, (Saigon, 1968), p. 16. 
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of U.S. air power, and the surprisingly good performance of ARVN ground forces, are 
credited with defeating the 1972 Easter Offensive. 
Bolstered by the apparent ability of the ARVN to deter Northern aggression, the 
U.S. completed its withdrawal following the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 
January 1973. As a result of the strategic vacuum left by the departing Americans, there 
was little to stand in the way of North Vietnamese ambitions to unite the country. In 
197 5 regular units of the NV A invaded the South and succeeded in capturing the South 
Vietnamese Capital of Saigon. A conflict notable for its enduring guerrilla 
characteristics, was finally decided by a conventional invasion. 
B. ANALYSIS 
1. Ideology 
Communism dominated the political constructs of the Viet Cong Infrastructure 
from the leadership down to the operating core of functionaries at the village level. 
However, the VCI should not be misconstrued as a purely "Red menace" surging forth 
from the ideological loins of Lenin, Mao, and Marx. While this sort of ideological 
extremism was no doubt present at higher levels, the VCI political ideology was just as 
influenced by other sub-variables, nationalism being the most pervasive. 
Societally, the role of the family and familial responsibility was significant in the 
ideological make up of the VCI. Additionally, class division between landowners and 
peasants established rifts which were vulnerable to exploitation. Ethnicity played a subtle 
role in the inner workings of the VCI with respect to the differences between Northern 
and Southern Vietnamese. These differences included language, dialects, mannerisms, 
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and the long-held resentment and mistrust on the part of Southerners toward any 
outsiders . 
. 2. Organizational Personality 
The leadership style found within the Viet Cong organization is best classified as 
authoritarian. This designation is consistent with Communist organizations which 
maintain a facade of democracy with committees and politburos, but suffer no quibbling 
when it comes to following orders. The VC, to an even greater extent than the Huks and 
MRLA, had evolved through a maturation process that created a seasoned and resilient 
organization. It is a testament to this resiliency that the VC generally maintained 
themselves in an expansion phase from the formation of the National Liberation Front in 
1960, until the disastrous Tet Offensive in 1968. 
3. Mission Goal 
The Viet Cong aspired to a revolutionary goal as their ultimate objective. Their 
espoused goal was liberation of the South from foreign interlopers and the Saigon regime, 
and unification of Vietnam under a communist central government. While this espoused 
goal was ultimately achieved, the reality for many of the rank and file VC was a goal 
more aligned with nationalist or even rational choice motivations. While they certainly 
held no love for the various Saigon regimes (and some may have become VC as a way of 
settling personal grievances), to say they adopted the communist goals as a matter of 
principle would simply be inaccurate. 
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4. Core Technology 
The VC had a varying mix of both endogenous and exogenous inputs at different 
points in its life cycle. In contrast to some strategists who held that the infamous Ho Chi 
Minh Trail was the lifeblood of the VC, as well as to others who felt the trail was 
insignificant to the insurgents, the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle. By late 
1964 the trail began to provide a fair percentage of weapons and other logistics to the VC, 
but prior to that time the VC received the bulk of its support from within South Vietnam 
proper.49 
Production to convert inputs into outputs within the VC organization was, as may 
be expected in a more mature organization, fairly sophisticated. Production was highly 
dispersed with redundancies planned and built into the system. While these 
redundancies were effective for some nodes, the VCI had to adapt a system of having 
higher echelons assume the role of lower echelons that had been neutralized by anti-
infrastructure operations.50 Production was also complex with respect to the broad 
spectrum of outputs generated. These outputs ranged from the simple VC guerrilla to the 
deep cover agent collecting intelligence from the inner sanctums of Saigon. Despite the 
apparent strengths of the VC production nodes, they functioned in a fairly rigid manner as 
dictated by their extensively developed bureaucracy. 
Viet Cong outputs must be characterized as highly diversified with a production 
efficiency that was generally adequate to meet the demands of the organization. The VCI, 
49Cable, p. 225. 
50VCI Handbook, p. 18. 
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as a subset of the VC was much more diversified than typical guerrilla units in much the 
same manner as the Min Yuen in Malaya. It simply had more parts, performed more 
tasks, and maintained a higher level of activity than the guerrilla units. 
5. Environment 
The strategic environment for the VC was at its most stable in the early 1960's 
prior to the commitment of U.S. ground forces. As U.S. forces established a tactical 
superiority in the countryside, the Phoenix Program became institutionalized and the 
strategic environment for both the guerrillas and the VCI became much more dynamic. 
Played against the backdrop of Cold War alliances and interests, the strategic 
environment for the VC, supported by North Vietnam, in turn supported by China and the 
USSR, was highly complex. This is particularly true considering their opposition, the 
Saigon Government, was supported by the Americans and the SEATO alliance. 
The support of the population was overshadowed by a predominantly indifferent 
majority. As indicated in Chapter II, this indifference generally played to the VC's 
advantage. However, in many instances this indifference was easily swayed by the 
perceived ebb and flow of the conflict. Correspondingly, as the Phoenix Program 
achieved successes, the population adopted a slightly more pro-government stance, and 
the VC suffered accordingly. 
The operational environment for the VC ranged from permissive in "liberated 
areas" and cross-border sanctuaries, to non-permissive in government controlled or 
contested areas. For the VCI working at the district and village level, the constant risk of 
compromise and capture by Phoenix units prompted extreme internal security measures. 
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These included measures such as remaining hidden during daylight hours, sleeping in a 
different location each day, and never returning to a home village. 
The VC tactical environment generally offered good cover with vast areas of the 
country covered by some combination of heavy forest, jungles, and mountains. 
Resources and available targets remained an ever-present concern for the VC, but rarely 
an issue in terms of forcing a suspension of operations. Perhaps the most viable effect 
resource control had on VC units was to force a change in operational tempo, or prompt a 
withdrawal to a sanctuary area. Resource control also prompted increased activity on the 
part of supporting VCI members who would have to scramble to find and supply rice to 
local VC units. This increased activity, particularly in violation of curfews, made the 
VCI vulnerable to identification and interdiction. 
C. ILOC FUNCTIONING AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS 
The Phoenix Program was unique in that it formalized the significance of the 
infrastructure to the overall functioning of the insurgent organization. The use of lessons 
learned from the Huk, and particularly the Malayan insurgencies, allowed for 
development of a systematic and deliberate methodology for targeting what was for the 
first time recognized as a critical target. The program's use of extensive intelligence 
resources, U.S. advisors, and indigenous units created vast opportunities for exploitation 
and neutralization of VC ILOC' s. 
1. ILOC Pathways and Infrastructure Functioning 
Within the VC organizational structure the flow of formal authority was 
significant. In a similar pattern, the flow of decision making followed a top-down flow 
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consistent with military organizations, but also allowed for delegation of routine decision 
making authority to the lowest practical level. This use of delegation should not, 
however be misconstrued as a freedom of action on the part of subordinate elements, but 
rather as a control mechanism that clearly defined what decision could be made at what 
level. These characteristics are consistent with a machine/divisional hybrid. 
The flow of regulated systems was significant for the duration of the insurgency 
but lacked flexibility and redundancy in areas like communications and logistics. These 
weaknesses became evident to Phoenix advisors who learned to focus on clandestine 
communications activity and illicit logistics traffic as both local activity indicators and 
lucrative target sets.51 Informal communication between structural components was 
strongly discouraged. However, at the village and district level informal communication 
and the associated familiarity with the local organization could not be avoided and was a 
significant threat to internal security. Phoenix units, like the PRU's, successfully 
exploited this familiarity by creating a "mini-domino effect" based on the knowledge of 
the first VCI suspect they would detain. 
2. Structural Strengths 
The structural strengths of the VC organization reflect characteristics consistent 
with a machine/divisional hybrid. These strengths are seen in the VC's organizational 
consistency, with respect to their ability to control national programs with a grassroots 
style of organization, and their ability to generally self-sustain. The organization's 
51 From an interview conducted at Ft. Bragg, N.C. with a former Phoenix Advisor (a 
retired Army LTC) who asked to remain anonymous (September, 1995). 
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extended reach, ranging from Saigon streets to the Mekong Delta rice paddies, as well as 
its operational diversity, are also strengths consistent with those indicated in Table 2.3. 
3. Structural Weaknesses 
Many of the structural weaknesses of the VC organization didn't become readily 
apparent until interaction with the Phoenix Program stripped away the VC mystique of 
invincibility that had become pervasive by 1965. Internal security, particularly at the 
village and district level, was the most glaring of these weaknesses. While adequate for 
warning VCI members of pending government sweeps, the VCI were ill-prepared to deal 
with specific targeting directed against individuals. As noted earlier, the familiarity with 
local organization members allowed for a synergistic effect as suspects informed on their 
comrades, who in tum informed on others. This phenomenon became so common that by 
1968 the Phoenix Program was able to provide its advisors with a handbook that was 
essentially a generic "who's who" in the VCI and perhaps more important, who should 
know whom within a given VCI substructure.52 
Additional weakness evident in the VC organization was their supply-side 
dependency in order to maintain operational outputs. Another weakness, normally 
associated with an adhoc/cellular structure, was slow communications. This slowness is 
attributable to the VC reliance on nontechnical systems like couriers and letter drops 
when communicating at subordinate levels. This weakness was demonstrated during the 
TET Offensive when VC units in two separate corps tactical zones didn't receive word to 
52VCI Handbook, Section ill. 
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delay their attack for 24 hours.53 The resultant attacks provided the most significant early 
warning to MACV that a general offensive was in the offing. 
4. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities 
The vulnerabilities present in the VC organizational structure can be gleaned from 
those offered in Table 2.3. Arguably the most critical vulnerability present within the 
VCI were the C3 ILOC's between headquarters at Regional and Province level, and the 
operating cells and committees at District and the village level. Phoenix's effectiveness 
at interdicting these ILOC' s, once a criticism of the program because it focused too much 
energy at low-level cadres, was one of its greatest strengths. As the VCI in a local area 
were neutralized, higher echelons were stymied in their attempts to project influence back 
into the area. 
The VCI techno-structure was another vulnerability that became particularly 
susceptible to interdiction and neutralization. By the early 1970's, aggressive action on 
the part of Phoenix operating elements had effectively crippled the VCI at a cost of 
thousands arrested or killed. The survivors, many of them featured prominently on 
Phoenix wanted posters, were driven across the border into Cambodia for sanctuary.54 
These losses, principally among low to mid-level cadres like tax collectors, proselytizers, 
recruiters, and other party functionaries could not be readily replaced and left a void 
between the higher-level VCI and the population. 
53James J. Wirtz, The Tet Offensive, Intelligence Failure in War, (Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca and London, 1991), p.219. 
54Dale Andrade, Ashes to Ashes, The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War, (Lexington 
Books, Lexington and Toronto, 1990), p. 278. 
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5. . Action Plan 
The pure-case generic action plans offered in Table 2.3 offer an appropriate 
macro-level targeting strategy for the machine/divisional hybrid encountered in the VC 
organization. We know from history that efforts against mid-level functionaries and 
technicians took a damaging toll on the VCI. We also know that these efforts had a 
synergistic effect and served to isolate entire locales from further VC proselytizing 
efforts, and effectively segregated them from VC influence. This effect was also 
consistent with the generic action plan's call for isolating C3 ILOC's and denying mutual 
support between elements. 
Another aspect of the generic action plan that was not adequately addressed by 
Phoenix was the interdiction of endogenous sources of support. An effort in this regard, 
generally recognized as a population segregation scheme, was attempted under the 
Strategic Hamlet Program. This program, loosely modeled on the Malayan "New 
Village" concept, was badly managed and alienated countless peasants who were herded 
from their ancestral homes and into government compounds. 55 It also had little effect on 
denying rice to the VC, who were functioning in an area once considered Vietnam's 
"Rice Bowl." 
D. CONCLUSION 
The ultimate resolution of the Vietnam conflict provides a very useful contrast to 
the outcomes in the other cases. The Phoenix case provides the strongest evidence yet to 
substantiate the premise that infrastructure targeting is a necessary condition for success, 
55Kamow, p. 256. 
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but not sufficient in and of itself to cause success. This may seem counter-intuitive when 
one considers that Phoenix was undeniably effective at interdicting the Viet Cong 
Infrastructure, yet South Vietnam ultimately fell to Communist control. Or is it? We 
must remember that Saigon did not fall to a VC led popular uprising, but rather to a 
conventional invasion from the North. The role of VC, or what remained of them, had · 
been reduced to insignificance. 
Even though the goals of Phoenix increased in perceived importance as the 
conflict evolved, the reality was that no real integration between anti-infrastructure 
activities and an overarching campaign plan existed. Given the ultimate resolution of the 
conflict, replete with an armor-led conventional invasion, this lack of integration assumes 
a critical significance as a condition that was not achieved. When integration did occur, 
as best exemplified by the Marines' Combined Action Platoons, the results were 
extremely positive. 56 
Another condition not achieved within the parameters of the Phoenix Program 
was centralized guidance or planning for targeting ILOC's within the VCI structure. As 
early as 1968, the defining characteristiCs of a VCI member had been crafted into the 
same presidential decree that gave Phoenix its charter. 57 Despite later refinements of the 
definition, no further prioritization was placed on targets within the VCI with the 
exception of rank ordering. As a result, Phoenix Advisors were faced with a target-rich 
56Krepinevich, p. 172. The Marine CAP's comprised a detachment of U.S. Marines and a 
local militia unit permanently assigned to a hamlet to deny access to the VC. 
57 Andrade, p. 84. 
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environment and generally allowed to expend their efforts as they saw fit. The results 
were predictably mixed; as one former Phoenix adviser recalled, "some guys got it, 
others never did, and you could tell who belonged in what group by looking at the VC 
activity in their area."58 While targeting appropriate subgroups within the VCI may have 
shown promise, no appreciable effect could be discerned at a national level because 
subgroup data was lost in the overall tally of VCI. 
Ultimately, Phoenix's success, which came as a result of a systematic approach to 
targeting, contributed to its downfall. This approach was subject to statistical 
interpretation using systems analysis correlation techniques. As a result, the measure of 
effectiveness for districts, provinces, and regions became a statistical drill to satisfy a 
numbers-based unit of measure. This emphasis on numbers fueled a quota system which 
all but ignored the qualitative nuances of selecting targets, and limited exploitation 
options for the advisors in the field; in effect defeating the concept of systematic 
targeting. 
In the final assessment, Phoenix must be considered a success with respect to its 
interaction with the VC. However, the failure to achieve the related and necessary 
conditions for overall success effectively negated the program's achievements. With 
respect to final resolution of the conflict, although ultimately achieving the mission goal 
of the VC, the final conquest of Vietnam was much less about the VC and much more 
58from a series of discussions on Phoenix with LTC (Ret.) Terry Johnson, A former 
Phoenix Advisor, (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., 1995). 
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about the strategic aspirations of the North Vietnamese. Ironically, much the same could 
be said about the role of Phoenix and the many masters it strived to serve. 
E. EPILOGUE TO THE HISTORICAL CASES 
A brief review of the historical cases allows us to make some preliminary 
conclusions about various aspects of these cases and discuss the necessity and sufficiency 
of what we earlier termed, "related and influencing conditions for success." 
1. Initial Observations 
As offered in the introductory chapter, all three historical cases substantiate 
infrastructure targeting as a necessary condition for success in a counter-organization 
campaign. However, the outcome of the Phoenix case also demonstrates that this 
condition is not sufficient, in and of itself, to explain success. 
The cases offer mixed results with regard to the systematic or intuitive nature of 
the infrastructure targeting plan. In the Huk case, Magsaysay's intuitive planning 
achieved exemplary results, while the Malayan and Phoenix cases show the virtue of 
systematic targeting. Given these results it is apparent, at least from the historical 
examples, that neither systematic or intuitive targeting were necessary or sufficient to 
achieve success in a campaign. This does not consider the questions of efficiency in 
developing a targeting plan, or the luck of having the right leader in the right place at the 
right time. We argue that either of these considerations would give greater credibility to 
the systematic approach for targeting. 
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The cases offer strong support to the condition of appropriate targeting of nodes as 
necessary for success. Both the Huk and Malaya cases demonstrate a discriminating 
application of effort against nodes within the infrastructure that had a lynch-pin effect. In 
contrast, the Phoenix case shows an uncoordinated effort in this regard with results, either 
positive or negative, restricted to the local level. 
2. Preliminary Conclusions 
Finally, these cases also offer historical validation for the inclusion of 
infrastructure targeting in an overarching counter-organization campaign plan as 
necessary for success. 
The role of the police provides an excellent illustration of this point. In the two cases 
(Huks and Malaya), where the ultimate outcome favored the government, police agencies 
were tasked with critical roles in concert with both military operations and civic actions. 
These cases also demonstrated an ability to work around weaknesses in the police 
organizations, while optimizing their strengths in investigative techniques and urban 
intelligence. Divergently, the Phoenix case shows a National Police that was poorly 
trained, staffed with the least qualified recruits, and outside of Saigon, poorly controlled 
in terms of integration with national level efforts. Efforts to increase the organization's 
viability in a counterinsurgency role, where simply too little, too late. 
Both the Huk and Malaya case showed the counterinsurgency effort as diverse 
endeavors encompassing an enormous commitment of resources in a highly coordinated 
manner. In contrast, Phoenix was a program distinct from other pacification programs 
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and largely disassociated from the greater military and national objectives sought by 
MACV and the governments of South Vietnam and the United States. 
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VI. TERROR, INC.- THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we will apply our framework in a detailed analysis of the Abu 
Nidal terrorist organization (ANO). By doing so, we intend to demonstrate our theory's 
applicability outside of the general, overarching medium of insurgent warfare, as well as 
provide an example of the level of detailed analysis attainable through the use of our 
framework. Given these goals, we will therefore present a much more detailed case 
background, representing a realistic level of information available to an analyst prior to 
the beginning of the process. We will also present a number of visual pictograms, 
representing the types of finished products produced as a result of the analytical process. 
While the ANO case does not allow for complete evaluation based on historical 
resolution, it does provide a demonstration of our theory and framework in practical 
application on a case, as of yet, still left unresolved. 
B. THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION 
1. General 
The Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) has long been considered one of the most 
dangerous state-sponsored terrorist organization in existence. 59 While the trend in recent 
years had been moving away from state-sponsored international terrorist acts, we are now 
59 For the purpose of this case study, state-sponsored terrorism is defined as the use of 
violence by states through surrogate organizations, who in-tum derive political, financial, 
organizational, and operational assistance from the sponsor, to achieve political or 
strategic objectives. This form of violence is an alternative to direct conflict, with all its 
attending risks and costs. 
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beginning to see a re-emergence of the phenomenon as a form of surrogate warfare waged 
by weaker states that dare not challenge the major powers in open conventional warfare. 
Nowhere else is this trend more active than in the Middle East. The rise of groups like 
Iranian-backed Hizbollah and Islamic Jihad, as well as the continuing re-emergence of 
ANO, attest to this fact. 60 
ANO is a radical Palestinian Rejectionist group that contends both inter-Arab and 
intra-Palestinian terrorism are needed to precipitate an all-embracing Arab revolution 
that alone can lead to the liberation of "Zionist-occupied Palestine" (i.e., Israel). ANO's 
continued success and longevity is inexorably linked to the zeal and purposefulness of its 
founder, Sabri al-Banna (alias Abu Nidal). 
From its beginning as a splinter faction of the PLO in 1974, ANO aligned itself 
with a succession of notorious state sponsors. Today ANO has evolved into an 
organization with financial assets worth an estimated 200-400 million dollars.61 It has 
survived internal purges that eliminated over 600 ANO personnel. Likewise, it was able 
to avoid destruction even as Operation Desert Storm was raging nearby. These 
achievements, as well as the fact that ANO has foiled all attempts at neutralization by 
some of the best counter-terrorist organizations in the world (all while continuing to 
60 While individual and group-sponsored acts were predominant in 1995, a re-emergence 
of both direct and indirect state-sponsorship has been observed. From: U.S. Department 
of State, I995 Patterns of Global Terrorism, (April, 1996). 
61 Jeffrey Builta, Extremist Groups: An International Compilation of Terrorist 
Organizations, Violent Political Groups, and Issue-Oriented Militant Movements, (eds. 
John Murray and Richard H. Ward, Chicago, Ill: OICJ, 1996), p. 733. 
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mount some of the most spectacular terrorist operations ever), indeed earns ANO the title 
of "Terror, Incorporated." 
2. Historical Background 
The Abu Nidal Organization was formed, has evolved, and continues to survive 
entirely under the direction of its founder, Sabri al-Banna, who has evolved terrorism into 
an entrepreneurial enterprise of enormous proportions.62 Born in Jaffa in May of 1937, 
the youngest child by his father's eighth wife, al-Banna lived a relative life of luxury 
during his earliest years. However, following the death of his father in 1945, al-Banna 
and his mother (who had at one time been the family maid) were forced out of the 
household. 
In November, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly resolved to partition 
Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states. As a result of the fighting between the 
Arab armies and the emergent Jewish state, al-Banna's family lost all of their property 
and holdings. As the family took up residence in a U.N. refugee camp, their former home 
in Jaffa became quarters for Israeli army units. 
After spending nine months in the refugee camp, the family moved from the Gaza 
Strip to Nablus, the largest city in the West Bank area of Jordan. Here, al-Banna entered 
a government-run school and after graduating in 1955, enrolled as an engineering student 
62 Portions of ANO historical background information provided to the authors courtesy 
CPT Lane Lance (USA), LT Michael McGuire (USN), and LT Carl Bush (USN) from 
their research paper "State Sponsored Terrorism: The Abu Nidal Organization," (Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1995), pp.12-17. 
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at Cairo University. While he attended school for several years, he never graduated, in 
spite of his claims of having earned an engineering degree. 
In 1960, on the advice of his brother, al-Banna traveled to Saudi Arabia seeking 
work as an electrician's assistant. He soon joined the underground Ba'ath political party, 
which was outlawed in Saudi Arabia. Shortly thereafter, he joined al-Fatah, the guerrilla 
arm of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), headed by Y asser Arafat. Al-
Banna's political activities soon drew the attention of his Saudi employers and the Saudi 
secret police; he was soon fired from his job, arrested and imprisoned (and tortured), and 
then expelled from the country. Al-Banna's feelings of persecution multiplied, and he 
soon added Saudi Arabia to the list of states (which at the time consisted of Great Britain 
and Israel) at which he directed his hatred.63 
As a result of his experiences in Saudi Arabia, along with the Israeli victory in the 
1967 War, al-Banna plunged further underground and became heavily-involved with the 
al-Fatah movement. As the Israeli occupational forces uncovered Fatah members, al-
Banna fled Nablus to join several of his older brothers in Amman, Jordan. It was during 
this period that al-Banna chose his underground name, Abu Nidal. 
As al-Banna made connections with prominent al-Fatah leaders, his power and 
influence within the organization grew. PLO Chairman Arafat assigned al-Banna first as 
PLO representitive to the Sudan. After the Sudanese discovered that al-Banna was 
forming underground Fatah cells within their country, Arafat recalled him and gave him a 
new posting as PLO representative to Iraq. 
63 Ibid., p. 13. 
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3. Organizational Life-Cycle Phases 
a. The Iraqi Phase (1970- 1983) 
Sabri al-Banna's previous ties to the Ba'ath Party proved useful to him in 
Iraq, as the ruling family were also members of the Ba'ath Party. Ba'athist movement 
ideology proclaims the party as " ... a popular and nationalist revolutionary party which is 
struggling for Arab unity, freedom, and socialism."64 While neighboring Syria's ruling 
party also subscribed to Ba'athist ideology, the Iraqi's felt that Syria had betrayed the 
movement by accepting UN Resolution 242, which called for a peaceful resolution of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Iraqi leaders decided to sponsor a terrorist organization known as 
the Arab Liberation Front, which had been formed in 1969 to clandestinely serve the 
interests of the Ba'ath Party in Iraq, while simultaneously opposing the Syrian movement 
through its underground operations inside Syria. 
During this time, al-Banna used his growing power and influence with the 
ruling family to consolidate his personal power base and soon became the most influential 
Palestinian in Iraq. He maintained close ties with Iraqi Intelligence, and was afforded the 
opportunity to receive extensive guerrilla training and instruction (as well as an 
introduction to Marxist ideology and organization) in Communist China and North 
Korea. 
After the crushing defeat of the al-Fatah guerrillas in Jordan by the Royal 
Army in 1970, the PLO decided to shift its strategy of open opposition against Israel 
directly, and instead embarked upon a campaign of international terrorism to call 
64 Ibid., p. 14. 
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attention to the Palestinian cause. The first such incident was the hostage seizure and 
subsequent gun battle when the terrorist group Black September (the PLO's terrorist arm) 
seized the Israeli Olympic Team at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. A series of high-
visibility terrorist acts followed, but instead of support, the Palestinians received only 
condemnation. After the hard-fought Israeli victory over an Egyptian/Syrian coalition 
(along with small contingents from both Iraq and Jordan) in the 1973 October War, the_ 
PLO began to moderate its position towards Israel and move away from terrorism. 
Throughout 1973, al-Banna began to build the infrastructure of an 
organization that would eventually become ANO. With Iraqi help, al-Banna began 
recruiting personnel and acquiring equipment. He began to openly oppose the PLO 
leadership's political moderation towards dealing with Israel. His conviction meshed 
perfectly with the Iraqi Ba'athist rejection of a political settlement to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict as accepted by Syria, and would become the foundation for the growth of ANO in 
Iraq. 
In 1974, al-Banna was stripped of his positions within al-Fatah, primarily 
due to his open criticism of Fatah' s leadership, as well as his known complicity with Iraqi 
authorities. While losing all ties with the PLO, al-Banna gained extensive support from 
Iraq- ANO was given all assets belonging to the PLO within Iraq to include weapons, 
equipment, offices, training bases, and even the PLO radio station and tower. 
Additionally, ANO was given political and operational support by the Ba'athist regime. 
All told, ANO started out with an "investment capital" totaling approximately forty 
million dollars. 
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ANO, along with several other Palestinian terrorist organizations that did 
not agree with the PLO's moderate stance, splintered off to form "The Rejectionist 
Front." Al-Banna immediately set ANO on a course to strike out against the PLO 
leadership for their "traitorous" rejection of terrorism. As the number of attacks against 
the PLO grew, cooperation within the Front began to unravel. The other members did not 
agree with the PLO, but they could not see the efficacy of starting what amounted to a 
"civil war" among the various Palestinian factions. In response to this lack of support, al-
Banna formally pulled ANO out of the Rejectionist Front and continued with his 
campaign (with complete Iraqi backing) against the PLO. In retaliation, a PLO court tried 
al-Banna in-absentia for treason against the PLO and sentenced him to death. Al-Banna 
responded in kind with his own death sentence passed on Arafat. 
Iraq stepped-up its direct support to ANO in the form of training and 
financial backing and in return, ANO was aimed against the Iraqi's primary enemies: 
Syria, Israel, and the PLO. However, after the fall of the shah of Iran in 1979 and the rise 
of Shia-inspired Islamic Fundamentalism, war broke out between Iran and Iraq and at this 
point Iraqi and ANO interests began to diverge. ANO launched a series of bloody attacks 
throughout Europe, and these attacks subsequently interfered with Iraq's attempts to 
garner European support for its war against Iran. Similarly, al-Banna's private extortion 
operations against several wealthy Gulf States interfered with Iraq's initiatives for 
regional support. In 1982 al-Banna was informed that ANO would no longer receive 
Iraqi backing and would have to relocate its base of operations to another country. 
Consequently, in response to this development, the United States removed Iraq from the 
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list of state sponsors of terrorism (even though the U.S. knew full well that Iraq continued 
to sponsor terrorism). 
b. The Syrian Phase (1983 -1985) 
As al-Banna detached from Iraq, Syrian intelligence officers facilitated 
ANO operations to expand both in the Middle East and Europe. Like Iraq previously, 
Syria had plans to utilize ANO in their internal wars as well as their external wars. They 
considered a notorious figure such as Abu Nidal an asset that could be used to pressure 
the likes of Y asser Arafat and Saddam Hussein into compliance with their own agenda. 
While ANO was never given the political legitimacy it enjoyed in Iraq 
(President Assad continuously refused to meet al-Banna face-to-face), they were allowed 
to set up a series of legitimate travel and real estate agencies throughout the country. 
During this phase, ANO waged a bloody campaign on Syria's behalf against Jordan, in an 
attempt to prevent peace between King Hussein and Israel. Al-Banna was also allowed to 
continue his extortion against the rich Gulf States. Both UAE and Kuwait paid ANO 
huge sums of money to prevent attacks on their countries. 
Also during this phase, with Syrian consent, ANO filtered agents into 
Lebanon and began to build the People's Army, the guerrilla arm of ANO. In late 1983 
when Israel invaded Lebanon in an attempt to crush the PLO, al-Banna 
uncharacteristically sent 130 of his best guerrilla fighters to join with al-Fatah guerrillas 
in the fight against Israel. When Y asser Arafat heard of this development, he had all the 
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ANO fighters arrested as possible spies. When al-Banna found out, he was supposedly 
"enraged," and vowed to destroy the PLO himself.65 
In response to increased international pressure regarding Syrian-sponsored 
terrorism, ANO was placed under an ever-tightening set of restrictions for operating both 
inside and outside Syria. Al-Banna did not appreciate this further constriction and began 
to make overtures to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddaffi. By 1985, ANO began 
conducting operations for Libya, even though it had not fully transitioned out of Syria. 
c. Libyan Phase (1985-Present?) 
Under Libyan sponsorship, ANO enjoyed immense support and enormous 
freedom of maneuver. The years 1985 and 1986 proved to be peak years in international 
terrorist incidents for ANO. Two of the most violent acts, the simultaneous attacks 
against El Al ticket counters in Rome and Vienna, occurred during this period. However, 
after the late-1986 bombing of the LaBelle Discotheque in Berlin resulted in the killing 
and wounding of U.S. servicemen (for which ANO involvement was indicated), U.S. 
retaliation against Libya (in the form of aerial bombing) brought about an almost 
instantaneous halt toANO activities. 
This temporary lull only served to focus al-Banna's attention on his own 
organization. From 1987- 1989, he undertook a most violent "corporate down-sizing" in 
which over 600 of his own members were executed in an attempt to purge the system of 
suspected traitors and to return the organization to a smaller, more covert operation. 
65 Patrick Seale, Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire, (Random House, New York, 1992), pp.113-
116. 
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Emerging from this purge, ANO found itself on the verge of the beginning of Operation 
Desert Shield/Storm. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was a direct challenge to the 
Gulf's oil reserves and the West's concept of the state system. In response, a massive 
coalition was arrayed against Iraq, ANO's former sponsor. Allied with Iraq was Yasser 
Arafat and the PLO. Sensing that this situation would prove tempting for al-Banna, 
Qaddaffi again shut ANO down for the duration of the Gulf War. After the war, al-Banna 
was apparently tired of being so tightly-controlled by his state sponsors and again set 
ANO off in a new direction. 
d. Recent/Current Operations 
Starting in 1993, ANO almost exclusively directed its operations against 
senior al-Fatah commanders and representatives in Lebanon, and began tore-expand the 
People' Army. This apparent strategic shift would enable ANO to become the 
predominant secular Palestinian group operating in Lebanon and would allow ANO to 
conduct operations in a much less constrained fashion.66 During the past two years, 
apparent ANO operations have been sharply focused on both attempting to assassinate 
Y asser Arafat and the infiltration of Palestinian Authority (P A)-controlled territory in an 
effort to derail the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Accords.67 
66 
This interpretation of events, as well as all analytical content within this chapter is 
derived entirely from open source documents. Undoubtedly, the inclusion of classified 
information might lead to different conclusions, but the distribution and hence, the 
usefulness of this work would be restricted. 
67 
FBIS Report: NC1909141095, "New Group Accuses Abu Nidal of August Killing," 
(19 Sept 95); FBIS Report: NC1401100696, "Palestinian Police Reportedly Foil Abu 
Nidal Terror Campaign," (14 Jan 96); FBIS Report: TA141102096, "PA, IDF Prevent 




ANO's espoused political ideology is an offshoot of the radical Rejectionist Front 
which rejects the idea of a peaceful or negotiated settlement with Israel. Violence is 
viewed as the only appropriate means in dealing with Israel. Anyone who is seen as 
supporting or negotiating with Israel (i.e. the U.S. or Arafat) is considered an enemy as 
well. While al-Banna has espoused his beliefs as supporting those of Marx and Mao, in 
practice he has adapted the ideological rhetoric of whomever happens to be sponsoring 
him at the moment. 
2. Organizational Personality 
While the internal leadership structure of ANO is modeled loosely along 
Marxist/Maoist lines, in function it is much more like a sheikdom (with al-Banna at the 
head). An elaborate hierarchy of telescoping structures gives the appearance that a 
system of quasi-democratic leadership exists within ANO. In reality, al-Banna rules out 
of fear and intimidation of his subordinates. Dissent is not tolerated (and is historically 
fatal). When al-Banna says "make it happen," it happens ... 68 
The organizational maturity of ANO is well developed and represents an 
organization that is extremely long-lived for one whose primary output is terrorist actions. 
68 This phenomenon is explained in "Narcississism and the Charismatic Leader-Follower 
Relationship," Political Psychology, (Vol. 7, No.4, 1986), wherein Jerrold M. Post 
describes the relationship authoritarian/charismatic leaders develop with their "value-
hungry" followers. 
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ANO is now roughly twenty-two years old. There are approximately 100 personnel 
currently involved in ANO terrorist operations or supporting roles, with approximately 
500 personnel serving as guerrilla fighters in the People's Army in Lebanon.69 Not only 
is ANO anomalous in its long life, but it has also proven to be uncannily resilient against 
setbacks and major efforts from its enemies to destroy it. 
Culturally, ANO members come from all strata of Palestinian Diaspora society. 
The leadership, managerial, and technical positions are filled predominantly by the 
intellectual class, while the actual operators are recruited out of the refugee camps in 
Lebanon. Many recruits are sent abroad for technical training, while others remain less-
educated and wind up in the People's Army guerrilla wing. ANO membership is largely 
secular, and does not espouse Islamic Fundamentalism. Two particular ethno-cultural 
aspects apparent in ANO that reveal the connection to common Bedouin roots include the 
familial ties between al-Banna and other members of his family he has placed into 
positions of power, and the willingness of ANO to form temporary alliances with rival 
factions in an effort to defeat a common enemy. This last trait is also reflected in ANO's 
willingness to switch allegiance back and forth between sponsors and former enemies 
(except with the PLO). 
3. Mission Goal 
ANO's long-standing espoused goal is the ultimate destruction of the state of 
Israel and the establishment of an independent Palestinian homeland encompassing all of 
69 The People's Army is an off-shoot of ANO and represents al-Banna's effort to counter 
al-Fatah in Lebanon. The People's Army conducts guerrilla operations only and is not 
involved in terrorist activities. 
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the land considered as Palestine. While this goal reflects those of other Rejectionist Front 
organizations, ANO's operations, as well as al-Banna's personal behavior, suggests that 
other goals on multiple levels of analysis conflict with this overarching goal. 
On the personal level, al-Banna has demonstrated that his own survival, along 
with his continued massing of personal wealth have long-since replaced any selfless 
desire to help the Palestinian people. Likewise, his personal vendetta against the PLO in 
general, and against Arafat in particular has frequently conflicted with furthering the 
Palestinian cause. 
From an organizational level of analysis, ANO has always acted in the best 
interest of its own organizational survival. This has manifested itself in actions as diverse 
as an internal purge of over 600 ANO members in an attempt to reduce its vulnerability to 
penetration by its enemies, to conducting terrorist attacks totally unrelated to its own 
goals in an effort to placate its state sponsor at that particular time. 
From a societal level of analysis, ANO's actions indicate that it has continually 
drifted further away from its original mandate: the violent overthrow and destruction of 
the state of Israel in order to establish an autonomous, independent Palestinian state. A 
close examination of the ANO activity chronology (provided in Appendix C) reveals a 
pattern of continuous attacks against other Palestinians; the very group ANO espouses to 
be fighting for. Further examination reveals only a handful of attacks against Jewish 
targets worldwide and no attacks occurring within Israel. Likewise, upon comparison 
with the Middle Eastern activity chronology, in several instances, ANO's actions led to 
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extremely negative outcomes for the Palestinian movement as a whole.70 Presented with 
these facts, it is very difficult to see how ANO has positively impacted the Palestinian 
people or their movement. 
4. Core Technology 
a. Inputs 
Despite ANO's vast resources, it has until very recently relied heavily on 
exogenous support from its state sponsor. This support comes in several forms. Perhaps 
the most important is an overarching political protection associated with the state status 
of the sponsor and extended to ANO: protection within sovereign borders, travel 
passports and visas, and the use of diplomatic bags for moving funds and weapons. 
ANO receives organizational support in the form of access to the 
sponsor's intelligence and security apparatus. In many cases, al-Banna established his 
own extensive intelligence net within the sponsoring states and successfully infiltrated his 
agents into those security services in order to keep abreast of any internal developments 
that might impact ANO. Additionally, ANO received funding, training bases, weaponry, 
and numerous personal gratuities from all of his various sponsors. 
Other exogenous support included funds extorted from the oil-rich gulf 
states such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United. Arab Emirates, which were paid to 
prevent ANO terrorist attacks within those countries. Similarly, allegations have been 
made that several Western European states paid ANO millions of dollars either to settle 
70 An example is the attempted assassination of the Israeli Ambassador to England in 
1982 directly led to the retaliatory invasion of Lebanon by Israel, in which the PLO was 
routed and deported. Seale, pp. 222-226. 
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ongoing terrorist operations, or to prevent ANO terrorist actions from occurring within 
their borders.71 
Endogenous support to ANO also comes in a variety of forms. Palestinian 
Diaspora living in the refugee camps of Lebanon provide a sizable pool of possible 
recruits from which to choose. ANO has also developed its own sources of income 
through an elaborate network of investments, front companies, and arms trading 
companies. Many of these companies existed behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold 
War. But after the downfall of the Soviet Bloc, this protective screen disappeared, and 
little is actually known about what happened toANO's assets. In all probability, .al-
Banna saw the end coming and with his characteristic ability to stay one step ahead, re-
invested the money into front companies in the West. 
b. Production 
ANO' s production mechanism can be described as dispersed, complex, 
and inefficient. First, production is dispersed as each type of output is produced in a 
different location. This dispersion is a function of operational security, as 
compartmentation of various functions and operations ensures that if one part is 
compromised, the entire organization will not follow suit. 
Next, production is considered complex due to the high degree of 
differentiation among the various outputs. ANO transforms its recruits into anything 
71 In Abu Nidal: Gun for Hire, Seale alleges that Belgium paid ANO millions of dollars 
for the return of several kidnapped Belgian citizens, and to prevent any further incidents. 
Seale also alleges that France paid off ANO in a similar effort to prevent attacks on 
French targets. 
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from a basic guerrilla fighter in the People's Army, to intelligence operatives, assassins, 
bomb makers, newspaper publishers, financial managers, and a variety of other 
specialized functionaries. Likewise, because ANO conducts operations worldwide, its 
support networks are also highly complex, both to ensure mission success, as well as the 
survivability of the net. 
Finally, ANO production can be considered inefficient in pure 
"production" terms. The length of time and amount of raw materials needed to produce a 
limited number of outputs constitutes inefficient production (an analogy between hand-
crafted products versus mass-produced products is illustrative of this point). In ANO's 
case, many recruits are recruited initially, but very few survive (literally) the vetting 
process to become an active ANO operative. The process to train and emplace agents is 
very long and not easily accomplished. The training facilities are spread throughout the 
Middle East to ensure security, further subtracting from overall production efficiency. 
Yet what must be understood is that while producing a more "tailored" output may be 
inefficient in one sense, long term gains for the organization will ultimately be measured 
by its overall effectiveness, which should increase due to a higher-quality product, all 
other things being equal. 
c. Outputs 
ANO's outputs can be characterized as being highly diversified, especially 
for a terrorist organization that is considerably removed from its overarching political 
movement. Not only is there a high degree of diversification between the terrorist section 
of the organization and the guerrilla section (People's Army in Lebanon), but the terrorist 
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operations themselves represent a very diverse capability, again reflecting the complexity 
of the production mechanism. 
5. Environment 
a. Strategic 
The strategic environment in which ANO operates is extremely dynamic, 
with a high level of uncertainty continuously in effect (an overarching state of affairs 
throughout the Middle East...). Complexity is also high due to the multiple mission goals 
ANO pursues which require continuous cross-spectrum strategic interaction. Similarly, 
support from the population varies widely among the various Palestinian groups, 
depending on location and their perceived risks or benefits of being associated with ANO. 
b. Operational 
The operational environment for ANO ranges from semi-permissive to 
extremely non-permissive. Within areas under the organization's direct control (i.e., 
within its own wire of a training camp located within a host nation), ANO has a 
reasonable level of autonomy and may be considered semi-permissive. However, outside 
the wire, even within its host nation, ANO implements security measures consistent with 
a non-permissive environment. Naturally, the international cells operate within an 
extremely non-permissive environment and conduct communications and operations 
utilizing maximum secrecy. 
c. Tactical 
On the tactical level, ANO utilizes the cover of secrecy to hide its 
activities, whether it takes the form of urban cells, or remote desert training bases. Raw 
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materials and resources, be they new recruits, weapons, or explosive materials remain 
plentiful. High value targets are readily accessible worldwide (over 70% of ANO' s 
operations have been conducted outside the Middle East). 
D. STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ILOC FUNCTIONING 
1. Structure 
a. Overall Structure (Situational Template) 
The great diversification of outputs and activities of ANO, along with the 
sophisticated infrastructure of the organization suggests an overall structure along the 
lines of a Divisional Hybrid Covert Organization (see Figure 6.1). This structure 
incorporates an elaborate "corporate" headquarters (consisting of the strategic apex, 
techno-structure, and support staff), along with two very distinct and differently 
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Divisional Hybrid Covert Organization 
Figure 6.1. ANO Situational Template. 
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b. Major Divisions 
The two major divisions consist of the People's Army in Lebanon, and the 
Intelligence Directorate (see Figure 6.2). The People's Army is structured as a Machine-
like Covert Organization and is responsible for conducting guerrilla operations within 
Lebanon. The People's Army is fairly autonomous and self-supporting, except for 
leadership and funding ties back toANO's headquarters. The Intelligence Directorate is 
responsible for the conduct of covert terrorist operations and takes the form of an Adhoc-
Cellular Covert Organization. Each section within the Directorate is compartmentalized, 
as is each of its specialized operational cells. The only time the cells interact with each 
other is when they form a temporary matrix relationship during the execution of a 
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Intelligence Directorate 
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Figure 6.2. Major Divisions within ANO. 
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c. Major Sub-Structures 
ANO's sub-structure architecture is highly developed and complex. At the 
top of the leadership hierarchy within the strategic apex is al-B anna himself. Al-Banna 
acts as the head of the Political Bureau, a five person group responsible for senior-level 
decision making. Beneath and encompassing the Political Bureau is the ten member 
Central Committee, consisting of the heads of all the directorates and committees within 
ANO. The Central Committee is responsible for providing a supposedly democratic 
forum for deciding on recommendations for future operations forwarded by the 
Revolutionary Council. The Revolutionary Council consists of all members of both the 
Political Bureau and Central Committee, plus other representatives from within the 
various substructures. The Council is supposedly an open forum for proposing and 
discussing future operations and organizational direction. 
Beneath this leadership hierarchy lies a number of directorates and 
committees that are both diversified and autonomous in their function (see Figure 6.3). 
Because of the secretive nature of a terrorist organization (where security measures 
determine organizational and personal survival), most of the organizational substructures 
do not interface with each other on a routine basis. Because of this advanced 
organizational structure, ANO has been able to survive direct attack, penetration, and 
removal of state sponsorship, and has demonstrated an uncanny ability to repeatedly come 
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Figure 6.3. Major Sub-Structures within ANO. 
2. ILOC Pathways and Infrastructure Functioning 
a. Flow ofF ormal Authority 
Finance Dir. 
I Expend. Invest. I 
Despite the elaborate Marxist-based leadership hierarchy, what is readily 
apparent within ANO is that the most important substructures report directly to al-Banna 
(see Figure 6.4). These include the following: The Membership Committee, which 
maintains computerized files on all ANO members. The Finance Directorate, with 
responsibility over the management of all ANO assets worldwide, as well as 
disbursement of funds for operations. The Political Bureau, which publishes both an 
internal newspaper and an externally distributed journal, and also controls ANO's 
"ambassadors at large" charged with maintaining relations with other Arab states and 
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Palestinian groups. And finally, the Secretariat, which acts as a command and control 
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Figure 6.4. The Flow of Formal Authority within ANO. 
b. The Flow of Decision Making 
The flow of decision making within ANO is quite similar to the flow 
found in other covert, highly secretive organizations in that it is decidedly uni-directional 
from the top, down to the lower echelons. However, due to the Marxist/democratic 
structure of the strategic apex, "officially" there is some allowance made for lateral, as 
well as "bottom-up" input into the decision loop (see Figure 6.5). 
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Infrastructure Functioning 






I Expend. Invest. I 
Figure 6.5. Flow of Decision Making Within ANO. 
In theory, ideas concerning future ANO operations are initiated and openly 
discussed within the Revolutionary Council. Recommendations are then forwarded to the 
Central Committee for refinement and approval. Once approved, the decision to conduct 
an operation would pass through the Secretariat to the Intelligence Directorate, to then be 
disseminated to the appropriate sections and subsequent action cells. However, reality 
indicates that al-Banna routinely makes unilateral decisions without input or debate from 
others and then jumps the communications channel to personally initiate an action. 
c. System of Regulated Work Flows 
This view of ANO examines the system of regulated work flows occurring 
on a routine basis. This system includes the flow of information from the support 
structures on efficiency and productivity necessary for strategic planning; feedback from 
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the major divisions on current operations or any problems encountered; the flow of work 
through both operating cores; and finally, the flows of commands and decisions from the 
apex that direct the efforts of the divisions' operating cores. What we observe within 
ANO is a very compartmented and limited lateral flow with elongated vertical flows to 
the two divisions, as well as to sub-divisions within each (see Figure 6.6). 
Infrastructure Functioning 
(System of Regulated Work Flows) 
Figure 6.6. System of Regulated Work Flows Within ANO. 
d. Work Constellations 
The work constellation pattern depicts routine working relationships 
between various components within ANO. Analysis reveals a pattern that follows along 
the same narrow, elongated pathways as seen in the view of the system of regulated work 
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flows (see Figure 6.7). This suggests extreme compartmentation with limited contact on 
an "as-needed" basis. The pattern appears much "busier" between the corporate 
headquarters sub-structures and internally within each of the divisions, but to a much 
lesser degree between headquarters and the two divisions. 
Infrastructure Functioning 
(Work Constellations) 
Figure 6.7. Work Constellations Within ANO. 
e. Informal Communications 
As in most successful covert organizations, ANO strictly enforces the 
prohibition of informal communication between any of its members (with, of course, the 
exception of al-B anna himself). Even top-level functionaries are prohibited from meeting 
with each other informally unless al-Banna personally grants prior clearance. The 
supposed penalty for violating this rule is death (after a prolonged, and most certainly 
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brutal torturing). While this measure marks the ultimate in operational security 
procedures, it also provides for the largest opportunity for communications to be 
misinterpreted or slowed down. 
3. Structural Strengths and Weaknesses 
a. Strengths 
The first structural strength immediately apparent is the extreme level of 
compartmentalization of functions, operations, and communications within ANO. While 
this characteristic is quite common within covert organizations, ANO has developed it to 
an extreme degree. Much of this is surely a result of al-Banna' s paranoid penchant for 
secrecy and his desire to centralize power around him, but it has no doubt served him 
well, as evident by both ANO's and his own personal longevity. 
The next structural strength stems from the physical dispersion of the 
various sub-structures of the organization. While many directorates and committees are 
located within Lebanon, few are collocated with each other. Similarly, many directorates 
have back-up offices in the sponsor state of the time. This structure effectively spreads 
the risk of compromise or destruction over a wider physical area, ensuring that the 
organization cannot be completely destroyed through a direct action fait accompli. 
The final structural strength is ANO's diversified sources of inputs. From 
the beginning, ANO has tried to develop multiple sources of income, supplies, and 
sponsors. Similarly, ANO has continued to convert from a reliance on endogenous 
support to primarily endogenous sources of support. This can be seen in the operations of 
the Finance Directorate, where money given by sponsors or extorted from other states is 
130 
subsequently reinvested into front companies and bankrolled in multiple Swiss bank 
accounts. Thus ANO has developed a capacity for self-sustainment at a level other 
terrorist organizations only dream of. 
This trend is also reflected in ANO' s efforts toward local hegemony over 
other Palestinian groups (particularly al-Fatah) within Lebanon. While located within a 
sponsoring country still makes ANO vulnerable to that sponsor's considerable political 
influence, it would be difficult for any country (including Israel, Syria, or the United 
States) to root ANO out of its entrenched position in Lebanon. This would provide ANO 
with nearly unlimited freedom of maneuver. 
b. Weaknesses 
While the above strengths may make ANO appear to be invulnerable to 
penetration or destruction, each strength described also has its own accompanying 
weakness. While extreme compartmentalization ensures operational security, it also 
tends to hinder unity of effort throughout the organization. Operational planning and 
execution occur within a virtual vacuum. Few ANO operations have been successfully 
coordinated (one exception being the simultaneous attacks in Rome and Vienna) and 
fewer still have supported any overarching strategically planned campaign. 
Similarly, the dispersion between the various sub-structures within ANO 
contributes to overall inefficiency. Communications are slower, and the isolated 
components cannot reinforce or support each other without great difficulty if attacked. 
The physical separation also means there must be redundant support and logistics 
channels, as well as an increased number of security personnel to safeguard the various 
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sites. This would point to a larger signature of activity, as well as an increase in the 
number of people who would know about various aspects of the organization. 
4. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities 
Based on our theoretical propositions concerning infrastructure vulnerabilities as 
summarized in Chapter II (Table 2.3), the following macro-level vulnerabilities are 
apparent within ANO: C3 ILOC's between the headquarters and the two major divisions; 
isolation/decapitation of the strategic apex; internal substructural C3 nodes and ILOC' s; 
input ILOC's; ILOC's between ANO and its state sponsor. While these represent 
theoretical vulnerabilities without regard to operational or political constraints or 
considerations, practical considerations of the real world show that they are in fact 
relative to the apparently invulnerable nature of ANO (in other words, if they were easy 
to neutralize, they would have been a long time ago ... ). 
5. Generic Action Plan 
Again turning to our theoretical guidance (as summarized in Table 2.3), we can 
situationalize a macro-level generic action plan for conducting a counter-organization 
campaign against ANO. We must first caveat this by recognizing that we are presenting a 
plan unconstrained by political realities or operational limitations. while this condition 
rarely, if ever, exists in the real world, this framework offers a starting point for 
generating viable courses of action that take all relevant factors into account. These 
course of action would then be further analyzed and refined into a strategic level counter 
organization campaign pain for targeting ANO. Aditionally, we alert the reader that 
particular methodologies and techniques offered here, are purely illustrative and are in no 
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way offered as a specific recommendation. Any methodologies and techniques relevant 
to targetting ANO would only come as a byproduct of a micro-targetting process. 
First, we would attempt to isolate all major structures from each other. This would 
mean isolating the strategic apex (through interdiction or decapitation), isolating the 
headquarters from the major divisions, and isolating each division from one another. 
Further, we would isolate exogenous sources of support and put political and economic 
pressure directly on the sponsor state. Simultaneously, we would likewise attempt to 
interdict endogenous support ILOC' s, but this would require a high degree of 
multinational cooperation. 
Next, we would interdict C3 ILOC's in an attempt to disrupt communications and 
force ANO to waste time and assets trying to counter our efforts. This action would 
further isolate the various sub-structures and deny mutual support. These interdiction 
efforts would culminate in the concentration of effort against the most vulnerable division 
most likely the People's Army), forcing ANO to contract in on itself, and completely 
switch to the self-preservation mode. At this point, terrorist operations would have 
ceased, cells would have been compromised or dispersed, and al-Banna would probably 
be consolidating his personal holdings and looking for a safe location for retirement. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The case of the Abu Nidal Organization demonstrates several very important 
points with regard to the utility of our framework for analysis, as well as our overall 
theory and the importance of infrastructure targeting to any counter-organizational 
targeting campaign. Likewise, it demonstrates the ability of our framework to describe 
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and explain other types of covert organizations' structures and functioning (besides pure 
insurgent organizations), and how to derive a macro-level action plan for a case in 
progress. 
1. Framework for Analysis 
Our framework for analysis leads to the first conclusion that from an 
organizational perspective, ANO is no closer today from achieving its mission goals than 
it was the day al-Banna split away from al-Fatah. ANO suffers from an extremely 
dysfunctional structural hybrid stemming from the conflict between ideology and 
organizational personality factors, that has ultimately led to a straying from and 
splintering of the primary mission goal. 
Second, our framework reveals that the impact of organizational personality on 
overall organizational survival cannot be discounted in the ANO case. Similarly, the 
framework provides an example of what happens to a covert organization when it relies 
too heavily on its sponsor for exogenous support. Figure 6.8 depicts the relationship 
between activity level and sponsorship control. 
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ANO LIFE-CYCLE/ACTIVITY CORRELATION 
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Figure 6.8. ANO Activity Level/Sponsorship Correlation 
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What we see is a direct correlation between the two variables: when a sponsor 
provides a steady flow of exogenous support, activity levels rise; when a sponsor curtails 
support (either due to retaliation, sanctions, or fear thereof), particularly that all-important 
political support, activity levels drop. While this relationship pertains to state-sponsored 
terrorism in this particular case, the same relationship exists within other types of covert 
organizations in the form of an insurgent or resistance group, and a terrorist wing it owns 
or controls (i.e., Sinn Fein and the IRA). Thus we can now understand ANO's push for 
more autonomy through its increased control inside Lebanon. ANO has nothing to fear 
from the government of Lebanon as it is too weak to present a legitimate challenge (this 
move also provides more strategic depth between Israel and ANO as Israeli interventions 
into Lebanon prove extremely costly and unpopular in terms of world opinion). 
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2. Relevance to Infrastructure Targeting and Overall Theory 
The ANO case serves as a negative example of what happens when the 
infrastructure of an extremely covert organization is not targeted correctly nor tied into an 
overarching counter-organization campaign plan. The most obvious evidence of this 
comes from the ongoing campaign by the PLO/PA to destroy ANO and kill al-Banna (in 
this example, the PLO acts as a de facto regime with al-Fatah acting as regime security 
forces). 
As evidenced by the ANO chronology of activity (Appendix C), the primary 
means al-Fatah has used to target ANO is through the killing of top-level functionaries 
within ANO (this has also been al-Banna's strategy against al-Fatah, and has also proven 
equally unsuccessful). Because of the decentralized and redundant nature (except for 
decision-making) of ANO, it is highly unlikely that even the successful decapitation of 
ANO (by killing al-Banna) would prove a fatal blow to the organization. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the ANO case validates our propositions (through 
Mill's method of difference) by illustrating that when ILOC's are not correctly targeted, 
and when the targeting effort is not tied into an overarching campaign plan, a negative 
outcome will follow. This would demonstrate the necessity of these two conditions for 
overall success. Likewise, this case demonstrates that when targeting is conducted solely 
on intuitive, intimate knowledge by one organization thoroughly familiar with the other 
(one having sprung from the other), it will not necessarily lead to correct ILOC targeting. 
This supports our argument for the systematic approach to targeting. 
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VII. FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
A. FINDINGS 
1. Variable Dominance Between Cases 
Findings regarding the analyses of our case studies demonstrate that different 
variables (and subsequent sub-variables) proved dominant from case to case. Our 
findings validate our chosen variables in their ability to describe the structure, function, 
and associated strengths and weaknesses of each insurgent organization's unique mix. 
Further, we find that we can rank-order the impact of each variable within each case, and 
then compare the outcomes for any similarities, differences, or significant emerging 
patterns (see Table 7.1). These findings lead to a number of observations about the 
relationships between variables and their rank-order, and the dominance or 
~ PHILIPPINES MALAYA VIETNAM ABU NIDAL . 
IDEOLOGY 4 3 1 4 
ORGANIZATION 
PERSONALITY 1 4 4 1 
CORE 
TECHNOLOGY 3 2 3 3 
MISSION 
GOAL 5 5 2 5 
ENVIRONMENT 2 1 5 2 
Tl!ble 7 .1. Variable Dominance Rank-Ordering. 
recessiveness of individual variables within each case. These observations are stated as 
inductive, data-derived hypotheses (in italics), and are grouped together by variable: 
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a. Ideology 
Organizations that stay ideologically focused seem to demonstrate a 
higher level of cohesion and enhanced longevity over those that drift. In the Vietnam 
case, we see first the Viet Minh's, and then the VietCong's adherence to their ideology as 
an overriding influence acting as a cement to keep the organization focused and together, 
even when under intense external pressure. The VC's indoctrination program was intense 
and never-ending; and ideologically-reinforcing positions (such as people's councils and 
political officers) were designed into the organization's structure at every level from the 
start. 
In the other three cases, we see ideology treated as a low organizational 
priority. This was reflected in the lack of any regulated, on-going efforts at indoctrination 
within the Huks, the MRLA, and ANO. This lack of a deep-rooted belief in a singular 
ideology is further reflected within the leadership hierarchy of those respective 
organizations. This lack of ideological emphasis may be the result of the dysfunctional 
hybrid structure of the strategic apexes of these three organizations, as was detailed in the 
case analyses. Further, this deficiency correlates very highly with a low prioritization of 
mission goal across the same three cases, and may in fact speak to the necessity for a 
strong, binding ideology to provide a focus for mission goal as a condition for success of 
a covert organization. 
b. Organization Personality 
The overwhelming dominance of organization personality within a covert 
organization can bring about decline if not modulated by other variables. In both the 
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Huk case and the ANO case, we find organization personality as the dominant variable. 
With the Huks, the patriarchal nature of the various leaders clashed with the Marxist-
based structure, which led to complications with command and control and the eventual 
decline of the organization. 
In the ANO case, the overbearing dominance of al-Banna's psychotic 
personality leaves the organization succeptable to general paranoia, internal division, and 
ultimate decline. These events have all occurred at different points in ANO's life-cycle. 
The most extreme examples being the mass-execution of ANO recruits, the purges of 
upper-level leadership, and the decreasing levels of activity in the late '80's, as well as in 
recent years. ·While this factor is most closely associated with decline, we cannot ignore 
the point that conversely it has been through al-Banna's sheer force of will that ANO has 
survived (albeit not very effectively) to this day. 
c. Core Technology 
The core technology of a covert organization rarely proves dominant, but 
the "how" of organizational production is central to overall efficiency and therefore, 
ultimate effectiveness. Across the four cases, core technology was ranked in the "middle 
of the road" in dominance. While this finding does not, on the surface, provide any 
startling revelations, if we increase the magnification of our focus on this variable we can 
observe an interesting correlation on a finer level of analysis. 
In the Huk, Malaya, and ANO cases, the covert organizations relied 
primarily on one form of support. The Huks and the MRLA relied exclusively on 
endogenous support (although in the case of the MRLA, the ethnic Chinese population 
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from which they received support from was quickly isolated by the British and thus 
became, by our definition, exogenous), and were forced to divert most of their time and 
resources towards maintaining the flow of production. When the organizations attempted 
to expand, they exceeded the capacities of their sources of support, and were pushed 
across the threshold of efficiency. The regimes in these two cases were also successful at 
isolating the organizations from their resources, thus causing an immediate decline in 
productivity and effectiveness. This continued pressure led to the insurgents' ultimate 
defeat. 
In the ANO case, we see a total dependence on exogenous (state-
sponsored) support as an equally limiting factor. While ANO's sponsors provided 
enormous amounts of money and logistical support to the organization, this only lasted as 
long as ANO served the sponsor's purposes. When supporting ANO became too much of 
a physical or political risk, the sponsor either withdrew support and kicked ANO out of 
the country (Iraq and Syria), or simply "clamped down" and prevented ANO from 
conducting operations (Libya). That ANO realized this dependence as a liability is borne 
out in initiatives designed to generate endogenous sources of support, as well as carving 
out its own "sphere of influence" inside Lebanon. 
In the Vietnam case, the Viet Cong relied on a mixture of both endogenous 
and exogenous sources of support for their production. While the percentage of each 
varied within the mix over time, what invariably transpired was when one source would 
come under great pressure, the other source was able to "take up the slack" and 
compensate until the situation normalized. This provided the VC with a steady flow of 
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personnel and equipment with which to conduct operations. While the Phoenix Program 
did impede the functioning of the VCI to a large extent, it must be remembered that the 
decline of the vc is more attributable to poor timing and the mis-reading of popular 
support during Tet-'68 than to direct pressure from U.S. or ARVN forces. 
Thus we may hypothesize that from the covert organization's perspective, 
utilizing mixed sources of support is better than relying entirely on either endogenous or 
exogenous sources by themselves. How much of each is appropriate? The answer to that 
question goes beyond the scope of this investigation, but it is obviously context-
dependent. However, it is the analyst's job to determine what that mix is within a given 
organization, and then concentrate on isolating the most vulnerable source for intense 
micro-targeting. 
d. Mission Goal 
Organizations that do not hold mission goal as a high priority typically do 
not succeed. An interesting finding concerning mission goal is that three of the covert 
organizations in the case studies (Huks, MLRA, ANO) all held mission goal as their 
lowest priority. While it is almost certain that if a researcher were able to interview 
members from these organizations they would all respond that the ultimate victory for 
their people over their respective opponents was their number one priority, reality shows 
that the disparity between their espoused and actual (or even more realistic) mission goals 
prevented victory. 
Conversely, the VC in the Vietnam case placed mission goal as a high 
priority (both espoused and in actuality) and resulted ultimately in victory. While it is 
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questionable as to whether the North Vietnamese held the same espoused and actual 
mission goals as the VC (as demonstrated by the arrests of prominent members of the VC 
by the North shortly after the successful invasion in 1975), the outcome still resulted in a 
Communist victory over the South. 
Thus the importance of mission goal as a sort of "lynch-pin" variable as 
proposed in Chapter IT is reasonably confirmed. The particular synergistic effect of 
ideology on mission goal (as first proposed in sub-section a. above) is graphically 
demonstrated in the Vietnam case, and even more graphically demonstrated by its 
absence in the other three cases. Finally, the correlation between mission goal and covert 
organizational success as hypothesized at the beginning of this sub-section clearly seems 
to be high. 
e. Environment 
Covert organizations that can hold the environment "constant" (i.e., 
overcome physical obstacles and conditions, responses to regime pressure, etc ... ) and 
still maintain production have a significant advantage over their regime opponents. This 
hypothesis reflects the organization's ability to adapt to changing strategic, operational, 
and tactical environmental conditions and still maintain a steady operational tempo 
against the regime. The most successful organization (from our case studies) in this 
respect was the Viet Cong. 
The VC became totally integrated with its physical and operational 
environment. The jungle provided sanctuary to the VC, whereas the American forces 
viewed the jungle as an obstacle. The VC conducted all manners of business at night, 
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while American forces typically "dug in" by nightfall. In the cities, the VC adapted its 
structure to guard against the increased presence of U.S. and ARVN forces in urban areas. 
Strategically, the VC were able to stabilize environmental factors; and those people they 
were not able to win the support of were either intimidated into indifference, or 
eliminated. As a result, the environment proved to have the least impact in the Vietnam 
case. 
In contrast, the environmental variable ranked relatively high across the 
other three cases. Strategically, all three environments remained complex and extremely 
unstable. The decisive support of the people was never solidified. Operationally, once 
the various regimes devised a comprehensive plan and fielded enough trained forces, they 
took the initiative away from the insurgents.72 Thus we see the Vietnam case as the only 
case in which the covert organization neutralized the effects of the environment, and an 
overall positive case outcome from the insurgent's perspective. 
2. Conditions For Success Between Cases 
Having demonstrated the viability of our variables as a framework for analysis, we 
can now examine each regime's targeting responses against its corresponding covert 
organizational opponent as detailed in each case. First, we must evaluate each targeting 
condition in terms of its necessity and/or sufficiency as analyzed in each case (see Table 
7 .2). Next, we will analyze these findings for any patterns or correlations between 
7~hile the ANO case differs in that it is not in direct confrontation with only one regime 
(Israel not withstanding), once the international community brought concerted pressure 
against sponsor states, ANO was forced into the reactive, survival mode and activity 
drastically declined. 
143 
conditions which might help validate our hypotheses and our theory. Finally, we can then 
compare our results with those we hypothesized in Chapter I. 
a. Systematic Targeting 
The first finding we observe is a mixture of targeting types across the four 
cases. Next, we see that there is no apparent correlation between intuitive or systematic 
targeting and overall success. Thus we must conclude that systematic targeting is not a 
necessary condition for success in and of itself. However, the price of relying on intuitive 
~ PHILIPPINES MALAYA VIETNAM ABU NIDAL . 
INTUITIVE or 
SYSTEMATIC Intuitive Systematic Systematic Intuitive 
NODESIILOC's 








OVERALL C-O Yes Yes No No 
SUCCESS? 
OVERALL 
POSITIVE Yes Yes No No 
CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION? 
Table 7.2. Targeting Conditions Case Comparison. 
targeting is time, primarily that neither the gifted intuitive leader nor the trial-and-error 
method will provide the correct plan before the covert organization achieves its goal. 
Thus we must caveat this finding that systematic targeting, while not an absolute 
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necessity, is the most efficient process for correctly identifying and targeting covert 
organizations and their ILOC' s, particularly when time is at a premium. 
b. Correct Targeting of Nodes and ILOC's 
Here we see three positive results (Philippines, Malaya, Vietnam), and one 
negative result (ANO). Yet the only two cases of overall success are the Philippines and 
Malaya, which leads to the conclusion that the correct targeting of nodes and ILOC's is a 
necessary condition for success, but not sufficient for success by itself. This conclusion is 
substantiated in the Vietnam case. While the Phoenix Program (arguably) correctly and 
effectively targeted the VCI (even though Phoenix wasted effort in some areas), its efforts 
could not overcome the failure of other, less effective initiatives (such as conventional 
force operations, the civilian police force, and "Vietnamization") and provide an overall 
counter-organization campaign success against the Viet Cong. 
c. Targeting Integrated Into Overarching C-0 Campaign Strategy 
Here again with this condition we see a split across the four cases with two 
positive results (Philippines and Malaya), and two negative results (Vietnam and ANO). 
When correlated against overall success, we once again find that this condition is 
necessary for success, but is not sufficient in and of itself. The two positive cases 
validate the condition's necessity, as does its absence in the two negative cases. 
However, none of the cases provide substantive evidence against its sufficiency. A 
confirming example would include a case wherein incorrect targeting of nodes and 
ILOC' s are targeted, and yet an overarching counter-organization campaign proves 
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successful anyway. A case such as this example would almost surely reveal the presence 
of an extremely weak or inept covert organization to begin with. 
d. Overall Success/Overall Conflict Resolution 
The pattern of conditions for overall success against a covert organization 
appears to be based on a "building-block" process of necessary conditions. First, 
regardless of method, the critical nodes and ILOC's within a covert organization must be 
correctly identified and targeted. Next, the targeting effort must be integrated into an 
overarching counter-organization campaign strategy. These two conditions, if executed 
correctly, should prove sufficient for overall success. 
However, success of the counter-organization campaign proves to be a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for overall positive conflict resolution. Ultimate 
conflict resolution will depend on the regime's coordinated efforts at addressing social, 
political, and economic issues which fall under the rubric of counterinsurgency or internal 
defense and development (IDAD) strategy.73 Further, while systematic targeting is not 
necessary per se, it does represent the most accurate and efficient means available, 
particularly when time is a critical factor. 
73 See Army FM 100-20 for current elaborations on these topics. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
In Ted R. Gurr's classic work, Why Men Rebel, Gurr asserts that: 
The central scientific criterion for theory is that it be subject 
to empirical assessment. Four attributes of theory that 
facilitate its assessment are its falsifiability, definitional 
clarity, identification of relevant variables at various levels 
of analysis, and applicability to a large universe of events 
for analysis. The first two are necessary conditions for 
assessment, the others desirable.74 
Throughout this investigation, we have held this passage as our standard towards which 
we have strived. We feel that we have met the above criteria both fairly and objectively. 
We have backed up our hypotheses with historical fact, and validated the consistency of 
our theory removed from history and operationalized in the real (and present) world. We 
have been clear and consistent in our defining and usage of variables and terminology, 
and demonstrated our variables' descriptive power across multiple levels of analysis. 
While this study did not utilize the large-n statistical analysis methodology, we did 
subject our framework to a more-than-adequate number of cases for utilizing case study 
methodology. 
To be certain, this work makes no claim to offer the "golden bullet" or miracle 
formula for achieving success in future intra-state conflict scenarios. It does however, 
offer an innovative framework allowing for a logical and common sense approach to 
observing, assessing, targeting, and interdicting adversary organizations. Additionally, 
the melding of two academic disciplines in the construction of both the theory and the 
74 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 16. 
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analytic framework, strengthens both the explanatory, predictive, and prescriptive 
qualities encompassed within the body of the work. While we consider this a self-evident 
conclusion based on the detailed findings presented in this chapter, we also feel it 
necessary to address these conclusions with respect to the predictive and prescriptive 
qualities of the theory, as applied against the operational continuum. 
a. Predictive 
The predictive quality of this work comes as a result of its utility as a lens 
for observation and as an analytic tool. When placed under the scrutiny of our 
framework, not only is an organization's past behavior made more understandable, but its 
intentions and goals (hence future behavior), become predictable as well. 
The framework we have constructed allows for a clear understanding of 
the cyclic nature of an organization's life-cycle and provides a finite number of options 
for an organization reacting to a changing environment. Combined with the knowledge 
and familiarity derived from our in-depth analysis, the number of options can be further 
reduced to a highly manageable level. These options, and the behavior associated with 
them, can then be tracked as trends and indicators, and predicted as tendencies. 
An appropriate analogy to the predictive quality of our work, can be seen 
in those activities associated with stock and commodity trading. Analysts and brokers 
have established certain indicators in the "business environment" (interest rates, currency 
exchange rates, etc.) that serve as tripwires for an approaching shift in trends. By 
tracking the effect of these indicators over years of market performance, their 
understanding has been refined to the degree that the effect of a shifting trend on any part 
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of the market, is fairly predictable. This predictability, while far from precise, has shown 
a general utility in terms of market direction and subsequent effects. It is this same 
manner of general predictability that we offer as a result of applying our framework for 
analysis against an organization. 
b. Prescriptive 
The prescriptive qualities of this work are evident throughout and need 
little elaboration. Suffice it to say that resultant from this study, a planner can analyze a 
potential adversary organization, identify its strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities 
and attack it in the most efficient and effective manner possible. 
One aspect of the prescriptive qualities of this work that does beg 
elaboration is its role with respect to the greater strategic-operational-tactical continuum. 
We argue that to achieve the greatest effect in operationalizing this study, it should be 
integrated as part of any logical planning process. Accordingly, we believe it is best used 
to fill the niche between the strategic level analysis offered in Appendix A, and the 
tactical level micro-targeting procedure found in Appendix B. We submit that when 
these processes are performed together, in order, and on a continuing basis, they will 
become an integrated campaign planning tool. 
The final conclusion that comes from this work appropriately concerns the 
practitioner who plans and executes, whether in an emerging -intra-state conflict scenario, 
or in response to a heightened terrorist threat, a counter-organization campaign. Our 
intention throughout this study has been to offer a campaign planning tool that better 
prepares and equips these practitioners. To that end, we have endeavored to create a 
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mechanism by which commanders can seize and retain the initiative in the poorly defined 
battlescape of the future. In so doing , we have also reinforced one of the constructs of a 
path leading to ultimate conflict resolution. 
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APPENDIX A. STRATEGIC/MACRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
The following text appears in the U.S. Army's new Field Manual 100-20-
Stability and Support Operations, as "Appendix C-How to Ana/ize a Society in 
Conflict. It is included in this thesis as an excellent example of a strategic/macro-level 
analysis framework that must be conducted prior to the introduction of U.S. forces in a 
stability and support operation. The resulting products from this analysis would in turn, 
provide the initial database that would drive our operational-level targeting analysis of 
oppositional covert organizations (which is the subject of this thesis), which would finally 
lead to the tactical-level micro-targeting analysis of a specific covert organization's 
ILOC's (the process of which is detailed in Appendix B). Where comment is appropriate, 
we have included (AUTHORS' NOTE:). 
How to Analize a Society in Conflict 
This appendix provides guidance for the analysis of a society in conflict. It 
contains general questions that the analyst must ask. The questions address 
conditions in the whole society. The answers are not simple, and the list of 
questions is not complete. 
The military analyst must analyze a situation in detail. He must understand 
the nature of this complex conflict to determine effective courses of action. 
His analysis must consider the following factors: 
The nature of the society. 
The nature of the conflict. 
The nature of the government. 
The analyst must identify the principal factors for each of these broad 
areas. He must study each in turn. Finally, he must weigh and compare the 
factors in each area and reach conclusions. These conclusions lead to 
development of courses of action. The analyst then predicts the potential 
effects of each possible course of action and selects the best one. 
This guide for analysis is more than just a simple checklist. Each area and 
factor requires detailed study. The process is time-consuming and may require 
additional expertise. 
MISSION ANALYSIS 
Mission analysis requires a concise, yet broad, description of the end state 
to be achieved. The analyst must consider all constraints and restrictions 
151 
affecting mission achievement. Among these are material and human resource 
constraints, as well as the demands of politically active groups in the society. 
The analysis uses assumptions in the absence of facts and replaces them with 
the facts when they become available. 
The depth of analysis required varies by echelon. At national and theater 
levels, great detail is required. It would be useful to contract with a 
university to bring the best minds in the country to focus on the problem. At 
lower echelons, commanders and staff should make use of the work done at higher 
levels, adding depth in areas that particularly concern them. (AUTHORS' NOTE: This 
integrated approach is, as we've shown, a necessary condition for success not to be 
overlooked or taken for granted). 
Nature of the Society 
Social Organization 
1. Identify social groups; for example, race, religion, national origin, 
tribe, economic class, political party, ideology, education level, union 
memberships, management class, armed forces, occupation, and age. 
2. Identify overlaps among classes and the splits within them. Do union 
members belong to one or a few religious or racial groups? Are there 
ideological divisions within a profession? 
3. Identify composite groups based on their political behavior; for example, 
those that actively or passively support the government or the opposition, or 
those which are neutral. Determine the component and composite strength of 
each. 
4. Identify active or potential issues motivating the political behavior of 
each subgroup and group; for example, desire for economic benefits, social 
prestige, political participation, and perception of relative deprivation. 
Determine population growth or decline, age distribution, and changes in 
location by groups. 
Analysis. Determine programs that might accommodate the goals of a plurality 
of the politically active groups. Are these programs within the value systems 
of the opposition or counterinsurgency? 
Conclusion. The analyst must determine which groups and composite groups 
might be motivated to support his position. He should determine which groups 
might be politically neutralized and identify programs acceptable to him that 
might mobilize these groups 
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Economic Organization and Performance 
1. Identify the principal economic ideology governing the society; for 
example, communist, socialist, capitalist, or a mix of these. Determine local 
innovations and departures from this ideology. 
2. Evaluate the economic infrastructure; for example, fuel and mineral 
resource locations; electricity production and distribution; rail, highway, and 
other transport facilities; and postal, telephone, telegraph, and other 
communication networks. (AUTHORS' NOTE: This infrastructure refers to the physical 
network of utilities and communications of a country, which is not the infrastructure we 
refer to in the covert organization). 
3. Evaluate economic performance; for example, gross national product, gross 
domestic product, foreign trade balance, per capita income, inflation rate, and 
annual growth rate. 
4. Evaluate the performance of productive segments of the society; for 
example, agriculture, manufacturing, information, service, transportation, 
mining, and forestry. Determine ownership patterns in each. Are they public or 
private? Are they concentrated or dispersed? 
5. Evaluate public health factors; for example, birth and death rates, 
nutrition, water supply, sanitation, and the availability of health care. 
Identify endemic diseases. 
6. Identify foreign trade patterns; for example, domestic and foreign 
indebtedness (both public and private) and resource dependencies. 
7. Determine the availability of education; for example, its accessibility to 
individuals and groups, and its sufficiency for national needs. Consider 
scientific, technical, professional, and liberal education and crafts training. 
Identify surpluses and shortages of skills in the society. 
8. Identify unemployment, underemployment, and exclusion of groups from 
employment. Identify career mobility, both horizontal and vertical. 
9. Identify taxing authorities, tax rates, and how they are determined. 
10. Evaluate the distribution of economic benefits, occurrence of poverty, 
and concentration of wealth. 
153 
11. Identify population shifts; for example, rural to urban or manufacturing 
to service. Determine their causes and effects. 
Analysis. Correlate the economic factors with social groups and subgroups. 
Determine which groups are favorably and unfavorably affected by each economic 
factor. Identify the economic motives and goals of group behavior. 
Conclusion. The analyst must identify economic programs--consistent with his 
values and resources--which might generate favorable support, stabilize neutral 
groups, or neutralize hostile groups. 
Political Organization and Dynamics 
1. Determine the formal political structure of the government. 
2. Identify the informal structure and compare the two; for example, ask 
whether the government is a dictatorship with only superficial democratic 
characteristics. 
3. Identify legal and illegal political parties. What determines their 
legal status? Do they have reasonable prospects to accede to office? What is 
the program of each? Quantify the strength of each. Which might unite in 
coalitions? 
4. Identify nonparty political organizations; for example, political action 
groups. What issues motivate them? Assess the strength of each organization. 
Which political parties do they support? Does the government regulate these 
organizations? 
5. Identify nonpolitical interest groups; for example, churches, cultural 
and professional organizations, and unions. Do they have interests 
corresponding to parties or to nonparty political organizations? 
6. Identify the mechanism for government succession. Are government offices 
inherited? Does government function by exercise of power or consensus of a 
ruling class or oligarchy? Are elections held regularly? Are the results 
honored? What are the requirements to vote? Does the electoral process 
systematically exclude any groups? Determine which groups, if any, vote as a 
bloc. Does a patron-client relationship determine bloc voting? 
7. Determine if the judiciary is independent. 
8. Determine if government or any other group controls the press. What 
alternatives exist for dissemination of information and opinion? 
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9. Determine if decision making is overcentralized. Determine whether 
individuals and groups can make important decisions for themselves. Determine 
whether government agents at the state or local level can make important 
decisions. Can individuals and groups make their voices heard in policy-making 
councils? 
10. Determine the administrative competence of the bureaucracy. Are 
politicians and civil servants self-serving or corrupt? 
Analysis. Correlate political groups with economic and social groups. 
Determine which subgroups have joined together to form significant political 
forces. Are they favorable or unfavorable to the opposition or are they 
neutral? Identify the political issues motivating the behavior of subgroups and 
groups. 
Conclusion. The analyst must identify political programs that fall within 
his value limits. He must ask which programs might neutralize opposing groups 
or mobilize support from neutral groups. He should identify groups that can 
combine to produce a plurality favorable to the analyst's position. 
History of the Society 
1. Determine the origin of the incumbent government. Does it have a long 
history? Was it elected? Have there been multiple peaceful successions of 
government? Did the government originate in violence? If so, was it by popular 
revolution or coup d'etat? 
2. Determine the history of political violence; for example, is violence a 
common means to resolve political problems? Is there precedent for revolution, 
coups d'etat, or assassination? Does the country have a history of consensus 
building? What is the frequency of violent crime? 
3. Does the present opposition have causes and aspirations in common with 
historic political violence? 
Analysis. Determine the legitimacy of the government. Estimate how 
acceptable violent remedies to political problems are among the people. 
Conclusion. The analyst must determine the type and level of violence 
required. He should determine the type and level of violence the opponents are 
likely to employ. He should identify groups or subgroups which will support the 
use of violence and those which will oppose it. 
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Environment 
1. Determine the density and distribution of population by groups. What is 
the balance between the urban and rural populations? Are there sparsely 
populated areas? Are primary racial, linguistic, or similar groups concentrated 
in specific areas? 
2. Identify distinct geographic regions; for example, mountains, forests, 
plains, deserts, swamps, and coastal lowlands. What are their effects on 
economic and social development? 
3. Identify natural and man-made aids and obstacles to mobility; for 
example, rivers, canals, lakes, roads, railroads, mountains, forests, and urban 
areas. What are their effects on economic development? What are their effects 
on political and social integration? 
4. What are the effects of aids and obstacles to mobility on tactical 
operations? Is heavy equipment road-bound? Are special units required; for 
example, airmobile, riverine, amphibious, or mountain units? What special 
equipment and tactics can overcome geographic limitations? How can off-road 
mobility be enhanced? Are electronic communications masked? How can cover and 
concealment be used to advantage? 
5. Identify climate types by area and season. What are the effects of 
extreme heat, cold, rain, snow, blowing dust, and sand on tactical operations? 
What are their effects on mobility and air operations? Do the seasons dictate 
the timing of operations? How can weather restrictions be used to advantage? 
How can weather obstacles be overcome? 
Analysis. How does the environment affect development programs? Are some 
economic dependencies a result of the weather and terrain? Wha:t are the effects 
of weather and terrain on the organization, equipment, and doctrine of the 
security forces? 
Conclusion. Are development and security programs appropriate to the 
environment? What changes need to be made in plans, organization, and doctrine? 
Nature of the Conflict 
Objectives 
1. What is the desired end state of the opposition? Is it clearly 
formulated? Is it openly articulated? 
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2. Do all elements of the opposition share a common view? 
3. Is the desired end state different from that publicly advocated? 
4. How does the opposition's view of desired social organization differ from 
that of the government? 
Analysis. Identify groups and subgroups that support the general objectives. 
of the opposition, as stated publicly or privately. Identify factions, minority 
views, and dissensions within the opposition regarding all or parts of its 
general program. Identify groups that the opposition may have misled or 
deceived concerning its end-state objectives. Make a similar analysis of groups 
and subgroups supporting the government. 
Conclusion. The analyst should identify objectives of groups supporting the 
government and those supporting the opposition. He must determine which of 
these objectives he can accommodate within his value system as part of a 
preemptive strategy. He should devise programs to lead groups away from the 
enemy toward neutrality or support for the analyst's position. 
Strategy 
1. Determine the strategy used by the opposition (see Chapter 6). Identify 
variations or combinations of the basic models of organization and operation 
employed. Determine whether the opposition has previously shifted from one 
pattern to another or is likely to do so in the future. Determine the balance 
between urban- and rural-based centers of opposition. Does one have primacy 
over the other? 
2. Determine the stage or phase of the opposition. Has it progressed 
through successive stages? Has it regressed to an earlier or simpler stage? Is 
the opposition capable of moving forward or backward from stage to stage? 
3. Is the opposition employing a united front and, if so, with what group? 
What are their common interests and areas of disagreement? 
Analysis. Determine the strategy employed by the opposition. Identify 
leadership, environmental, and geographical factors in the selection of one 
pattern over another. Identify elements within the opposition that disagree 
with the model being used. Determine the ability and propensity of the 
opposition to adopt different organizational and operational patterns. 
Conclusion. The analyst must identify resource, leadership, and 
environmental conditions and requirements that will best enable the opposition 
157 
to accomplish its goals. He must determine whether the opposition needs to 
change organizational and operational patterns, how they should do this, and how 
the government can prevent or limit their freedom to do so. The analyst must 
identify conditions that will permit the opposition to advance to a higher phase 
or stage. He must determine which factors will force the opposition to regress 
to an earlier or simpler stage. 
Leadership 
1. Who are the leaders of the opposition? Is there a single, dominant, 
charismatic leader? 
2. Are the leaders highly dedicated to an ideology? 
3. Are the leaders committed to a specific strategy? Identify differences 
of opinion among leaders regarding purpose and method. 
4. What is the relationship between the leaders and the combat elements? Do 
the leaders participate directly in violence? 
5. Determine the decision-making process in the opposition leadership. Are 
decisions made by a dictator, by consensus, or by democratic participation? 
Analysis. Identify divisions within the leadership. Determine whether rigid 
commitment to a method constitutes vulnerability. Compare the leadership's 
goals and methods with the preferences of major societal groups. Will the 
leadership's methods enhance social mobilization? 
Conclusion. The analyst must determine the political and physical strengths 
and weaknesses of the opposition's leadership, and how an opponent could exploit 
weaknesses to destroy or discredit it. Conversely, he must determine how the 
government's weaknesses are exploited in order to build the opponent's strength. 
Tactics 
1. What are the short-range and long-range tactical objectives? Are they 
designed to apply force decisively at the areas of government weaknesses? (AUTHORS' 
NOTE: We would argue that what is referred here to as "long-range tactical objectives" 
are more correctly termed as campaign objectives). 
2. Identify the primary targets; for example, government organization, 
security forces, or economic infrastructure. 
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3. Identify military tactical doctrine, order of battle, and training, 
morale, and discipline of the regular and part-time combat forces. 
4. Do the tactics make effective use of the terrain and the political 
environment? What is their attitude toward the use of terror? How do they use 
it? 
5. Identify the material resources and determine how they can overcome the 
limitations of these resources. 
Analysis. How can the opposition develop locally superior combat power? How 
can the opposition overcome the government's superior firepower and mobility? 
What intelligence sources and methods does each side use? 
Conclusion. The analyst must determine how the opposition can use terrain, 
offensive actions, surprise, and cross-country mobility to develop locally 
superior combat power. He must identify areas of government and opposition 
weakness. He must determine the political effects of combat tactics and 
countertactics. He must develop courses of action that will optimize the 
political-military coercive power of the analyst's side. He must consider the 
government's superior mechanized mobility, firepower, air power, and numerical 
strength. 
External Support 
1. Identify the sources of external support for the government or the 
opposition; for example, countries, blocs, or nonstate entities (including 
international organizations, ideological groups, religions, terrorist groups, 
and cultural, social, and linguistic groups). 
2. Determine the extent and effectiveness of moral or political support. 
How and by whom is it articulated? What media are used? What are the effects 
of moral and political support? 
3. Identify the sources and amounts of foreign economic support. How is 
money made available; for example, through foreign banks or laundering? 
Is economic support overt or covert? Does it originate with public or private 
sources? What constraints does the supporting entity require? Do they hinder 
operations? 
4. Identify sanctuaries for opposition forces, logistical activities, and 
political and propaganda work. How can sanctuaries be denied? Consider the 
possibilities of political action (boycott, information, or propaganda 
operations). Consider military action (attack, isolation, or interdiction). 
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Identify the land, sea, and air routes to and from sanctuaries. 
5. Identify material support; for example, weapons, equipment, supplies, and 
services provided. 
6. Identify advisory assistance as well as CS and CSS assistance. 
Analysis. Determine the dependency of the government and the opposition on 
external support. What would be the effect of reduction or elimination of this 
support? 
Conclusion. The analyst must develop plans for the reduction or elimination 
of external moral or political support, economic support, or military and 
material support. Conversely, he should determine the means for increasing such 
support. (AUTHORS' NOTE: While many of the same specific topics for analysis that 
we address in our framework are addressed here as well, note that references to specific 
processes to accomplish this analysis are glaringly absent; as is any reference or 
acknowledgement of the "opposition" as an ORGANIZATION. .. ). 
Nature of the Government 
National Strategy 
1. Has the government established a general plan to counter the opposition? 
Does the plan address political, social, and economic issues? Does it correctly 
define the issues? Does it consider all social and political groups and 
subgroups? 
2: Determine the government's organization and methods for the strategic 
planning and execution of its program. Identify areas of strength and weakness. 
Identify resource requirements and constraints. Has the government established 
realistic priorities? 
Analysis. Determine the effect of the government plan on specific groups and 
subgroups. Which will the government's plan mobilize? How can an opponent 
prevent mobilization? Which groups or subgroups are not likely to be satisfied 
by the plan? How can they be mobilized? What is the effect of mobilization by 
the government or the opposition on the political balance? 
Conclusion. The analyst must identify the means by which the government can 
mobilize a favorable political balance through combinations of coercive measures 
and progressive political, social, and economic development. Conversely, he 
should determine what opposition actions might tip the balance in its favor. 
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Coercive Measures 
1. Identify the government's use of populace and resources control. How 
does it affect each social group? How can the opposition turn adverse effects 
to their own advantage? 
2. Determine the organization, equipment, and tactical doctrine of 
government security forces. Are they sufficient? Are they appropriate to the 
environment? Are they appropriate to the nature of the conflict? 
3. What is the effect of government military operations on each group within 
the population? Does the government effectively limit collateral damage to 
people and property? 
4. Does the government maintain the initiative? Can it identify, locate, 
and attack key personnel, installations, and military forces? How does the 
government protect installations and the populace? What is the effect of 
protective measures on the government's ability to take the offensive? Do the 
people provide intelligence to the government and deny it to the opposition? 
Analysis. The analyst must balance the beneficial effects of coercive 
measures against the harm they may do to friendly or neutral groups. 
He must determine the favorable balance between government firepower and 
mobility and its dependence on logistical support and modern lines of 
communication (LOC). Does government firepower cause civilian injury and death, 
thereby undermining popular support? Are government weapons and vehicles 
restricted to roads? 
Conclusion. The analyst must develop plans for populace and resources 
control that will not cost him popular support. How does the government provide 
security for the populace without losing the initiative? 
He must devise tactics to employ superior firepower without incurring 
debilitating dependence on logistical support. He must ask how surprise, 
deception, and restrictive terrain can be used to overcome government firepower, 
armor protection, and air power. He must determine how the government can seize 
and maintain the initiative. 
Balanced Development 
1. Determine prioritized economic programs to mobilize support within key 
subgroups and groups. Determine which groups, if mobilized, will tip the 
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balance of forces. Identify each group's perception of its economic standing. 
To what extent will groups tolerate the postponement of economic programs? How 
can the government or the opposition make economic benefits contingent on 
supportive behavior by affected groups? 
2. Establish feedback mechanisms to determine group reaction to programs. 
How can decision making be decentralized without loss of direction? 
3. Determine social imbalances. Identify the affected groups. Develop 
programs to correct these imbalances. What is the effect of these social 
development programs on other groups? 
4. Identify groups that lack a political voice. How can the government 
accommodate them? How can the opposition accommodate them? 
Analysis. How can the benefits of development be evenly distributed? 
Conclusion. The analyst must identify groups whose change of loyalty will 
affect the balance of forces. He should target those groups for development 
without it having an adverse effect on other key groups. 
Administrative Competence and Efficiency 
1. Determine whether national plans are effectively executed. Identify 
sources of incompetence and corruption. 
2. How is a balance achieved between centralized planning and decentralized 
execution? 
Analysis. Identify corrupt and incompetent officials. How can they be 
reformed or eliminated? Were they appointed by a spoils or patronage system? 
To what levels of government does corruption reach? What would be the effect of 
reform on the structure of government? Identify the source of new leadership. · 
Do artificial barriers exist? For example, does the government require 
unnecessary academic degrees, racial or other social classifications, or 
patronage as a precondition for employment? Are there opportunities for 
vertical mobility by merit? Are the most competent people concentrated at 
higher levels of government? 
Conclusion. Determine the means for equitable distribution of competent 
leaders at all levels of government. Determine whether material and symbolic 
rewards are adequate. Are talent and initiative frustrated? What psychological 
and tactical opportunities does government incompetence and inefficiency provide 
to the opposition? 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND COURSES OF ACTION 
The analyst must now consider the separate analyses of the society, the 
opposition, and the government together. His conclusions must reflect the 
interaction of all factors. The analyst must determine the dynamics with which 
each side attempts to mobilize human and material resources in its favor. These 
dynamics affect specific groups of people. The analysis identifies issues that 
concern key political, social, and economic groups. The government and 
opposition offer solutions to the people's problems and attempt to deliver on 
their promises, within resource constraints. Measured combinations of benefits, 
persuasion, and coercion motivate groups to conform their behavior to the will 
of the government or the opposition. 
Conclusions lead to courses of action. Whether the analyst supports either 
side or is a neutral third party, he must determine what is necessary to--
1. Mobilize a plurality of societal groups to provide active or tacit support. 
2. Neutralize opposition groups. (AUTHORS' NOTE: This is where our thesis 
ties in to help develop both the counter-organization, and overall campaign plan). 
3. Prevent unaligned groups from supporting the opposition. 
Whether he is an observer or a direct or an indirect participant in this 
struggle, the analyst must keep his courses of action in balance. He must 
consider the effect of each course of action on each societal group. 
Frequently, a benefit to one group will have a negative effect on another. He 
must consider all groups and neglect none. He must assign priorities to groups 
in proportion to their importance in achieving a favorable balance of forces. 
If the analyst is a supporter of either side, he must consider using coercive 
measures against those groups implacably committed to the opposition. He should 
recommend using a degree of violence appropriate to the nature of the groups' 
involvement in the conflict. He may recommend an attack on the enemy's main 
combat forces with all available military resources. He may recommend the 
neutralization of passive supporters by close observation and movement control. 
He concedes no group permanently to the enemy. He holds open the option that a 
group will defect to his ranks. In general, he should select courses of action 
that hold the greatest promise of mobilizing groups to his side and the least 
risk of driving groups into the enemy's camp. 
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APPENDIX B. TACTICAL-LEVEL MICRO-TARGETING PROCEDURE 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide the practitioner and planner a tactical-
level organizational sub-structure targeting procedure. In so doing, we establish the final 
link in the strategic-operational-tactical continuum. 
A. ROLE OF TACTICAL TARGETING 
Tactical targeting is the final step prior to bringing actual force to bear against an 
adversary organization. At the tactical level, commanders frequently encounter a classic 
cost-benefit scenario when planning operations. At its simplest, it is a question of "How 
much of my resource pool will I deplete in achieving an objective, and then having 
achieved that objective, will I have damaged my adversary to a relatively greater degree 
than I have damaged myself?" To take the guesswork out of this process, a procedure for 
analyzing potential targets against an established criteria is a must. While tactical target 
analysis is not a new process (we have borrowed heavily from pre-existing tactical 
frameworks), applying it from an organizational perspective is; and the one we offer is a 
logical evolution from the operational level of analysis offered within the body of this 
thesis. 
B. TACTICAL TARGETING METHODOLOGY 
The tactical targeting methodology we propose consists of two elements. The first 
element calls for a distillation of background information that is gleaned from the 
operational level analysis resultant from our framework, and a "ground-truth" assessment 
of factors influencing the variables comprising our analytic framework. To facilitate the 
ground-truth assessment, we have provided a series of questions that allow the tactical 
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level analyst to refine the pre-existing analysis and targeting plan to a finer, more detailed 
level. While this aspect is initially time consuming, it should be considered time 
invested, rather than lost. 
The second element of the methodology requires the tactical level analyst to apply 
the results from the ground-truth analysis against a targeting analysis matrix. While the 
results of the tactical analysis actually identifies targets, thus refining the generic action 
plans, these targets must now be evaluated against a standard targeting matrix. The 
matrix we offer, a revision of the U.S. Army's Special Forces Demolition Target 
Analysis, is the final analytical step in the process and allows commanders to make 
informed, logical decisions concerning the allocation of their assets. 
1. Background and Assessment 
The structure for the tactical assessment follows the framework offered in Figure 
2-3. While many of the questions we ask at the tactical level are also appropriate for 
operational level analysis, the responses may in fact show variance and a more finite 
resolution when viewed from a tactical perspective. 
a. Identify Mission Goal of the Organization 
• What final outcome does the organization want? Expect? Settle for? 
• What does the organization's propaganda say? 
• What does the organization's strategy appear to be? 
• What is the power status quo in the organization? 
b. Identify Core Technology of the Organization 
• What are the organization's endogenous sources for personnel, 
weapons, and sustenance? 
• Does the organization receive exogenous support? From whom? What 
type? How strong is the coupling? 
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• Is support centralized or decentralized? 
• Is production centralized or decentralized? 
• Does production occur in a certain region? Inside or outside of the 
host nation? 
• What types of outputs are produced? 
• What types of operations haveoccurred/are occurringg? 
• What are the organization's estimated consumption rates? (As 
determined by tons of food, number of casualties, etc.). 
c. Identify Organization Ideology 
• What is the source of the organization's core system of beliefs 
(political, ethnic, religious, or societal)? 
• If political, what is the organizations platform? Is there an overt wing? 
• If societal, where are the lines of distinction (clan, tribal, caste)? 
• If ethnic, what is the diversity and demographics? 
• If religious, is the organization fundamentalist, reformist, apocalyptic? 
d. Identify Attributes of the Organization Personality 
• Who are the people who comprise the organization? 
• What ethnic, political, or religious cleavages exist in the society as a 
whole? 
• What are the important traditions and symbols for the organization? 
• How do politics work in the host nation? 
• What form of leadership does the organization have (charismatic, 
autocratic, democratic, etc.)? 
• How old is the organization? 
• What sort of challenges has it survived? 
Having established a tactical view of the "playing field," the commander is now in 
a position to determine the adequacy of the target sets offered in the generic action plan. 
This determination is based on the use of the tactical analysis in assigning values or 
scores to the ILOC's comprising each sub-system. 
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2. CARVER-RIME Matrix 
CARVER-RIME is the acronym used to identify the components of our targeting 
matrix. The purpose of this matrix is to allow for a comparison of sub-systems against a 
standardized criteria. These criteria, which make up the components of the matrix are 
defined as follows: 
• Criticality- The degree to which a target's destruction or neutralization will 
influence the organization's ability to conduct operations. 
• Accessibility- The ease with which a target can be interdicted, either by direct 
or indirect means. 
• Recuperability- The amount of time an organization will require to recover 
from the damage or destruction of a particular target. 
• Vulnerability- The degree to which a target is exposed, relative to the means 
and expertise possessed by friendly forces which enable them to successfully 
attack the target. 
• Effect- The results, both positive and negative, of a successful attack against a 
target. While positive results may be observed in a diminished capability for 
the organization, negative results, in the form of reprisals, terrorism, or other 
reactions must be considered. 
• Recognizability- The ease by which a target can be positively identified. 
Against fixed installations this is a relatively simple component when 
compared to individuals comprising an organizations strategic apex. 
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• Redundancy- The degree or depth to which target functions are duplicated 
within an organization. Much like a depth chart on a sports team. Highly 
redundant targets will have an impact on recuperability as well. 
• Isolatability- The degree to which a target sub-system can be segregated from 
other organization systems which can either support or absorb it during 
periods of volatility. 
• Mutability- The degree to which an organization or target sub-system will 
likely restructure itself if threatened. 
• Exploitability- The degree to which a target's destruction or damage will 
cause the organization to expose more sub-systems as potential targets. 
Many of the components of CARVER-RIME offer obvious units of measure. 
For instance, recuperability can be scored in terms of time as measured by hours, days, 
weeks, or even months. Other components lend themselves to a subjective (albeit highly 
informed), scaled numeric rating. A rating of this type might score a component such as 
redundancy as a seven on a scale of one to ten. While either of these techniques is 
acceptable, they, like most techniques, are inconsequential. The most important aspect of 
conducting the tactical targeting analysis is consistency. Stated bluntly, all components 
must be measured against each target presented in an absolutely identical manner, 
utilizing the same unit of measure. 
To determine which sub-system(s) to concentrate targeting on, an analysis matrix 
would be performed first comparing each major functional sub-system of the covert 
organization (i.e., personnel, intelligence, operations, training, logistics, transportation, 
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communication, etc ... ). Once the decisive sub-system(s) is/are identified, a micro-
analysis is performed to determine critical ILOC nodes. The matrix in Table B. I depicts 
a CARVER-RIME matrix for a specific sub-system. When placed into operation, each 
numbered ILOC would be replaced by a potential target, and the analytic scoring would 
fill the descending vertical boxes. 
SUB-SYSTEM: ILOC-1: ILOC-2: ILOC-3: 
(Communications, 











Table B.l. The CARVER-RIME Matrix. 
The strength of this targeting system is that it allows analysis and prioritization of 
identified ILOC's of each sub-system with respect to time and assets available. The 
system also allows the tactical commander the flexibility to address ILOC's relevant to 
the overall campaign goals. It is these goals, influenced by host nation wishes, U.S. 
policy, and various other constraints, that provide the principal control over the conduct 
and manner of tactical operations on the ground. 
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APPENDIX C. MIDDLE EAST EVENTS/ANO ACTIVITIES 
CHRONOLOGY 
MIDDLE EAST EVENTS 
May- Four terrorists from Black September group seize Sabena jet; killed by Israeli 
paratroopers. 
In retaliation, three Japanese terrorists allied with PFLP attack Lod airport; kill 
twenty-four. 
September- Eight Palestinian terrorists attack Israeli Olympic team in Munich, killing 
two and seizing nine hostages. Hostages along with five Palestinians killed in exchange 
with German police. 
December- Members of Black September seize Israeli Embassy in Bangkok; hostages 
eventually released unharmed. 
1973 
February-Israeli fighters down Libyan Airlines airliner; kills 104. 
April-Israeli hit team assassinates three high-ranking PLO Fatah officials in Beirut; 
Lebanese government falls. 
July-Israeli hit team looking for a Black September-commander mistakenly kill a 
Moroccan waiter in Lilehammer, Norway. Trial follows and exposes Israeli 
counter-terrorist efforts. 
October-Israel surprised by joint Egyptian/Syrian/Jordanian attack during Yom Kippur 
holiday; narrowly averts defeat. 
1974 
October-Arafat denounces use of terrorism; Abu Nidal tried in absentia and sentenced to 
death. 
1975 
April-PLO/Christian civil war begins in Lebanon. 
1978 
March-Israel begins Operation Litani and invades southern Lebanon; drives PLO north 
to Beirut. 
1979 
January-Ali Hassan Salameh, head of PLO Force 17 and mastermind of Munich 
Olympics mission, is killed in Beirut by an Israeli car bomb. 
Shah of Iran flees into exile. 
Ayatollah Khomeini takes power. 
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November-Iranian militants overrun U.S. Embassy in Tehran and seize sixty-three 
embassy personnel as hostages (this ordeal would last 444 days). 
1980 
April-Attempted hostage rescue by U.S. forces fails. 
1981 
January-American hostages released as Ronald Reagan is sworn in as President. 
1982 
June-(6)-Israellaunches Operation Peace for Galilee into Lebanon in an attempt to 
dislodge and destroy the PLO. 
(9)-Israel destroys Syria's air defense system in Bekaa Valley. 
( 13 )-Siege of Beirut begins. 
September-PLO in Beirut (over 10,000 guerrillas) are shipped out of Lebanon. 
Israeli protege' Bashir Gemayel, president of Lebanon, is assassinated (Syrian complicity 
susp.ected). 
As retribution, Christian militiamen raid Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila 
and kill over 1,000 Palestinians as Israeli soldiers look on. 
1983 
April-U.S. Embassy in Beirut is blown up by suicide bomber in a truck bomb. 
August-Due to mounting opposition at home and increasing casualties, Israel's Prime 
Minister, Menachem Begin resigns. 
October-Factional fighting and clashes with Israeli troops leave thousands of Lebanese 
civilians dead or displaced. U.S. criticized for supporting Israel. 
U.S. Marine compound in Beirut is destroyed by suicide truck bomber killing 241 
Marines. 
December-U.S. retaliates against Syrian-backed factions with air strikes and naval 
gunfire. Eight more Marines are KIA and two aircraft are shot down. 
1984 
March-Beirut CIA station chief William Buckley is kidnaped by Shi'ite militants. Killed 
later in June. 
April-President Reagan signs bill authorizing reprisals against terrorists. 
Britain breaks off diplomatic ties with Libya after British policewoman is shot during 
demonstration in London by Libyan gunman. 
1985 
February-Israeli army units raid Lebanese villages near Tyre destroying homes and 
killing and wounding many civilians. 
March-Large car bomb explodes in Beirut killing eighty people. Explosion was near the 
residence of Hizballah's "spiritual guide" Sheikh Fadlallah. CIA-trained and funded 
covert action team was implicated in the operation. 
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Israeli army units raid southern Lebanese villages killing and wounding many civilians. 
June-TWA airliner hijacked by Shi'ite militants and fly back and forth between Algiers 
and Beirut. Hijackers kill a U.S. Navy diver and demand the release of imprisoned 
Lebanese held in Israel. 
September-Israeli agents intercept boat in international waters off Cyprus and kidnap 
Faisal Abu Sharah, a senior commander in the PLO security unit Force 17. Sharah is 
taken back to Israel for interrogation and imprisonment. 
In retaliation for Israel's actions, a Force 17 team boards a yacht near Cyprus and kills 
three Israeli civilians (claimed to be Mossad agents). 
October-In retaliation for the murder of the three Israeli's, Israel mounts an air attack on 
PLO headquarters in Tunis killing seventy-one and wounding 100+. Arafat narrowly 
escapes death. 
In retaliation for air raid, members of the extremist PLF group hijack the Italian cruise 
ship Achille Lauro and murders a handicapped American Jew on board. 
1986 
January-Italy issues an international arrest warrant for Abu Nidal in connection with the 
Rome attack. He is sentenced in absentia to life in prison. 
PLO chairman Arafat again condemns the use of all forms of terrorism. 
February-Qaddafi holds a terrorist conference in Tripoli to prepare for action against the 
U.S. in case of attack. 
Israeli jets intercept Libyan executive jet returning Syrian delegation from conference. 
Delegation is escorted to Israel. Reports that Abu Nidal was aboard proved false. 
March-Car bomb in Damascus is blamed on Israeli/CIA agents. 
U.S. naval task force begins freedom of navigation exercises in the disputed waters of 
the Gulf of Sidra. Attacks Libyan missile sites and ships when fired upon by Libyan 
aircraft. 
April-TWA jetliner en route from Rome to Athens has hole blown in section of fuselage 
from bomb in luggage. Four Americans are sucked out of aircraft but it is able to land 
safely in Athens. 
Bomb rips through La Belle discotheque, a club frequented by U.S. servicemen in Berlin. 
One soldier and one civilian are killed; over 200 wounded. U.S. claims evidence points 
to Libyan involvement. 
U.S. aerial strike force attacks targets in Libya in retaliation to La Belle bombing. 
Qaddafi barely escapes death. 
In response to the U.S. attack, extremists in Lebanon execute three western hostages. 
Security guards stop bombing of an El AI airliner at London s Heathrow Airport. Nizar 
Hindawi, a Syrian agent, is arrested after implicating Syrian intelligence (paid for by 
Libya). 
October-Hindawi is sentenced by a British court to forty-five years in jail; the longest 
sentence handed-down in British history. Britain breaks formal diplomatic relations with 
Syria. 
November-First published report of the U.S. arms-for-hostages deal with Iran appears in 
a Beirut newspaper. 
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1987 
December-Intifada begins in Occupied Territories. 
1988 
Iran/Iraq war threatens Persian Gulf oil shipping. U.S. reflags Kuwaiti tankers and naval 
warships patrol the Gulf. 
June-Iraqi fighter mistakenly targets USS Stark in Gulf with an Exocet missile. 
July-USS Vincennes mistakenly shoots down an Iranian Airbus, killing all290 on board. 
1989 
The fall of the Soviet Union and the entire Eastern Bloc effectively end their sponsorship, 
funding, training, and political protection of terrorist organizations worldwide. 
1990 
· August-Iraq invades and occupies Kuwait over disputed land and oil rights. U.S. 
responds by forming international coalition against Saddam Hussein. Operation Desert 
Shield begins in Saudi Arabia. 
June-U.S. military barracks in Saudi Arabia is destroyed by a 5000 gallon fuel tanker 
truck bomb. 
July-TWA jumbo jet explodes shortly after takeoff from Kennedy Airport in New York. 
All230 passengers and crew are killed. Either bomb or missile is suspected. No group 
claims responsibility. 
August-Israel restarts settlement projects in Palestinian-controlled areas in violation of 
negotiated agreements. Arafat calls the moves totally unacceptable. 
1991 
January(15)-Deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait passes. President George Bush 
orders ground attack, Operation Desert Storm to begin. Iraq is invaded and cease-fire 
ordered within 100 hours. 
October-U.S./Former Soviet Union host the Madrid Conference for Mideast peace. 
1992 
June-Israeli government changes; Yitzak Rabin is elected Prime Minister. Peace 
negotiations continue. 
November-U.S. President Bush is defeated by Bill Clinton in national election. 
1993 
February-Bombing of World Trade Center in New York leaves eighteen dead, hundreds 
injured. Suspected mastermind Ramzi Ahmed Y ousef linked to militant Egyptian 
Muslim cleric Abd al-Rahman, suspected of involvement in assassination of Anwar 
Sadat. 
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September-After a series of secret negotiations, Israel-PLO sign Declaration of 
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements in Washington. 
1994 
July-King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel sign Washington 
Declaration, ending the state of war between the two countries. 
Y asir Arafat returns to the Gaza Strip and establishes the Palestinian Authority (P A) as a 
step in the transition to self-rule. 
1995 
February-Ramzi Yousef is arrested and extradited to the U.S. to face charges of planning 
the World Trade Center bombing, as well as an alleged scheme in conjunction with 
Filipino Muslim groups to blow up U.S. airliners over the Pacific. 
June-Gunmen attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during his visit 
to Ethiopia. Gunmen flee to Sudan. 
July-Senior Hamas official Musa Abu Marzuq was detained while trying to enter the U.S. 
in New York. Israel seeks extradition. 
October-Shaykh Abd al-Rahman and co-conspirators were convicted in New York of 
bombing the World Trade Center and plotting to blow up the United Nations, the New 
York FBI Building, and the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels. 
November-Hamas military wing commander and master bomb-maker, Yahya Ayyash, 
alias the engineer, is assassinated in Gaza. Israeli Shin Bet is suspected, along with PA 
complicity. 
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin is assassinated by a radical right-wing Jew. Shimon Peres 
takes over. 
Terrorists bomb headquarters of the Office of the Program Manager/Saudi Arabian 
National Guard in Riyadh. Kills seven (five U.S.) And wounds forty-two. 
1996 
February-Hamas conducts suicide bombing campaign inside Israel allegedly in 
retaliation for the killing of Ayyash. Peres government under increasing pressure to act. 
May-By the narrowest of margins, Peres loses election to conservative candidate 
Benjamin Netanyahu who is elected Prime Minister. 
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ABU NIDAL MAJOR ACTIVITIES 
1973 
Abu Nidal is PLO representative in Baghdad. Secretly begins organizing ANO with Iraqi 
backing. 
October-ANO's first attempt on Arafat's life; PLO Treasurer killed instead. 
November-KLM airliner hijacked to Malta. Passengers/crew released; hijackers land in 
Syria. 
1974 
October-Abu Nidal makes formal break from Fatah; sentences Arafat to death in return; 
attempt on Arafat's life fails, as does attempt on Arafat confidant Abbas. 
November-BEA airliner hijacked and diverted to Tunis. One fatality. Passengers/crew 
released while hijackers continue on to Libya. 
1976 
September-Attack Semiramis Hotel in Damascus. 
October-Attack Syrian embassies in Pakistan & Rome. 
November-Attack Intercontinental Hotel in Amman, Jordan. 
December-Attempted attack on Syrian embassy in Turkey fails; Attempted assassination 
on Syrian foreign minister fails. 
1977 
October-Second attempt to kill Syrian foreign minister at Abu Dhabi airport; UAE 
foreign minister accidentally killed. 
November-Assassinated director of Arab Library in Paris. 
1978 
January-PLO representative in London, Sa'id Hammarni (a PLO moderate) assassinated. 
February-Senior Egyptian journalist and director of the Afro-Asian Solidarity 
Committee assassinated in Cyprus. 
April-Abu Nidal sends 130 of his best fighters from the People's Army to join forces with 
Fatah and fight the Israeli's. Arafat suspects a plot and has all guerrillas arrested. Abu 
Nidal is enraged ... 
June-PLO representative in Kuwait assassinated. 
August-PLO representative (and moderate) in Paris assassinated. 
PLO representative in Pakistan narrowly escapes assassination attempt; four others are 
killed. 
1979 
June-Assassinate former ANO member Muhammad Arif. 
November-Attempt assassination of Israeli Ambassador to Portugal; bodyguard is 
wounded instead. 
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Attempted attack on a Jewish conference being held at the Peter Hotel in Salzburg, 
Austria. 
1980 
January-Assassinate director of the Arab Library in Paris. 
April-Attempt assassination of PLO intelligence and security chief Abu Iyad in Belgrade. 
July-Attack on children at Agudath Israel school for Jewish children in Antwerp. 
Attempted attack on El AI airliner in Brussels. 
Assassinated Israeli Commercial Attache' in Brussels. 
October-Bombing of Rue Copernic synagogue in Paris .. 
1981 
May-Assassination of Viennese City Councilman Heinz Nittel and threatens life of 
Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. 
June-Assassinates PLO representative (and moderate) in Brussels. 
July-Attempted assassination on Fatah guerrilla commander Abu Dawud in Warsaw, 
Poland. 
August-Attack on Vienna synagogue; kills two, wounds seventeen. 
September-Bomb attack on Shoham-Zim offices in Cyprus; five wounded. 
October-Bomb attack on Abu Sharar, spokesman for PLO Unified Information Office 
and member of the Fatah Central Committee; successful. 
Attempted assassination of PLO representative to Libya in Malta; another man killed by 
mistake. 
1982 
June-(3)-Shlomo Argov, Israeli Ambassador to Great Britain is shot and wounded in 
assassination attempt in London. 
August-Attack on restaurant in Jewish quarter of Paris leaves six dead, twenty-two 
wounded. 
September-Assassinated the first secretary of Kuwaiti embassy in Madrid, Spain. 
Attacks synagogue in Brussels. 
October-Attacks synagogue in Rome killing one, wounding ten. 
Begins to Transition ANO out of Iraq and into Syria. 
1983 
April-ANO claims responsibility for killing PLO's roving European ambassador, Issam 
Sartawi while attending Socialist Congress in Portugal. 
June-Attempted assassination of Fatah official in Barcelona. 
August-Egyptian cell broken up by police while planning attacks against Israeli and Fatah 
targets. 
September-Gulf Air (UAE) airliner blown up by bomb killing all122 people on board. 
October-Now fully transitioned and working for Syria, ANO begins a two year terrorist 
campaign against Jordan to prevent King Hussein from negotiating peace with Israel. 
177 
Attempts to kill Jordan's ambassadors in Italy and India. One wounded (India). 
November-Attacks Jordanian Embassy in Athens killing one guard while wounding 
another. 
December-Bomb attack against French Cultural Center in Izmir, Turkey. 
1984 
February-Implicated in murder of UAE Ambassador to France. 
March-Explodes bomb in hotel in Amman, Jordan, two days prior to a planned visit by 
Queen Elizabeth. 
Assassinates deputy director of the British Council from the British Embassy, Kenneth 
Whitty, in Greece. 
May-Abu Nidal meets Colonel Qaddafi in Libya and agrees to do contract work for 
Libya. 
September-Assassinate PLO representative in Bucharest, Romania (gunmen escaped). 
November-Assassinate Britain's deputy high commissioner in Bombay, Percy Norris. 
Bombs Beirut office of British Airways. 
1985 
Abu Nidal opens up operations in Libya and gradually breaks away from Syria. 
March-British journalist Alec Collet is kidnaped by front organization for ANO. 
May-Egyptian police arrest ANO agent who was targeting U.S. Embassy in Cairo for a 
truck bomb attack. 
July-British Airways office in Madrid is destroyed by a bomb blast. 
August-A bomb attack on a hotel in the resort of Glyfada outside of Athens injures 
thirteen. 
September-Grenade attack on the Cafe' de Paris in Rome injures forty people. 
Jordanian journalist and avid Arafat supporter Michel Nimri is assassinated. 
November-AND terrorists hijack an Egyptian airliner and force it to fly to Malta. 
Hijackers kill six passengers before an Egyptian commando unit storms the aircraft. 
Sixty passengers are killed as a result of the assault and the ensuing fires caused by it. 
December-AND squad attacks El AI ticket counters at Leonardo Da Vinci Airport in 
Rome while another squad simultaneously assaults counters at Schwechat Airport in 
Vienna. Eighteen dead and 110 wounded between the two before the attackers are either 
killed or wounded. 
1986 
February-France releases ANO members responsible for murder of PLO representative 
in Paris in August, 78 are released on probation. Deal between ANO/France suspected. 
April-Abu Nidal involvement suspected in both the TWA and the La Belle disco 
bombings. 
Attack against an Israeli bus in the West Bank. One killed. 
Abu Nidal traced to supplying the explosives for Hindawi' s failed bombing of El AI 
airliner in London. 
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ANO front organization executes hostage British journalist Alec Collett in retaliation for 
Britain s complicity in U.S. air strike on Libya. 
August-ANO front organization on Cyprus conducts rocket and mortar attack on British 
base. No fatalities. 
September-ANO hijackers seize Pan Am jumbo jet with 358 people on board in Karachi. 
Pakistani troops assault the aircraft and seventeen people are killed, 150 wounded during 
the course of the shoot out. 
ANO gunmen attack the Neve Shalom Synagogue in Istanbul, Turkey. Twenty-one 
worshipers are killed. 
October-Britain expels six known ANO members from the country. 
1987 
]une-ANO is kicked out of Syria; Abu Nidal breaks completely from Syria and works 
solely for Libya. 
July-Bombing of restaurant in the West Bank city of Qalqilya wounds seventeen. 
During 1987, Abu Nidal allegedly sentenced over 600 of his own people to death as 
traitors to the organization. 
1988 
Abu Nidal continues purge of his own organization and has some of his most trusted 
leaders killed. Others defect before they are killed. 
March-Alltalia airline crew is attacked on a commuter bus in Bombay, India; one 
wounded. 
May-Detonated a car bomb near the Israeli Embassy in Nicosia, Cyprus; three dead, 
seventeen wounded. 
Two targets in the Sudan attacked simultaneously; total of eight dead, twenty-one 
wounded. 
Belgian doctor kidnaped in southern Lebanon. 
July-Assault team attacks the Greek cruise ship City of Poros; nine killed, eighty 
wounded. On same day, ANO assault team leader Samih Khudr was killed by car bomb 
intended for cruise ship. 
1989 
Purges continue within ANO; massive reorganization occurs throughout. 
1990 
March-Attacks and wounds a senior dissident in Algeria. 
Reportedly fearful of U.S. retaliation, Libya's Qaddafi keeps Abu Nidal under house 
arrest. ANO performs no terrorist acts in support of Iraq during entire GulfWar. 
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1991 
January(l3)-Bodyguard (working deep cover for ANO) of PLO chief of security Abu 
Hol and PLO chief of intelligence (and long-time enemy of Abu Nidal) Abu Iyad, 
assassinates both in Tunis. 
December-Ibrahim-Mohammed Khaled, sole ANO survivor of ANO attack at Rome 
airport in 1985, is captured by Italian authorities. Agrees to cooperate and describes 
organization and functioning of ANO. 
1992 
January-Former member Samir Hammouda is assassinated in Lebanon. 
April-Attempted assassination of Fatah commander of forces in Tyre, Lt. Col. Ainain. 
June-Assassinates Atef Bseiso, chief of Fatah intelligence in Paris. 
Assassinates Lt. Col. Anwar Madi, top Fatah officer in Lebanon. 
October-Assassinates Mohammad Houbeish, a former ANO member and Fatah 
commander in Tyre. 
Assassinates three Fatah officials, bodyguard, and a civilian at a cafe in Sidon. Attack 
came hours after bomb blast destroys an ANO official s car. 
December-Two ANO members are killed as they attempt to plant explosives in order to 
kill Fatah Lt. Col. Sufyan, also a former ANO member. Later, a Fatah member is killed 
by ANO members. 
Third attempt to assassinate Fatah Lt. Col. Ainain fails when bomb planted in Rashidayah 
refugee camp explodes but misses Ainain s passing convoy. Twenty civilians wounded in 
blast. 
1993 
February-Fatah activist Yousif Mansour is assassinated in Sidon. 
March-Mouin Shabaytah, Fatah stop official in Lebanon, is assassinated in Sidon. 
April-Assassinates Lt. Col. Salim, Fatah's top official in Beirut. 
In the United States, the FBI breaks up ANO cell (Isa, Musa, Nijmah) organizing in the 
Midwest. FBI had been tracking cell s movements/activities since 1986. Cell planned to 
kill Jews and blow up the Israeli Embassy. 
Fatah declares open war against ANO. Accuses Lebanon and Syria of providing aid to 
ANO. 
Assassinates Dr. Ibrahim Turkiyah, Fatah regional commander for southern Lebanon. 
Assassinates Y ahya Nabl al.Masri, Fatah head of Shabriha refugee camp near Tyre. 
Faction led by Abdul Karim al-Barna splits from ANO in dispute over the targeting of 
moderate Palestinians. 
June-Fatah releases fifty-two ANO members in southern Lebanon who had previously 
been convicted of terrorism. 
July-Barna claims ANO is too weak to resume activities and has been expelled from 
Algeria, Libya, and Sudan, and no longer has any political or organizational existence. 
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1994 
January-Jordanian diplomat Naeb Omran Maaytah is Assassinated in Beirut. Killers 
remove sensitive documents from body. 
February-During Nonaligned Summit being held in India, security forces capture ANO 
cell attempting to assassinate key officials at meeting. 
July-Yussef Shaaban, a Palestinian follower of Abu Nidal, claims responsibility for the 
destruction of PanAm Flight 103, destroyed over Scotland in 1988. Many feel Qadaffi is 
behind the claim. Motive unknown. 
1995 
January-President Clinton orders a freeze on the U.S. assets of twelve Mideast groups 
that could disrupt the peace process; Abu Nidal is specifically named. 
February-A man believed to be Mahmoud Khaled Eintour (Abu Ali Majed), one of 
ANO s top assassins, is arrested in Sidon. 
August-ANO accused by Lebanese Fatah faction of assassinating Shaykh Nizar al-
Halabi, chairman of the Islamic Charitable Projects Society in Beirut. 
November-Five suspected ANO members are arrested by PA security attempting to 
infiltrate into Gaza via Egypt. Linked to plan to assassinate Arafat. 
1996 
January-PA security chief Aminal-Hindi announces the capture of ANO cell in Gaza 
that was allegedly preparing to wage a terror campaign by assassinating top PA officials 
and bombing schools. Large quantities of weapons and explosives were seized. 
Recent reports indicate that ANO is attempting to establish closer contact with Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. Continuing relationship with Iraq. 
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